How solid is solidity? An in-dept study of solidity’s type safety. by Di Pirro, Matteo
Universita` degli Studi di Padova
DIPARTIMENTO DI MATEMATICA “TULLIO
LEVI-CIVITA”
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN INFORMATICA
How Solid is Solidity?
An In-dept Study of Solidity’s Type Safety
Master thesis
Supervisor
Prof. Silvia Crafa
Author
Matteo Di Pirro
SEPTEMBER 2018
Matteo Di Pirro:
How Solid is Solidity?
An In-dept Study of Solidity’s Type Safety,
Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Informatica, c© September 2018
Dedicated to my family,
for their love and endless support

Abstract
Blockchain has evolved a lot in the last years: one of the most important features
is the possibility, for mutually untrusted parties, to interact with one another without
relying on a third party trusted entity. This interaction is made possible by the so-called
smart contracts, passive arbitrary programs executed in a decentralized network and
usually manipulating money. One of the main platforms in this sense is Ethereum, and
a number of programming languages exist in its ecosystem, all with points of strength
and flaws. Of these, the most widely used is for sure Solidity. In spite of its high
potential, repeated security concerns have undercut the trust in this way of handling
money. Bugs and undesired behaviors are worsened by the impossibility of patching a
contract once it is deployed on the blockchain. As a consequence, many analysis tools
have been developed by researchers. However, those operating on Solidity lack a real
formalization of the core of this language.
We aim to fill the gap with Featherweight Solidity (FS). To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first calculus including the semantics as well as the type system.
Thanks to it, we proved the theorem of Type Safety for Solidity (claimed in the official
documentation, although not supported by any public proof). We also formalized, and
proved, an extended Type Safety statement addressing groups of transactions. Dur-
ing this process, we found out that Solidity’s type system is far from being safe with
respect to any type of error: in many occasions, contract interfaces are not consulted
at compile-time, and this makes the execution raise an exception and the user waste
money. Sometimes, in particular when transferring money from one party to another,
exceptions can be avoided by simply looking at, at compile-time, contract interfaces.
We also propose an extension of the type system, FS+, that targets this undesired
behavior. We prove that Type Safety is maintained, but we formalize additional the-
orems stating new safety properties, too. In particular, but not only, FS+ statically
detects, and consequently rules out, ill-formed money transfers made by means of the
Solidity’s built-in transfer function. We compared it with Solidity, and showed that
including this extension does not change radically the way of writing smart contracts,
whereas it makes them much safer.
FS has its limitations, and some aspects of Solidity have not been modeled yet,
but we believe that this first attempt of formalization could trace an important path to
further investigate new language features and contracts vulnerabilities.

The future belongs to those who
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Blockchain technology was proposed to support financial transactions in the Bitcoin
[34] system, but it has grown a lot over the last few years. In fact, it has become in-
creasingly important in many industries, thanks to the possibility of executing Turing-
complete programs that store their results on the history of the blockchain. For exam-
ple, mutually untrusted parties may transfer money to one another without relying on
a centralized third party. These programs are often referred to as smart contracts, and
Solidity is one of the main languages used nowadays to implement them. It is compiled
down into bytecode running on an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [53], the running
environment for the Ethereum [9] blockchain.
However, this new class of programs poses a number of new criticalities: in fact,
smart contracts are used not only for industrial applications, but also in critical do-
mains, such as intelligent transportation systems [54] [46], insurance and energy in-
dustry [16], smart cities [38], and health care [5]. For these reasons, it is highly impor-
tant to provide additional guarantees on their execution. For example, Solidity states
that it is a type-safe language, but no public proof is provided to support such a claim,
and, even worse, no precise statement of what “type-safe” means in this context has
been made. Consequently, no guarantees are given on the execution of smart contracts.
Bearing in mind that they can manipulate billions of dollars, this is particularly unde-
sirable. The recent history is full of examples of contracts not executing as expected,
exploited, or blocking money due to a clumsy implementation [18] [20]. Furthermore,
Solidity let programmers use harmful primitives, such as delegatecall or inline
assembly, that work around the type system, making the former safety totally useless.
Clearly, Solidity’s security aspects had not received much attention initially, until
the first bugs and issues arose. After that, a number of analysis tools have been devel-
oped, but none of them relies on a sound formalization of the language. In this work,
we seek to set a milestone in the formal aspect of defining smart contracts. Our aim is
two-fold. First, we strive to provide a full and sound formalization of the core part of
Solidity, in order to study its type safety. Then, we want to use such formalization to
investigate on the unexpected behaviors, looking for a way to avoid them.
Many attempts of formalizing the EVM have been made in the recent years [23]
[4] [24] [21]. Nonetheless, they all rely on a trustworthy logical framework capable of
expressing safety properties, but do not provide a platform-independent formalization.
Furthermore, their target is the virtual machine, and consequently the bytecode, instead
of the Solidity code. This has the obvious advantage that the formalization can apply no
matter the actual programming language (alongside Solidity are many other languages,
such as LLL, Serpent, Viper, and so forth), since the EVM executes bytecode. Never-
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theless, we believe that this approach has also an important limitation: programmers
write smart contracts in high-level languages that have to be carefully analyzed, too.
Bugs are almost always introduced during the implementation phase, and it is worth to
investigate on how we could statically identify buggy programs with the goal of ruling
them out.
With this reasoning in mind we propose Featherweight Solidity (FS), the first ab-
stract calculus modeling the core of Solidity including the operational semantics as
well as the type system. FS is completely “platform-independent” and relies on no
trustworthy logical framework. On our way to the proof of Type Safety we found that
when an exception occurs during the execution of a contract, the entire program stops
and returns a revert. The runtime detects this situation and rolls back any changes
made to the blockchain during the execution, thus leaving the former as if the contract
had never run. However, one change does remain: the nodes executing programs have
to be paid, in advance, an amount of money which is not reimbursed in case of error.
Hence, it is of interest of anyone “activating” a smart contract (i.e. making a contract
execute) that the execution proceeds without any exceptions. One of the most sensitive
scenarios in this sense is the transfer of money, where a “special” function of the target
contract (the so-called fallback) is invoked.
Perhaps surprisingly, Solidity’s compiler does not check that such function is ac-
tually defined in the target contract. In this latter case an exception is thrown, making
users waste money with no possibility of reimbursement. This is the reason why we
also propose an extension of our calculus, FS+, detecting and ruling out this behavior.
The key idea is letting a contract specify (in a fine-grained manner) the intended inter-
face of the contracts interacting with it. Bearing in mind that programmers hate writing
programs in tedious and verbose languages, in the design of FS+ we strive to keep the
syntax as simple as possible, making, on the other hand, the compiler quite more so-
phisticate and complex. The resulting language leaves the way of writing contracts
almost unaltered. As a pleasant side-effect, FS+ functions have a precise knowledge
of the contracts invoking them, and thus can make assumptions on their behavior. This
means that FS+ contracts invariants can be proven much easier than before, avoiding
the possibility of undefined, or unexpected, behaviors.
1.1 Organization of this document
The rest of this document is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives an overview on the concepts treated by this thesis: blockchain,
Ethereum, and Solidity.
• Chapter 3 provides a survey on the recent related work.
• Chapter 4 defines the syntax of our calculus, Featherweight Solidity.
• Chapter 5 defines the run-time syntax of FS as well as its operational semantics.
• Chapter 6 formalizes the type system, stating and proving the theorem of Type
Safety.
• Chapter 7 elaborates on the current limits of Solidity and proposes an extension,
discussing the pros and cons of adding it to Solidity. This chapter also formalizes
the modifications to the type system and proves the safety of the latter.
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• Chapter 8 concludes with some proposal of further work and personal consider-
ations.
5

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives a background on the topics of this thesis. The focus of this part
is very much on the presentation of the key, relevant, characteristics of Ethereum and
Solidity, with additional information about transactions. We shall therefore go through
it using examples and interaction patterns.
2.1 Transactions
The word “transaction” has been given many definitions over the last years, strongly
depending on the context. In general, it can be thought of as a sequence of operations
that forms a single step, transforming data from one consistent state to another. Such
definition implies that a transaction always ends either successfully or not. In the for-
mer case, any changes made by the transaction itself are safely stored on persistent stor-
age, and are thus recoverable even if something goes wrong later on. Such operation
is often referred to as “commit”. In the latter case, on the other hand, no changes are
made to the current state, thus leaving it as if the transaction had never run (“abort”).
It is also important to make sure that no transaction can see other transactions’ uncom-
mitted changes, so that its result will not depend on possibly aborted partial results. We
can thus point out, a bit more formally, the four fundamental properties of transactions,
the so-called ACID properties:
• Atomicity. Transactions execute with an “all or nothing” semantics: changes
are either all committed or all canceled;
• Consistency. Transactions always leave the system in a consistent state, with-
out any uncommitted partial results. Sometimes eventual consistency, a weaker
property, is achieved: it may happen that the system is in an inconsistent state,
but eventually all the changes will be propagated. This is usually the case in
systems giving more importance to scalability;
• Isolation. Transactions never have a chance to see uncommitted changes. In
other words, they run without interference from other transactions;
• Durability. Committed changes are always guaranteed to persist system fails,
and are thus recoverable.
Ensuring such properties in a distributed system is generally hard, and many al-
gorithms have been studied to this end. Generally, a consensus system is required, in
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order to get the changes correctly propagated to all the nodes. This is even more com-
plex when there is no centralized authority, since an arbitrary number of nodes have to
agree on what to do and when to do it. Blockchain falls into this latter category.
2.2 Blockchain
A blockchain is basically a continuously growing database distributed over many com-
puters (the so-called nodes). It is a digitized, decentralized, public ledger of all cryp-
tocurrency transactions: the innovation represented by the word blockchain is the spe-
cific ability of this network database to reconcile the order of transactions, even when
a few nodes on the network receive transactions in various order. This is done with a
combination of four main technologies:
• peer to peer networks: nodes can send messages to each other without the need
of a centralized authority managing such messages. In this way there is no single
point of failure;
• asymmetric cryptography: these messages are encrypted in such a way that
anyone can verify the sender’s authenticity, but only intended recipients can read
the message contents;
• cryptographic hashing: allowing the creation, for any data, of a small finger-
print to make sure the data has not been tampered with;
• distributed consensus: allowing nodes in the network to collectively agree on
a set of canonical updates to the state of the ledger. Nodes can freely enter into
the consensus process, solving the political problem of deciding who gets to
influence the consensus. It does so by substituting a formal barrier (e.g. being
on a particular list) with an economic barrier. The latter can be determined in
various ways, and two have been so far the main alternatives:
– proof of work: the weight of a single node in the consensus voting process
is directly proportional to the computing power that the node brings, and
– proof of stake: the weight of a node is proportional to its currency holdings.
In 2009 Satoshi Nakamoto combined the former three elements and added the latter to
create Bitcoin [34].
2.2.1 Blocks
A block in a blockchain is basically composed of four main elements:
• a block number;
• the nonce, a numeric value we will explain shortly;
• the previous block’s hash, which is basically a pointer pointing to the previous
block in the blockchain and used for the sake of consistency;
• some data.
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Mining Mining a block is essentially the process of adding some data to the block to
be included in the blockchain and finding a nonce satisfying a certain condition, which
is largely dependent of the actual blockchain instance. Figure 2.1 depicts a simple two-
blocks long blockchain. The data field is filled depending on the application and the
purpose the blockchain is being used for. Note how the prev field in Block2 points
back to the hash of Block1. Also note that both the two hashes begin with four zeros.
Figure 2.1: Example of a correct two-blocks long blockchain
This is a practical example of what we meant with “certain condition” above, and
shows what the nonce is used for. The miner computes this numerical value to make
the block’s hash begin with four zeros. The search for a suitable value may take a long
time, and is by far the most computational-intensive part of the entire mining process,
since many hashes might have to be computed before finding the one satisfying the
four-zeros-head condition. Once such nonce is found, it is saved into the block itself.
Afterwards, all the other miners in the networks have to validate the very same block
to make it actually appended to the chain. It is clear that the more blocks are added
after a certain Blockn the harder is to tamper Blockn with. The explanation is that
an attacker would have to change Blockn, recompute its hash (thus finding a suitable
nonce for that block), and then repeat this process for all the subsequent blocks. If the
networks is sufficiently large, this is extremely computational expensive and, even if
theoretically feasible, practically unfeasible. An attacker would need the 51% of the
entire network’s computational power to make such an attack successful (or to control
the 51% of the network) and, again, if the network is sufficiently large, this is all but
easy to accomplish. This way of mining is what we called “proof of work” above.
Blocks in Figure 2.1 are correct and are indeed green-colored. Figure 2.2, on the
other hand, shows an incorrect blockchain. Now Trudy, an attacker, has attempted
to modify Block1 making the two transactions transfer money to her account. This
has caused a change in Block1’s hash, which does not match with Block2’s prev
anymore. Hence, the latter is not a valid block, and neither is the blockchain. Trudy
has to remine Block2, too, and the more the blocks on top of Block1 the more difficult
is for Trudy to cheat.
Normally, blocks have to be mined at a given mining rate. To ensure so, the chal-
lenge is continuously adapted using another parameter, the difficulty. In our small
example we can imagine it as the number of zeros at the beginning of the hash, which
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Figure 2.2: Example of an incorrect two-blocks long blockchain
is continuously increased or decreased to make the mining ratio constant. When blocks
are mined too fast, the number of head-zeros is increased, thus making it harder to find
a suitable nonce. Vice versa, when the ratio is too slow, the number of head-zero is
decreased. Miners are given a compensation (measured in cryptocurrency) for their
computational effort.
State transition function Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show an arrow linking Block1
and Block2. We can, in fact, imagine the ledger of a cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin)
as a state transition system, where the “state” consists of the ownership status of all
existing money and a “state transition function” that takes a state and a transaction and
outputs a new state which is the result. Such function can be thought of as follows:
APPLY(S, TX) → S’ or ERROR
A simple ERROR condition can be an insufficient balance to accomplish a given
transaction (e.g. Alice’s balance is <500 in Figure 2.1). Under this point of view, a
block contains a list of transactions that can take the current state to either another valid
state or raise an error.
Block validation After being mined, blocks have to be validated by all the other
nodes in the network. The validation algorithm (forBlockn) roughly works as follows:
1. Check the validity of Blockn−1, which means checking if it exists and if its
hash matches with Blockn’s prev.
2. Validate the proof of work (i.e. the challenge). In our toy example, this step
means computing the Blockn’s hash and checking if it begins with four zeros.
3. Let S[0] be the state at the end of Blockn−1.
4. For each transaction (TX1 . . .TXm) in Blockn, let S[i]=APPLY(S[i-1],
TXi). If any application returns ERROR, stop and return false.
5. If every transaction in Blockn returns a valid state, return true.
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If such algorithm returns true, then the block is considered valid and appended to the
blockchain. If any of the nodes on the network returns false, then the block is not
included, since all the nodes must agree.
Stale blocks Consider two miners, A and B, mining, at the same time, a block. If
A is faster than B, its block will be propagated before B’s one, thus making the latter
end up wasted without any contribution to the blockchain. B’s block is said to be stale,
since it has actually been mined, but it is discarded because it arrived late. Blockchains
with fast confirmation times currently suffer from reduced security due to a high stale
rate. In fact, there is a centralization issue: if miner A is a mining pool more powerful
(i.e. faster) than B, A will have a risk of producing a stale block lower than B, since
it can mine blocks at a higher rate. Thus, if the block interval is short enough for the
stale rate to be high, A will be substantially more efficient simply by virtue of its size.
With these two effects combined, blockchains producing blocks quickly are very likely
to lead to one mining pool having a large enough percentage of the network power to
have de facto control over the mining process.
2.3 Ethereum
Ethereum [9] is a decentralized platform that runs programs called smart contracts:
applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime (i.e.
there will always be at least a machine capable of running them), censorship, fraud or
third-party interference. Contracts are written in a low-level Turing-complete bytecode
language, running in a virtual machine called Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [53].
Contracts are roughly similar to classes in the object-oriented programming paradigm:
they comprise a state and a set of functions, all defined by a sequence of bytecode
instructions.
2.3.1 Comparison with Bitcoin
Bitcoin also has a scripting language allowing the creation of a raw and weak version
of smart contracts. It is out of the scope of this work to provide details about Bit-
coin’s scripting language, but it is worth to point out the main differences between it
and Ethereum’s. The main limitation is that the former lacks Turing-completeness. In
particular, no loops can be written, just to avoid infinite loops during transaction veri-
fication. This is easily (and theoretically) overcame for script programmers, since the
underlying code can be replicated many times with an if statement, but such a solu-
tion does create very space-inefficient scripts. Secondly, in Bitcoin there is no way for
a script to provide fine-grained control over the amount that can be withdrawn, and
no state can survive over two, or more, transactions. This is a big limitation, since
such a language only enables the creation of one-off contracts. Lastly, scripts can-
not see any blockchain data, such as the nonce, the timestamp or the previous block’s
hash. Ethereum, on the other hand, provides a Turing-complete language enabling the
creation of stateful and blockchain-aware contracts. Several high-level programming
languages compiling to bytecode are provided: the most popular of such languages is
Solidity [48]. We shall go deeper into its details later on in this chapter.
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2.3.2 Accounts
Two are the kinds of accounts in Ethereum: externally owned accounts (EOAs), con-
trolled by public-private key pairs (i.e. humans or computers), and contract accounts,
controlled by the code stored together with the account itself. The address of an exter-
nal account can be recovered from the public key, whereas the address of a contract is
determined at the time the contract is created (it is derived from the creator’s address
and the number of transactions sent from that address, the so-called “nonce”). In both
cases, the pair (account, address) is unique: an address corresponds to one and only
one account, and vice versa. These two types of accounts are treated equally by the
EVM, and they both have a balance in Ether (Ethereum’s cryptocurrency) that can be
modified by sending transactions containing Ether. Accounts also have a storage area
(initially empty and further discussed in Section 2.4.2) and a nonce (not to be confused
with the one of blocks in a blockchain) used to make sure each transaction is processed
only once. In the context of Ethereum, transactions can carry Ether and binary data.
The recipient (or target) may contain code (i.e. it is a smart contract and not an EOA);
if it does, the code is executed using the binary data as input. The target address may
be 0, in which case a new contract is created. Any transactions are fired from exter-
nally owned accounts and the execution needs to be completely deterministic: its only
context is the position of the block on the blockchain (i.e. the block number) and the
data sent along with the transaction. Instances of different smart contracts may com-
municate via messages in the context of a transaction. Messages can be thought of as
function calls, and they are virtual object that are never serialized and exist only in the
Ethereum execution environment. They are essentially like transactions, and contain
the same fields (see below); the only exception is that they are produced by contracts
and not by external actors.
2.3.3 Transactions
Every Ethereum’s transaction contains the following fields:
1. the target (i.e. the recipient account);
2. a signature identifying the sender (i.e. the caller account);
3. VALUE, the amount of Ether to be transfered to the recipient;
4. an optional data field;
5. STARTGAS, the maximum number of computational steps the execution of this
transaction is allowed to take;
6. GASPRICE, the amount of Ether the caller is willing to pay for each unit of gas.
Gas Every transaction is charged, upon creation, with a certain amount of gas, the
fuel of Ethereum’s blockchain. Any bytecode instructions come with a gas fee ([53])
specifying how much it costs to execute that operation. The account initiating the trans-
action (caller) has to specify the maximum amount of gas (STARTGAS) and the price
(GASPRICE) it is willing to pay. Hence, the total fee is computed as GASPRICE *
STARTGAS. The caller is actually paying the miner, in advance, for the computation,
regardless of whether the transaction succeeds or fails. This mechanism is also used to
prevent infinite loops: any operations executed by the EVM decrease the STARTGAS
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and, if it reaches 0, an Out of Gas exception is thrown to immediately block the
execution. The transaction fees go to the miner who mines the block containing the
transaction. When miners mine a block they have to decide the transactions to include
in it. They can choose to include no transactions, or they can choose to randomly
select them. Most miners follow a very simple strategy: they first sort the received
transactions from the highest GASPRICE to the lowest; secondly, they include them
until either the block is full or they reach one that has a GASPRICE set lower than they
are willing to bother with. Hence, in general, the higher the GASPRICE the higher the
probability to have the transaction included in the next block.
State transition function Transactions in Ethereum are clearly more complex than
the ones we defined before: they do not simply represent an exchange of money from
two accounts, but involve a number of fields and possibly code. Thus, the state tran-
sition function (APPLY(S, TX) → S’ or ERROR) changes accordingly, as de-
scribed below:
1. Check if the transaction is well-formed (i.e. all the required fields are defined),
if the signature is correct and if the nonce matches the sender’s one.
2. Calculate the transaction fee as STARTGAS * GASPRICE, and determine the
sending address from the signature. Subtract the fee from the sender’s account
balance and increment the sender’s nonce. If there is not enough balance to
spend, return an ERROR.
3. Let GAS = STARTGAS and subtract an amount of gas corresponding to the
number of bytes composing the transaction.
4. Transfer the VALUE from the sender to the recipient. If the latter does not yet
exist, create it; if it is a contract, run its code either to completion or until the
execution runs out of gas. (We shall see what code is actually run shortly.)
5. If the value transfer failed (either due to a sender’s insufficient balance or because
the code execution ran out of gas) revert all state changes except the payment of
the fees, and add the fees to the miner’s account.
6. Otherwise, refund the fees for all remaining gas to the sender, and send the fees
paid for gas consumed to the miner.
It is clear that miners are paid even if the transaction is actually reverted. It is one of the
goals of this work to enhance Solidity’s type system in order to detect, at compile-time,
some of the errors that may occur at run-time.
2.3.4 Blocks and validation
Blocks in Ethereum are quite similar to the ones we described before, with two key
differences. First, two more values, the difficulty and a timestamp, are stored in the
block itself. Secondly, blocks do not contain only a transaction list, but also the most
recent state (i.e. all the active accounts together with their balance and their code, if
any). This might seem space-inefficient, but Ethereum uses a particular data structure,
known as Patricia Tree, to handle such a blockchain efficiently [10]. We can now give
the algorithm to validate a block (Blockn) in Ethereum:
1. Check the validity of Blockn−1.
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2. Check that the timestamp of Blockn is greater than that of Blockn−1 and less
than 15 minutes into the future.
3. Check the validity of some low-level fields (such as block number, difficulty, gas
limit, and the root of the tree).
4. Validate the proof of work.
5. Let S[0] be the state at the end of Blockn−1.
6. For each transaction (TX1 . . .TXm) in Blockn, let S[i]=APPLY(S[i-1],
TXi). If any application returns ERROR, stop and return false. Return false also
if the total gas consumed so far reaches STARTGAS.
7. Let Sf be equal to S[m], but adding the payment to the miner.
8. Check if the root of the tree in Sf is equal to the one stored in Blockn. If so, the
block is valid; otherwise it is not.
In Ethereum, the proof of work is slightly different than the four-zeros one we defined
before. In fact, the hash of each block, seen as a decimal number, has to be lower that
a given value, identified by the difficulty field, stored along with the block’s header.
In brief, given a block of successful transactions (mined by a miner node), if any
of them returns ERROR the validation process fails and the entire block is discarded.
Note that, even if every validation node executes APPLY (i.e. runs the transaction
again) the fee (payed by means of gas) is given only to the miner node the first time the
transaction is carried out. That is, every change to the balance of the accounts involved
in the transaction, as well as the miner’s one, are only checked to be sure they are valid.
No money transfers are performed at validation time.
2.3.5 Code execution
The aim of Ethereum is to allow programmers to define smart contracts. The latter are
very similar to classes in object-oriented programming languages and generally model
the back-end of a bigger application. This implies that the interaction between the “ex-
ternal world” (i.e. everything outside the Ethereum’s blockchain) and smart contracts,
and among smart contracts themselves is very important. At first this may sound a bit
confusing, since many parties play a role in a “standard” Ethereum application. To
clarify, suppose we want to develop a rock-paper-scissors game, modeled by a contract
named RPS: when a player makes a choice they are charged a fixed amount of Ether
and wait for the next player to make the second choice. The winner takes the entire
amount reduced by a small fee payed to the contract RPS. Below, we outline the steps
required to build such an application:
1. we write the smart contract RPS using one of Ethereum’s high-level languages.
The most known is Solidity, but many others are available (e.g. Serpent or LLL);
2. we compile down, using one of Ethereum’s libraries, our contract RPS into byte-
code and send it within a transaction to deploy the contract. Note that the byte-
code is necessary in order to accomplish the deploy. An instance C of RPS is
now on the blockchain waiting for someone to interact with it;
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3. an Ethereum account A1 (no matter if it is an EOA or a contract) wishes to play
with C. It invokes a function to send its choice along with the amount of Ether
to be paid, and waits for a second player to make a move;
4. when another Ethereum account A2 makes the second move, C is able to figure
out the winner (either A1 or A2) and to pay it back the award reduced by a small
fee (kept in the C’s balance);
5. optionally, a designated account A3 with more privileges (e.g. the one which
deployed the instance of RPS) can withdraw Ether from C’s balance.
You can see different parties playing different roles in this sequence of steps. First, we,
as programmers, develop RPS (for example in Solidity). Secondly, we write code to
deploy it (such code may be written in many programming languages, from JavaScript
to Haskell). The latter will run locally to our own computer or server, without the need
to store a copy of the blockchain or to be a miner. The transaction send to deploy an
instance of RPS, on the other hand, will be carried out by an Ethereum miner. Note
that there is no assurance that this transaction will be executed immediately: miners
can choose what to include in the block they are mining. Optionally, the design of our
contract may keep track of the account deploying it (i.e. A3), in order to let it withdraw
the money (Step 5). A1 and A2 are totally not known at compile/deploy-time, and
vary during the lifetime of C (i.e. two players play the first time, but then other two
players can play again, without even knowing about the former two). They can be
either contracts or EOAs, and the functions of RPS invoked to make their move will be
executed, again, by a miner. Later in this Chapter, and precisely in Example 2.1, we
shall show how to define a smart contract, how to deploy it and how to interact with it.
To sum up, we explicitly give an answer to two crucial questions: what happens
when the code is executed and where does it run? The latter is simpler: if a transaction
is added into Blockn the code execution spawned by that transaction will be executed
by all nodes, now and in the future, that download and validate Blockn. At first, a
miner node will chose to add the transaction in a block and will execute it. Then, every
node validating the same block will execute the same transaction to validate it. The
former question is a bit more complex. First, code written in high-level languages,
such as Solidity, is compiled down into bytecode (EVM code). Such bytecode consists
of a series a operations working on three memory spaces:
• the stack;
• the memory, an infinitely expandable byte array;
• the contract’s long-term storage, which is basically a list of key/value pairs.
Unlike stack and memory, which are volatile and reset when, respectively, the
transaction ends or a function returns, storage is persistent.
The code can access information regarding the current sender, the value, the cur-
rent block and transaction. EVM’s computational state can be defined by a tuple
(block state, transaction, message, code, memory, stack,
pc, gas), where block state is the global state containing all accounts and in-
cludes balances and storage. The current instruction is found by taking the byte of
code corresponding to the program counter pc (or 0 if pc >= len(code)), and
each instruction has its own definition in terms of how it affects the tuple (number of
push and pops on the stack, modifications to memory and storage, and so on) [53].
We can now take a closer look to Solidity, to understand how smart contracts are
defined.
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2.4 Solidity
Solidity is a statically-typed programming language, whose syntax has been strongly
inspired by JavaScript, enabling programmers to define smart contracts. Their defini-
tion resembles that of classes in the object-oriented programming paradigm. However,
programming in Solidity (and, more in general, defining smart contracts) presents some
thorny points to pay attention to. We will not list any security or programming best
practices, but smart contracts manipulate money, and clumsy implementations make
room to irreversible bugs that may have serious consequences. An example is the con-
tract The DAO [47]. It implemented a crowd-funding platform, which raised more or
less $150M before being attacked on June 18th, 2016 [39]. An attacker managed to
put about $60M under their control, until the hard-fork of the blockchain nullified the
effects of the transactions involved in the attack. In the context of blockchain, a hard-
fork is a rule change such that the software validating according to the old rules will
see the blocks produced according to the new rules as invalid. In case of a hard-fork, all
nodes meant to work in accordance with the new rules need to upgrade their software.
Contracts may contain state variables, functions, function modifiers, events, struct
types, and enum types. Contracts may also inherit from other contracts. Example 2.1
shows a simple, yet complete, example of smart contract written in Solidity.
Example 2.1 (Simple smart contract).
Listing 2.1 lists a basic smart contract modeling a person.
1 contract Person {
2 struct Address {
3 string city;
4 string street;
5 }
6
7 string public name;
8 uint public birthyear;
9 Address public addr;
10 bool public gender; // false = male, true = female
11 address public owner;
12
13 modifier ownerOnly {
14 require(msg.sender == owner);
15 _;
16 }
17
18 event NewAddress(Address _address);
19
20 constructor (string _name, uint _year, string _city,
21 string _street, bool _gender) public {
22 name = _name;
23 birthyear = _year;
24 addr = Address({city: _city, street: _street});
25 gender = _gender;
26 owner = msg.sender;
27 }
28
29 function setAddress(string _city, string _street) public
ownerOnly {
30 addr = Address({city: _city, street: _street});
31 emit NewAddress(addr);
32 }
33 }
Listing 2.1: Person contract in Solidity
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First, we define a struct Address containing the details of an address, the city and
the name of the street. Secondly, all the state variables are listed: the name of
the person, their birth-year, address (addr), and gender. We then add a vari-
able of type address, owner, which is used as a very basic form of access control.
The constructor initializes it with the address of the account instantiating the contract
(stored automatically in msg.sender, an implicit variable set by the runtime), and
subsequently read in the modifier ownerOnly. The require statement requires the
owner to be equal to the current msg.sender. At run-time, the special symbol ;
will be replaced with the body of setAddress(). In this contract, the only function
using such access control mechanism is setAddress(), which allows the owner
to change their address. This function also emits an event, NewAddress, actually
logging the address change in the blockchain. An event allows a contract to signal that
something particularly relevant has just happened. In this case, an instance of Person
signals everyone monitoring the blockchain that its address has changed. This al-
lows for an event-driven programming paradigm, since external applications may be
monitoring the blockchain and subsequently react to events of interest.
It is now time to deploy the contract. To this end, we can use either Remix, the
Solidity official on-line editor1, whose explanation goes beyond the scope of this ex-
ample, or an Ethereum compatible library. Here we shall use the JavaScript imple-
mentation, web3.js2, but many Application Program Interfaces (APIs) exist for other
popular programming languages, such as Web3.py3 for Python, hs-web34 for Haskell,
web3j5 for Java, and web3j-scala6 for Scala. Contracts can also be deployed directly in
Solidity code, using new (e.g. new Person(‘‘Matteo Di Pirro’’, 1994,
...)). In this case, if contract A is instantiating contract B, the code of B must be
know by the EVM when an instance of A is deployed (i.e. the code of B have to be
deployed together with A’s).
We shall show how to use web3.js to deploy a contract and interact with it. Con-
tracts are just like objects, and many different instances of the same contract may be
on the blockchain at the same time, similarly to what happens for class instances in
object-oriented programs. However, interacting with a deployed contract is slightly
more complex than just using an object. First consider Listing 2.2, showing how de-
ploy is done, supposing the smart contract code is stored in Person.sol.
1 // Compilation
2 var code = fs.readFileSync(’Person.sol’).toString(); // reads the
source code
3 var solc = require(’solc’);
4 var compiledCode = solc.compile(code); // and compiles it
5
6 /*
7 compiledCode.contracts[’:Person’].bytecode contains the code which
will be deployed
8
9 compiledCode.contracts[’:Person’].interface contains the interface
or template of the contract (called abi) telling the contract
user what methods are available in the contract.
10 */
11 var byteCode = compiledCode.contracts[’:Person’].bytecode;
1https://remix.ethereum.org/
2https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/
3https://web3py.readthedocs.io/en/stable/
4http://hackage.haskell.org/package/web3
5https://web3j.io/
6https://github.com/mslinn/web3j-scala
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12 var abi = JSON.parse(compiledCode.contracts[’:Person’].interface);
13
14 var myAccountAddress = ’0x...’;
15
16 // Deploy
17 var Person = web3.eth.contract(abi);
18 var deployedContract = Person.new(
19 ’Matteo Di Pirro’, ’1994’, ’Padua’, ’Via Trieste’, false,
20 {data: byteCode, from: myAccountAddress, gas: 4700000,
gasPrice: 200000000}
21 );
22
23 // deployedContract.address contains the address of the contract
just deployed
24
25 var contractInstance = Person.at(deployedContract.address);
Listing 2.2: Deploying an instance of Person
This short listing contains a lot of things to analyze. Let us start with Lines 2-4, that
simply read the contract source code and compile it, with the additional JavaScript
library solc. After that, the variable compiledCode has two fundamental fields:
bytecode, containing the actual bytecode resulting from the compilation (Line 11),
and interface (Line 12). The latter represents the Application Binary Interface
(ABI) of the contract, that basically is a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object rep-
resenting the set of functions and events exposed by the contract. myAccountAddress
(Line 14) defines the address of the account we are using to interact with the blockchain.
We can now deploy an instance of Person, first interpreting the ABI interface as a
JSON object and then using it as a parameter for the function web3.eth.contract,
that returns a contract “class” representing our contract (Line 17). We use it to create
a concrete Person object (i.e. a deployed contract) via the new method (Line 18).
Here we also specify the parameters required by the constructor of the contract (Line
19) and then additional parameters necessary to the deploy (Line 20). In particular,
data contains the bytecode of the contract to be deployed, from is the account initi-
ating the transaction (i.e. the sender). This is because the blockchain has to keep track
of who deployed the contract. Lastly, gas is the amount of gas we are willing to pay to
deploy the contract. The balance in the from account will be used to buy gas, whose
price is set by gasPrice. Finally, Line 25 shows how to get the contract instance by
its address (which is the one of the contract we have just deployed).
Clearly, every time this snippet of code is executed a new instance of Person is
deployed on the blockchain. Note that, in order to deploy the instance, the bytecode
is necessary. In this example we defined Person from scratch, but we could actually
reuse the source code of a contract we did not write. In fact, many smart contracts
make publicly available their source code7, which can be copied and reused to deploy
other instances, by anybody.
The last thing we need to understand is how to interact with a deployed contract
using web3.js. To this end, suppose we want to use a contract we did not deployed by
ourselves. Listing 2.3 shows how to do it.
1 var abi = JSON.parse(’abi’); // parse the abi as before
2 var Person = web3.eth.contract(abi); // get a contract object
3 var contractInstance = Person.at(’0x...’); // get an instance by
its address
7Visit https://etherscan.io/contractsVerified for a list of deployed Ethereum smart
contracts
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4 var myAccountAddress = ’0x...’;
5
6 // parameters used to interact with the smart contract
7 var transactionObject = {
8 from: myAccountAddress,
9 gas: 4700000,
10 gasPrice: 200000000
11 };
12
13 // JavaScript functions to interact with ‘contractInstance‘
14 function getPersonName() {
15 contractInstance.getName(transactionObject, function(error,
result) {
16 if(!error) {
17 // do something with ‘result‘
18 } else {
19 // handle ‘error‘
20 }
21 });
22 }
23
24 function changePersonAddress(city, street) {
25 contractInstance.setAddress(city, street, transactionObject);
26 }
Listing 2.3: Interacting with an instance of Person
Lines 1-3 are more or less as before. Given an ABI definition we obtain a contract
instance knowing its address. Note, however, that now both the ABI and the address
are hard-coded in the source code. As we said, Person has previously been deployed,
thus the instance has got a valid address (e.g. deployedContract.address in
Listing 2.2) and its ABI is accessible at https://etherscan.io/. As before, we
know our own account address and we store it in myAccountAddress. Hard-coding
in this way our address is not the only possible way: web3.js provides a property,
web3.eth.defaultAccount, which will work as a default value whenever the
from property is missing (see, for instance, Line 20 of Listing 2.2).
transactionObject contains the parameters we will use when invoking functions
on contractInstance, and is here declared to avoid code duplication. We are now
ready to show how to communicate with a smart contract. To this end, we define two
JavaScript functions, getPersonName() (Line 14) and changePersonAddress()
(Line 24), to interact with Person. This code is usually part of the front-end of a web
application, and thus generally manipulates things on a web page. In this case, for in-
stance, getPersonName() could, in case of success, display the name on the page.
Similarly, the actual parameters of changePersonAddress() could come from a
form filled in by the user. Lastly, note how getPersonName() uses the JavaScript’s
mechanism of callbacks (Line 15) to wait for the result of getName(). This would
happen also for changePersonAddress(), but we did not specify any callbacks
because we are not interested in the result of this invocation. We shall see, at the end
of this chapter and with a bigger understanding of Solidity, that function calls are not
treated always in the same way. Finally notice that the function’s actual parameters are
specified before the transaction’s ones, which are in turn specified before the callback.
This also means that, in this example, each JavaScript function causes an Ethereum
transaction.
Please note that, for the sake of simplicity, this example showed minimal snippets
of code using web3.js. The main aim was not to explain the details of how this library
works, but instead to give an overview to better understand the choices we made while
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formalizing a core calculus of Solidity. Many of the methods shown here, such as
the way of invoking functions of a smart contract, have many alternatives, each of
which is best suited for different scenarios. Furthermore, many frameworks simplifying
the programming pattern exist8. They provide built-in functions to compile, deploy,
manage, and test smart contracts and their interactions.
This simple example pointed out some peculiarities of Solidity. First, getter func-
tions are automatically added for each public state variable. We shall talk more in
details about visibility modifiers later on in this chapter. Note that Solidity only adds
getters, and not setters. The latter have to be explicitly defined by the programmer, if
necessary. Secondly, modifiers can be used to restrict the ability of invoking some func-
tions. In Example 2.1 we allowed only the owner to change their address, but modifiers
can be used to implement more advanced restrictions. They can also accept parameters,
such as functions, so that they do not only depend on the implicit variable msg. We
shall explain more in detail msg below, but for now it can be thought of as a special
variable containing information about the received message, such as the address of its
sender or the amount of Ether it contains. We here make use of require, which is a
short form for if (msg.sender != owner) revert();. require inputs a
boolean expression which, if false, throws an exception. We will go into exceptions be-
low. Thirdly, events are used to explicitly log something on the blockchain. This might
seem unuseful here, but many external applications monitor the blockchain looking for
events they can react to. Lastly, note the special syntax used to initialize a variable of
a struct type (addr in this case). We use a notation that reminds the one used to deal
with JSON objects, with every field of the struct explicitly associated with its value. In
this way the order of the actual parameters is not important, and we could have writ-
ten Address(street: street, city: city) without any changes in
meaning. We could also have used a more “natural” notation, setting addr as follows:
addr = Address( city, street), but it is order-dependent and discouraged
by the official documentation.
2.4.1 Implicit variables
Solidity provides a number of implicit variables and functions. The latter have to do, for
instance, with mathematical and cryptographic tasks. The former, on the other hand,
provide useful information about the current transaction and the current state of the
blockchain (remember that Ethereum is a blockchain-aware platform, as said before).
Three are the main implicit variables, whose scope is the contract definition:
• msg, storing information about the current message. As we said, accounts
communicate by sending each other messages containing two main informa-
tion: sender, the address of the account sending the message, and value,
the amount of Wei that has been sent. Wei is the smallest sub-currency of Ether
(1 Ether = 1018 Wei). This variable is first set when a transaction begins (i.e.
sender contains the address of the account initiating the transaction) and is up-
dated any time a contract invokes a function belonging to another contract. The
amount of gas is also readable, via the implicit function gasleft();
• block, storing information about the current block, such as its number,
gaslimit, difficulty, the timestamp, and the address of its miner
8An example is Truffle, https://truffleframework.com/
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(coinbase). Programmers can also read a given block’s hash, via the func-
tion blockhash(uint), specifying the number of the required block. Bear-
ing in mind that miners can decide which transactions to include in a block and
when, “current block” refers to the block the transaction is being included in, and
hence the values of the fields of block vary based on when the miner executes
the transaction.
• tx, storing information about the current transaction: its gasprice and the
address of the account that has started it (origin). Remember that a transac-
tion begins when an externally owned account invokes a function on a contract,
whereas any interactions among contracts cause a message call. Hence, origin
never changes during the execution of the transaction itself, and is equal to the
sender of the first message call. As we will point out shortly, fields of msg can
change due to particular function calls, but tx never does.
2.4.2 Types
Solidity is a statically-typed language, which means that variables are given a type at
compile-time. Such type can be either a value type or a reference type. The former
is named after its call-by-value semantics: variables are always copied when they are
used as function arguments or in assignments. The latter comprises all those complex
types whose copy can be expensive, and is associated with two memory areas: mem-
ory (not persisting) and storage (persisting). Every variable of a reference type has to
be annotated with its location using the keywords memory or storage. Depending
on the context, there is always a default value. Data locations are important because
they change how assignments behave: assignments between storage and memory and
also to a state variable (even from other state variables) always create an independent
copy. Assignments to local storage variables only assign a reference though, and this
reference always points to the state variable even if the latter is changed in the mean-
time. On the other hand, assignments from a memory stored reference type to another
memory-stored reference type do not create a copy.
Storage vs memory The key difference to keep in mind is that memory is temporary,
whereas storage is persisting. For example, one would perform intermediate computa-
tions using memory, and then save the result to storage. The latter is really expensive:
it costs 20000 gas to set a storage location from zero to a value, 5000 gas to change
its value, and 200 gas to read a word. The reason is that a contract’s storage values
are stored on the blockchain forever, which has a real-world cost. Hence, storage has
to be used when its really mandatory, that is, when values have to be persisted among
different contract calls, in the same way as state variables are. The storage of one con-
tract can also be read by another contract, or by querying the blockchain. Memory is
much cheaper than storage: it costs 3 gas to read or write a word, plus some gas if we
are expanding memory. For a few KB it is very cheap indeed, but the cost goes up
quadratically the more we use: a MB of memory will cost a couple of million gas. The
drawback is that this area is only accessible during the contract execution: when the
latter is over, the memory is wiped out. It can be thought of as a general workhorse,
and can be used for everything non-permanent.
Listing 2.49 lists a contract example clarifying the concept of data location. There
9This example is taken from https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.24/types.
html#data-location
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are some keywords we have not seen yet. First, delete a is an operator assigning
to a the default value for its type, for instance a=0 for integers. It can also be used
on arrays, where it assigns a dynamic array of length zero or a static array of the same
length with all elements reset. For structs, it assigns a struct with all members reset.
Secondly, var is a keyword used to let Solidity deduct the type of the variable being
initialized. Lastly, internal is a function visibility modifiers, and we shall explain
its meaning below.
1 contract C {
2 uint[] x; // the data location of x is storage
3
4 // the data location of memoryArray is memory
5 function f(uint[] memoryArray) public {
6 x = memoryArray; // works, copies the whole array to
storage
7 var y = x; // works, assigns a pointer, data location of y
is storage
8 y[7]; // fine, returns the 8th element
9 y.length = 2; // fine, modifies x through y
10 delete x; // fine, clears the array, also modifies y
11 // The following does not compile; it would need to create
a new temporary /
12 // unnamed array in storage, but storage is "statically"
allocated:
13 // y = memoryArray;
14 // This does not compile either, since it would "reset"
the pointer, but there
15 // is no sensible location it could point to.
16 // delete y;
17 g(x); // calls g, handing over a reference to x
18 h(x); // calls h and creates an independent, temporary
copy in memory
19 }
20
21 function g(uint[] storage storageArray) internal {}
22 function h(uint[] memoryArray) public {}
23 }
Listing 2.4: Reference types and data location in Solidity
Value types Many value types are the usual common ones found in many program-
ming languages, such as booleans, integers, static arrays, strings, enums,
and so on and so forth. Two are the most interesting:
• address, holding 20 byte values and representing Ethereum accounts. Values
of type address have two main properties: address.balance, allowing
programmers to query the balance of an address, and
address.transfer(unsigned integer), to transfer Ether (in units of
Wei) from one address to another. There are more properties, such as send,
which is similar to, but slightly lower-level than, transfer, and call,
delegatecall, and callcode, that are low-level alternatives to the “clas-
sic” function call. We will need additional information to explain in detail why
send differs from transfer, and we shall do so in Section 2.4.4 and Ex-
ample 2.5. Consider now the other three properties, and in particular call:
a.call(bytes4(keccak256(‘‘fun(uint256) ’’)), b) and
a.fun(b) are totally equivalent in the sense that they both invoke the func-
tion fun on the contract corresponding to address a, passing b as an argument
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(keccak256 returns an hash). call, anyway, does return false if the invoca-
tion encounters an exception, and true otherwise. As you can see, the former is
more complex, offers no type safe, and does not allow the (possible) return value
of fun to be used. Furthermore, the use of
bytes4(keccak256(‘‘fun(uint256)’’)) is necessary since Solidity
looks up the function to be invoked using the first four bytes of its hash. call,
delegatecall and callcode are to be used only as a last resort, since they
break type safety10 (no interface is available to check what is being invoked). At
the time of writing (version 0.4.24), contracts inherit from the address type, thus
one can access all the properties stated above using a contract reference instead.
For instance, things like the following are accepted:
B b = new B();
int x = b.balance;
b.transfer(10);
An implicit cast B→address applies in the cases above. This is currently
discouraged and the best practice is to explicitly make the cast and subsequently
access the required property (i.e. address(b).balance;). As of version
0.5.0, however, contracts will not derive from address anymore, but they can
still be converted to it.
• function types, allowing programmers to use functions as first-class values, thus
passing them as parameters, assigning them to variables, and returning them
from function calls. However, Solidity does not support lambda expressions,
and thus functions values can only refer to functions defined in any contract de-
ployed on the blockchain. We have not talked about visibility modifiers yet, but
we do give a first explanation about two of such modifiers here: internal
and external. These are the sole two visibility modifiers allowed for function
types. Values of the former type can only be called inside the current contract
because they cannot be executed outside of the context of the current contract.
They are implemented as basic jumps to the function inside the EVM: the cur-
rent memory is not cleared, and the implicit variable msg is not changed. The
latter type does not have this restriction, and can be used both through different
contracts or in the context of the current contract. They are implemented via
a message call to the function, thus causing a change in msg. The syntax of a
function type is as follows:
function (<parameter types>) internal|external
[pure|constant|view|payable] [returns (<return types>)]
We shall dive into all these modifiers in the paragraph about contracts below.
Note that a function can return a tuple of values.
We now give some examples to give a better understanding of what we just explained.
Example 2.2 goes deeper on the behavior of call, callcode, and delegatecall;
Example 2.3 clarifies the behavior of internal and external functions with respect to
msg and tx; lastly, in Example 2.4 we show how to use functions as values. Note
10Refer to https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/contracts.html#
functions for more details
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that Featherweight Solidity (FS), the language we formalize to study the behavior of
Solidity, does not take into account the functionality shown in these two examples. The
reader interested only in the core features modeled in FS may skip the following part.
Example 2.2 (call, callcode, and delegatecall). Listing 2.5 defines three
contract explaining the behavior of call, callcode, and delegatecall. A sim-
ply wraps these three functions and use them to invoke B’s setN(). C invokes A’s
delegatecallSetN(), which in turn call setN() of E. Suppose that all the ad-
dresses correctly refer to the expected contracts (i.e. when we use a we assume it
points to an instance of A, and so forth). In this example we shall use capital letters,
A, B, and C to indicate, as usual, contract names. For the sake of clarity, we shall
abuse the use this letters to identify also contract instances. Hence, when we write
“A calls B” we mean “any instance of A calls an instance of B”, and when we
write “msg.sender inside B is A” we mean “msg.sender inside the execution of
a certain function of B corresponds to an instance of A”.
1 contract A {
2 uint public n;
3 address public sender;
4
5 function callSetN(address _b, uint _n) public {
6 // B’s storage is set, A is not modified
7 _b.call(bytes4(keccak256("setN(uint256)")), _n);
8 }
9
10 function callcodeSetN(address _b, uint _n) public {
11 // A’s storage is set, B is not modified
12 _b.callcode(bytes4(keccak256("setN(uint256)")), _n);
13 }
14
15 function delegatecallSetN(address _b, uint _n) public {
16 // A’s storage is set, B is not modified
17 _b.delegatecall(bytes4(keccak256("setN(uint256)")), _n);
18 }
19 }
20
21 contract B {
22 uint public n;
23 address public sender;
24
25 function setN(uint _n) public {
26 n = _n;
27 sender = msg.sender;
28 }
29 }
30
31 contract C {
32 function f(A _a, B _b, uint _n) public {
33 _a.callSetN(_b, _n);
34 }
35
36 function g(A _a, B _b, uint _n) public {
37 _a.callcodeSetN(_b, _n);
38 }
39
40 function h(A _a, B _b, uint _n) public {
41 _a.delegatecallSetN(_b, _n);
42 }
43
44 function abort() public {
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45 revert();
46 }
47
48 function callAbort() public returns (bool) {
49 return this.call(bytes4(keccak256("abort()")));
50 }
51 }
Listing 2.5: call, callcode, and delegatecall in action
delegatecall basically says that a contract A is allowing (delegating) another con-
tract B to do whatever it wants with A’s storage. delegatecall is a security risk
for the sending contract, which needs to trust that the receiving contract will treat the
storage well. It was introduced to fix a bug in callcode, which did not preserve
neither msg.sender nor msg.value. If C invokes A who delegatecalls B,
the msg.sender in the delegatecall is C (whereas if callcode was used the
msg.sender would be A).
Let us explain so referring to Listing 2.5. When A calls B, the code runs in the
context of B, and B’s storage is used. This means that B’s n will mutate. On the other
hand, when A callcodes B, the code runs in the context of A, as if the code of B was
in A. Whenever the code writes to storage, it writes to the storage of contract A, instead
of B, and thus A’s n will mutate. Furthermore, when A callcodes B, msg.sender
inside B is A. When C invokes A, and A delegatecalls B, msg.sender in-
side B is C; on the contrary, it is A if callcode is used. In the former case, B
has the same msg.sender and msg.value as A, which are correctly preserved
since B’s setN() is not marked as external (remember that marking a function as
external modifies the variable msg since it generates a new message call).
The following tables sum up the results of various calls. Table 2.1 lists the results
on the interaction between A and B; Table 2.2 shows how msg.sender varies. All
these calls are made considering variables initialized at zero, that is integers are 0 and
addresses are 0x00 . . . 0.
a.callSetN(b, 1) a.callcodeSetN(b, 2) a.delegatecallSetN(b, 3)
a.n 0 a.n 2 a.n 3
b.n 1 b.n 0 b.n 0
b.sender a b.sender a b.sender a
Table 2.1: Interactions between A and B. When A uses callcode or
delegatecall, its own storage is modified instead of B’s. On the other hand, call
works as expected and as a normal function call b.setN(1).
As you can see, C contains other two functions, abort() and callAbort():
the former simply throws a revert() and the latter calls it by means of call and
returns a boolean flag. Note that for the sake of this discussion, the behavior of call,
callcode, and delegatecall does not change. So far, all the flags returned by
these three functions have always been true, to signal that no exceptions were raised.
However, when callAbort() is invoked, an exception actually occurs, and make
the function return false. false is returned also if the invoked function does not
exist.
So far, the behavior of these three functions seems predictable. However, we
cheated a bit, calling the state variables of A and B in the same way and declaring them
in the same order. Furthermore, we accurately avoided many important questions: what
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c.callSetN(a, b, 1) c.callcodeSetN(a, b, 2) c.delegatecallSetN(a, b, 3)
a.n 0 a.n 2 a.n 3
b.n 1 b.n 0 b.n 0
a.sender 0x0 a.sender a a.sender c
b.sender a b.sender 0x0 b.sender 0x0
Table 2.2: Interactions between C and B using A as a man-in-the-middle. When
C uses callSetN() everything is as expected, with only the storage of B mu-
tating and the msg.sender set to a. When it uses callcodeSetN() the
mag.sender is modified in A even though the function setN() is not external
(and thus calling it should preserve the original sender). This is solved by using
delegatecallSetN(), which correctly leaves unaltered msg.sender. As seen
before, only callSetN() operates on B’s storage.
would happen if A did not define any integer variable n? What would happen if A’s
state variables were declared in a different order than B’s? What would happen if the
order remained the same, but with different identifiers? In these cases the results would
be a lot more surprising than before. The fact is, when B writes to A’s storage, it does
so taking into account its own variable ordering. Consider two contracts with the oppo-
site order of state variables declaration (i.e. A declares sender and then n and B does
the opposite, first n and then sender). Suppose we invoke a.delegatecall(b,
100) (it would be the same using callcode). B writes on A’s storage, but the latter
is organized in a different way, and thus n in A becomes equal to the decimal represen-
tation of msg.sender, whereas sender in A becomes equal to the hexadecimal rep-
resentation of 100, that is 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000064. Note
that here the order of variables assignments in setN() does not matter. B actually
makes A’s storage dirty, changing not only its state variables but also any other values
that have been stored there. What is worse is that programmers do not receive any
warnings (nor the function returns false to signal that something bad just happened),
and could consequently assume that everything went fine even if the storage of their
contract is totally messed up. Since the latter is written on the blockchain, there is
no “undo” button or easy way out. This is the reason why call, callcode, and
delegatecall should be used extremely carefully and only as a last resort. They
not only are more complex then “normal” function calls, but are also not type-safe and
can seriously damage a contract’s storage.
Example 2.3 (Internal vs external functions).
Listing 2.6 lists the contract used in this example, together with a list of function calls
to be evaluated.
1 contract InternalExternal {
2 function f() internal returns (address) {
3 return msg.sender;
4 }
5
6 function g() external returns (address) {
7 return f();
8 }
9
10 function h() external returns (address) {
11 return tx.origin;
12 }
13
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14 function f1() public returns (address) {
15 return f();
16 }
17
18 function g1() public returns (address) {
19 return this.g();
20 }
21
22 function h1() public returns (address) {
23 return this.h();
24 }
25 }
26
27 c.f1();
28 c.g();
29 c.g1();
30 c.h();
31 c.h1();
Listing 2.6: Internal and external functions in a nutshell
This simple example shows a contract defining six functions. Some are internal
and some others are external. Let an instance c of InternalExternal be de-
ployed on the blockchain with address a1, and suppose we are making the invocations
listed below the contract definition using an account with address a2. First, neither
a1 nor a2 have absolutely nothing to do with the address of the miner, which actually
need not to correspond to an Ethereum account. Here, a2 is just the address of the
account initiating the transaction, which of course cannot be the miner. Secondly, note
that there is no c.f() since f() is not visible outside the context of c, due to its
internal modifier. Also note that we have to explicitly use this when calling an
external function from the same contract defining it (i.e. the body of g1() and h1()).
The following addresses are returned:
• c.f1() → a2
• c.g() → a2
• c.g1() → a1
• c.h() → a2
• c.h1() → a2
The third call, c.g1(), returns the address of the deployed contract c instead of
the one of the account we are making the calls from. This might seem surprising, but
actually it is not if we consider what we said about external functions. In fact, they are
implemented as new message calls, and thus msg.sender is modified accordingly:
we are invoking g() from the context of c, and hence the sender becomes equal to
the address of c. Indeed, when g() is directly called from the “outside”, we see the
address of our account, as we would expect. On the contrary, note that h() always
returns the address of our account, no matter who invokes it: this is because it reads
tx.origin, which always stores the initiator of the transaction, and it of course never
changes.
Example 2.4 (Functions as first-class values in Solidity). Listing 2.7 models a trivial
contract, Applier, storing only one state variable and exposing an interface composed
by a single method, apply, that inputs a function and applies it to the state variable,
returning the result. Test is only meant to show how to use Applier. It defines a ref-
erence to the latter contract and two functions, f1 and f2, to compute the square and
the double of the number 10. As you can see, function types in Solidity are quite com-
plex. Only internal or external functions can be used as values. The function
27
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
type defines the list of keywords that must appear in the definition of the parameters.
Indeed, both square and double are marked as view (so they do not modify any state)
and external (note the use of this to reference them). A mismatch in this keyword
list makes Solidity’s type system reject the function being used.
1 contract Applier {
2 uint private state;
3
4 constructor(uint _state) public {
5 state = _state;
6 }
7
8 function apply(function (uint) view external returns (uint) f)
view public returns (uint) {
9 return f(state);
10 }
11 }
12
13 contract Test {
14 Applier private app;
15
16 constructor() public {
17 app = new Applier(10);
18 }
19
20 function f1() view public returns (uint) {
21 return app.apply(this.square);
22 }
23
24 function f2() view public returns (uint) {
25 return app.apply(this.double);
26 }
27
28 function square(uint n) view external returns (uint) {
29 return n * n;
30 }
31
32 function double(uint n) view external returns (uint) {
33 return n + n;
34 }
35 }
Listing 2.7: Functions as values in Solidity
Lastly note that, for what we said before, the definition of Applier has to be
known when Test is compiled and deployed. In this example we can assume that both
the contracts are developed at the same time on the same machine, but in Ethereum this
is not necessary: an instance of Applier may already be on the blockchain when
Test is compiled and deployed. We shall go deeper on Ethereum’s separated compi-
lation and how to deal with it in Section 7.8; for now we can assume that the contracts
we use are written by the same programmers, and compiled and developed at the same
time.
Reference types Among the reference types we find dynamic arrays and structs.
The definition of the latter cannot contain a member of its own type, as the size of the
struct has to be finite.
Another interesting type is mapping. A mapping is declared as
mapping( KeyType ⇒ ValueType), where KeyType can be almost any type
except for a mapping, a dynamically sized array, a contract, an enum, and a struct.
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ValueType can actually be any type, including mappings. They can be seen as hash
tables virtually initialized such that every possible key exists and is mapped to a value
whose byte-representation is all zeros: a type’s default value, but the key data is not
actually stored in a mapping. Because of this, they do not have a length and cannot
be iterated over using loops. Mappings cannot be created locally to a function and are
only allowed for state variables: if they are used within a function, they have to reside
on the storage and point to a mapping state variable. It is possible to mark mappings
public and have Solidity create a getter. The KeyType will become a required
parameter for the getter and it will return ValueType. Listing 2.8 sums up what we
just said (please take note that this contract does not compile).
1 contract TestMapping {
2 mapping (uint => bool) private map;
3
4 function f1() public {
5 mapping (uint => bool) wrong; // this does not compile
6 }
7
8 function f2() public {
9 mapping (uint => bool) correct = map;
10 correct[0] = true; // this also modifies map[0]
11 }
12
13 // this function would be automatically created if ‘map‘ were
public
14 function map(uint n) public view returns (bool) {
15 return map[n];
16 }
17 }
Listing 2.8: Mappings in Solidity
2.4.3 Exceptions
Solidity uses state-reverting exceptions to handle errors. They are meant to undo all
changes made to the state in the current transaction and also flag an error to the caller.
When exceptions happen in a sub-call, they are rethrown automatically, and cannot be
caught. The reason for reverting is that there is no safe way to continue the execution,
because an expected effect did not occur. In fact, to retain atomicity of transactions,
the safest thing to do is to revert all changes and make the whole transaction without
effect. There are four ways to do so11:
• require(bool): used to ensure valid conditions, such as inputs, or contract
state variables are met, or to validate return values from calls to external con-
tracts;
• assert(bool): used to test for internal errors, such as division by zero or
out-of-bounds access to an array, and to check invariants;
• revert(): used to raise an error without providing a boolean expression;
• revert(string), also providing a string message about the error.
11The EVM raises require-like or assert-like exceptions in a number of scenarios. Re-
fer to https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/control-structures.html#
error-handling-assert-require-revert-and-exceptions for more information.
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Listing 2.9 provides an example of use of these four statements.
1 contract Exceptions {
2 address private owner;
3 address[] private array;
4
5 // constructor to initialize ‘owner‘ and ‘array‘ not shown
6
7 function onlyForTheOwner() public {
8 require (msg.sender == owner);
9 // do something
10 }
11
12 function arrayAt(uint i) public returns (address) {
13 assert (i < array.length);
14 return array[i];
15 }
16
17 function onlyForTheOwnerExplicit() public {
18 if (msg.sender != owner) {
19 revert();
20 }
21 // do something
22 }
23
24 function onlyForTheOwnerExplicitWithMessage() public {
25 if (msg.sender != owner) {
26 revert("You are not the owner of this contract!");
27 }
28 // do something
29 }
30 }
Listing 2.9: Exceptions in Solidity
2.4.4 Contracts
As said, contracts are similar to classes, and can be created “from outside” via Ethereum
transactions (using, for instance, the JavaScript library web3.js) or from within Solidity
contracts, via new. The full code of the contract being created has to be known in ad-
vance, so recursive creation-dependencies are not possible. Programmers can specify
an amount of Wei to send along with the creation (and such amount will become the
balance of the new contract), but they cannot specify the amount of gas. Contracts may
define one and only one constructor (hence, there is no overloading), which is executed
when the contract is being instantiated.
Visibility Solidity provides four types of visibilities for functions and state variables:
• external: external functions are part of the contract interface and can be
called from the outside, using transactions;
• public: public functions are similar to external ones, but can be called via
messages (and not via a new transaction). For public state variables, an external
getter is automatically added. Some types require these function to input parame-
ters. Examples are arrays and mappings. In general, given a public state variable
x of a simple type T, the getter function has the following signature: function
x() external returns (T). If T requires an additional parameter, such
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as for mappings, the signature is as follows: function x(KeyType k)
external returns (ValueType). The reason behind the external visi-
bility is that, from within the current contract, such variables can be accessed in
two ways: with this (i.e. this.x()) to call the getter and without it (i.e. x)
to access directly the variable without calling the getter;
• internal: internal members (i.e. functions and state variables) can be ac-
cessed from within the current contract or those deriving from it;
• private: private members are similar to internal ones, but can be accessed
only from within the current contract.
Others types of function Besides the visibility, Solidity allows programmers to an-
notate in many ways a function signature. First, payable enables a function to re-
ceive Ether, that will be added to the contract’s balance. If any value is sent to a
non-payable function an exception is thrown. Secondly, functions not modifying the
state12 can be marked as view. The automatically-generated getters fall into this cat-
egory. Function also not reading13 the state can be marked as pure. In general, they
are really rare. Solidity’s compiler do not check the compliance of a function with the
markers view and pure, and it is not possible to prevent functions from reading the
state at the level of the EVM.
Every contract may contain only one fallback function, which has no name, no pa-
rameters and returns no value. It is executed whenever a contract is sent Ether without
invoking a specific function (i.e. using, for example, transfer or send), and must
consequently be payable, or whenever a call does not match with any of the function
in the contract’s interface. If it does not exist, the contract cannot receive Ether through
regular transactions. It can only rely on 2300 gas, leaving not much room to perform
operations except basic logging. For instance, writing to storage, creating a new con-
tract or sending Ether consume more than 2300 gas. It is worth to mention that a
contract might receive Ether as a consequence of another contract’s selfdestruct.
selfdestruct is an operation allowing a contract to terminate itself, sending all its
balance to another account. A contract not defining any fallback is allowed to receive
an amount of Ether this way, but may not reject them.
Now that we know what a fallback function is, we can explain the difference be-
tween send and transfer. The behavior of the former is quite similar to the lat-
ter’s: an amount of Wei can be sent to another account, and if the latter is a contract,
its fallback function, if any, is executed. If no fallback is defined, transfer raises a
revert and aborts the execution, whereas send simply returns false to the caller.
Hence, checking the returned boolean is extremely important, since programmers have
to rely exclusively on it to get to know the result of the money transfer. If it failed, they
should explicitly abort the transaction or try to recover from the error. Nonetheless,
clumsy implementations might not check this boolean value, thus introducing danger-
ous bugs in the contract itself. Example 2.5 shows the two functions in action.
Example 2.5 (send vs transfer). Consider Listing 2.10 pointing out the differ-
ences between functions send and transfer in Solidity. A, B, and C are three
simple contracts defining only a fallback function, with some differences:
12For a complete list of the forbidden operations see https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/
develop/contracts.html#view-functions
13For a complete list of the forbidden operations see https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/
develop/contracts.html#pure-functions
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• A’s fallback has an empty body;
• B’s fallback is ill-defined, since it is not marked as payable;
• C’s fallback is well-defined, but its body contains a call to revert().
1 contract A {
2 function() public payable {}
3 }
4
5 contract B {
6 function() public {}
7 }
8
9 contract C {
10 function() public payable {
11 revert();
12 }
13 }
14
15 contract Test {
16 address a;
17
18 constructor(address _a) public payable {
19 a = _a;
20 }
21
22 function transfer() public {
23 a.transfer(address(this).balance);
24 }
25
26 function send() public returns(bool) {
27 return a.send(address(this).balance);
28 }
29 }
Listing 2.10: send and transfer in action
Now consider Test: it is initialized with a contract’s address and provides two func-
tions, transfer and send, invoking the functions of the same name. The results of
their invocation with addresses pointing to an instance of A, B, and C, respectively, are
as follows:
• A :
• transfer → No revert
• send → true
•B :
• transfer → revert
• send → false
•C :
• transfer → revert
• send → false
A’s results are as expected: transfer executes correctly and so does send, which
in fact returns true. On the other hand, B and C make transfer raise a revert,
thus propagating the exception, whereas send simply returns false. If this boolean
is not correctly handled, the caller may erroneously assume that everything went fine.
Inheritance Solidity supports multiple-inheritance and polymorphism by copying
code. All function calls are virtual, and hence the most-derived suitable function is
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called, except when the contract’s name is explicitly provided. When a contract inherits
from multiple contracts, only a single contract is created on the blockchain, and the
code from all the base contracts is copied into the created contract.
The reader interested only in the functionality of Solidity modeled in FS may skip
this part, as FS does not include any multiple-inheritance.
Before diving into the way function calls work, it is worth to mention a problem
that affects languages allowing multiple-inheritance: the diamond problem, sometimes
referred to as “deadly diamond of death” [32]. Example 2.6 explains it.
Example 2.6 (Diamond problem). Consider the hierarchy shown in Figure 2.3. Con-
Figure 2.3: Class hierarchy showing the diamond problem
tract A defines a state variable i as well as a function f. It is then extended by two more
contracts, B and C, defining, respectively, state variables j and k. They also override
f. Lastly, contract D inherits from both B and C. Two are the problem arising from this
hierarchy. First, if an instance of D call f, which f is to be invoked, B’s one or C’s
one? Secondly, which value of i is actually visible in D? Both B and C inherit this state
variable from A, and the value they assign to it is, in general, different.
These two problems are solved by Solidity in the same way as Python does. Using
C3 linearization programmers force a specific inheritance order, so that no ambiguity
can arise. Such an order is specified after the is keyword, from “most base-like” to
“most derived”. This mechanism rules out some hierarchies, but effectively solves the
diamond problem. Bearing this in mind, Example 2.7 explains how virtual calls work,
and how the former aforementioned ambiguity is solved.
Example 2.7 (Function calls with multiple-inheritance). Consider the contracts listed
in Listing 2.11, and the corresponding calls at the end. We use a lowercase letter (e.g.
a) to indicate an instance of the contract named with the same, capital, letter (e.g. A).
1 contract A {
2 string public x;
3
4 function f() public {
5 x = "A";
6 }
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7 }
8
9 contract B is A {
10 function f() public { x = "B"; }
11 }
12
13 contract C1 is A {
14 function f() public { x = "C1"; }
15 }
16
17 contract C2 is A {
18 function f() public { super.f(); }
19 }
20
21 contract D1 is B, C1 {}
22
23 contract D2 is B, C2 {}
24
25 a.f();
26 b.f();
27 c1.f();
28 c2.f();
29 d1.f();
30 d2.f();
Listing 2.11: Virtual function calls in Solidity
Note how Solidity specifies inheritance: the keyword is is used to introduce the in-
heritance list. Initially, x is given string’s default value (i.e. the empty string “”).
Afterwards, every call to f modifies such value in some way. a.f(), b.f() and
c1.f()have the expected effect, and set x to, respectively, “A”, “B” and “C1”. super
has the expected meaning: it refers to the immediate supercontract. For c2.f() the
immediate supercontract is quite evident: it is A, and the function sets x to “A”. More
confusing are the cases regarding D1 and D2. Remember the order in the inheritance
list goes from the most-base to the most-derived contract. Hence, d1.f() calls f in
C1, and sets x to “C1”. d2.f() is more interesting. It causes the call of f in C2,
which, in turn, calls the f of its super. Nonetheless, this super is not C2’s super-
contract, but instead the next contract in the inheritance list of D2: B. Hence, d2.f()
sets x to “B”.
Subcontracts need to explicitly call the constructor of the contracts they derive.
Such constructors are then invoked in the order specified in the inheritance list. There
are two ways to do so:
• in the inheritance list itself: contract Derived is Base(base args);
• in the base contract constructor’s signature: constructor (base args,
derived args) Base (base args) {}.
Specifying arguments in both ways is an error. Constructors may be public or
internal. In the latter case, the contract is turned abstract, and so is if it does
not provide all the parameters required by its base contract(s).
Contracts are marked as abstract when at least one of their functions lacks an imple-
mentation. They cannot be deployed, but can be used as a base constructor. As usual, if
a contract inherits from an abstract one and does not implement all the unimplemented
functions, it is marked as abstract, too. Abstract contract provide implementation in-
heritance and facilitate patterns such as the Template method. As in Java, alongside
abstract contracts are interfaces. Many restrictions apply to interfaces:
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• no implemented functions;
• cannot inherit other contracts or interfaces;
• cannot define constructor;
• cannot define variables;
• cannot define structs;
• cannot define enums.
Casts In Solidity, given a value of type address, it is possible to retrieve the corre-
sponding contract instance residing on the blockchain. This operation can be thought
of as a cast address→Contract, but it presents many differences with casts in
object-oriented languages, and its behavior can lead to bugs difficult to catch.
Let us begin with a high-level description of how a cast is carried out in Solidity.
Consider a statement like the following: C(a), where C is a contract name and a
is an address. First, in statically typed languages, it would compile if and only if a
really corresponds to an instance of C. In Solidity this is not true at all. C(a) always
compiles, even if a refers to another contract D, but there is more. Suppose that the
definition of C, as well as the one of D, contains a function f(), and suppose there
is another contract declaration E, which does not contain any f(). Now consider the
statement C(a).f(); according to the actual instance a refers to three things may
happen:
• if a refers to an instance of C everything works as expected, and f() in C is
called;
• if a refers to an instance of D, the cast compiles and executes successfully, as
well as the function invocation. However, since a points to a contract of type D,
f() in D is called without any warning to the programmer;
• even more surprisingly, if a refers to an instance of E the cast still is successful.
Nonetheless, at run-time, no f() is found since the declaration of E does not
contain it. Hence, a revert is thrown and the transaction is aborted.
Example 2.8 sums up this behavior.
Example 2.8 (Casts behavior in Solidity). Listing 2.12 contains three simple contracts,
A, B, and C, defining a function (f() for A and B, g() for C) invoked by a fourth
contract, Cast. The latter contains three addresses as state variables: suppose they
are correctly initialized, that is a refers to an instance of A, b to an instance of B, and
c to an instance of C.
1 contract A {
2 function f() public pure returns (string) {
3 return "A";
4 }
5 }
6
7 contract B {
8 function f() public pure returns (string) {
9 return "B";
10 }
11 }
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12
13 contract C {
14 function g() public pure returns (string) {
15 return "C";
16 }
17 }
18
19 contract Cast {
20 address private a;
21 address private b;
22 address private c;
23
24 constructor(address _a, address _b, address _c) public {
25 a = _a;
26 b = _b;
27 c = _c;
28 }
29
30 function f1() public view returns (string) {
31 return A(a).f();
32 }
33
34 function f2() public view returns (string) {
35 return B(a).f();
36 }
37
38 function f3() public view returns (string) {
39 return A(b).f();
40 }
41
42 function f4() public view returns (string) {
43 return A(c).f();
44 }
45
46 /*
47 f5() does not compile!
48 function f5() public view returns (string) {
49 return C(a).f();
50 }
51 */
52
53 function f6() public view returns (string) {
54 return C(a).g();
55 }
56 }
Listing 2.12: Casts behavior in Solidity
We start our discussion from f5(), which does not compile. The reason is that, after
a cast, the static type of C(a) is C, and C does not contain any function named f. The
compiler detects the violation and makes the contract not compile. The other function
calls are all successful, and produce results as follows:
• f1() → “A”
• f2() → “A”
• f3() → “B”
• f4() → revert
• f6() → revert
f1() behaves as expected, since a points to an instance of A. Also the second call
results in an invocation of f() in A, because, as we said, a refers to an instance of A
and at run-time the code inspected to find a suitable function is the one of A, not B,
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even though the static type of B(a) is B. f3() confirms this behavior, and now f()
in B is invoked (since the address b points to an instance of B). f4() and f6() throw
a revert. Starting from the former, c refers to a contract of type C, whose code does
not contain any declaration of f(). At run-time, the cast will be successful, but the
function call will not. The same applies to the latter. The comparison of f5() and
f6() reveals that the compiler does check if the function to be called is defined in the
contract corresponding to the static type, but it does nothing to enforce that the address
used as a parameter actually points to the desired contract. Perhaps worse, the compiler
does not give any warnings.
As we saw, casts in Solidity are extremely difficult to deal with and can lead to sub-
tle bugs. In Chapter 5 we shall model a slightly safer version of this, where reverts
are raised if the address does not refer to the desired contract (and a warning is given
at compile-time). Then, in Chapter 7, we shall propose an extension to better solve this
issue.
Events To further illustrate a possible field of application for events, Example 2.9
lists a simple oracle. Oracles in general work as follows: an application calls an or-
acle’s function to specify the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of an operation to be
invoked. Such function emits an event, caught by an external blockchain-monitoring
application, which takes the URL, invokes the operation, and calls back the original
contract to provide the result. In this way a value depending on external factors is
sent as a parameter to a contract’s function, thus preserving the determinism of the
transaction. Random number are ofter generated in such a way.
Example 2.9 (Oracle). The snipped in Listing 2.13 models a very simple application
using a built-in oracle to continuously monitor the temperature of a room.
1 contract Oracle {
2 event Execute(address, string);
3
4 function execute(string url) external {
5 emit Execute(msg.sender, url);
6 }
7 }
8
9 contract Room {
10 uint public temperature;
11 Oracle oracle;
12
13 constructor(uint _temperature, address _oracle) public {
14 temperature = _temperature;
15 oracle = Oracle(_oracle);
16 }
17
18 function getTemperature() public {
19 oracle.execute("...");
20 }
21
22 function callback(uint _temperature) public {
23 temperature = _temperature;
24 }
25 }
Listing 2.13: Oracle in Solidity
Oracle models the oracle contract and defines only a function, execute(), taking
a string representing a URL and, ideally, getting the result of the operation identified
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by such URL. To this end, the function simply emits an event and lets an external
application deal with it. It should then invoke Room’s callback, which handles the
result.
Even though this approach works fine in theory, it should be clear that it is really
fragile. What happens if Room does not define any callbacks or if the address used
as a parameter in Room’s constructor does not actually correspond to an instance of
Oracle? In these cases the execution cannot further proceed and a revert is raised.
We shall see how to solve it in Chapter 7.
Additional examples of code Appendix D contains additional examples of smart
contracts written in Solidity.
2.5 Decentralized applications
Normally, web applications consist of a web-based front-end taking commands from
users and sending them to a server-side back-end, located somewhere. This server
side creates a point of centralization that can fail or suddenly become unavailable.
This is solved by Ethereum and Decentralized Applications (DApps). A DApp is an
application using Ethereum and smart contracts as a back-end, which now runs in a
distributed fashion on the blockchain, thus avoiding the centralization issue. In this
configuration, smart contracts implement only a small part of the entire application (i.e.
the business logic), since executing things on the blockchain is computational and time
expensive. Hence, DApps should typically have their own suite of associated contracts
on the blockchain which they use to encode business logic and allow persistent storage
of their consensus-critical state.
The front-end is generally browser-based and built using the JavaScript library
web3.js, of which we have seen (and will see soon) an example, but this is not manda-
tory. As we pointed out, many programming languages, from Python to Java and from
Scala to Haskell offer a library to interact with Ethereum, and can thus be used to build
non-browser-based applications interacting with smart contracts and the blockchain.
Below we go a bit deeper on how to build a DApp. Example 2.1 explained how
to deploy and interact with a contract, but provided no additional information on how
a Dapp performs the actions regarding the blockchain. To this end, a Dapp has to
communicate with an Ethereum node (i.e. a computer with a copy of the Ethereum
blockchain mining and validating transactions), which, in web3.js, translates in using
an instance of the class Web3. For browser-based applications, this is best done using a
browser extension known as MetaMask14: it implements a Web3 provider that commu-
nicates with the browser extension, which in turn sends API calls to whatever node the
user has chosen. It may seem counterintuitive to use an intermediary like MetaMask
rather than communicating directly with a node (which is done creating an instance of
HttpProvider), but MetaMask performs an important function: it keeps a user’s
private key secure. Ethereum transactions need to be signed with an account’s private
key, but allowing an application unlimited access to that private key would mean that a
malicious application could drain a user’s account. Instead, MetaMask intercepts each
operation that requires a signature, prompts the user to approve that operation, and then
creates the signature using the private key. This way, users are in full control of how
their private key is used.
14https://metamask.io/
38
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
There are many ways to use MetaMask when getting an instance of Web3: the
recommended one is shown in Listing 2.14, and should be executed when the page is
fully loaded, to give MetaMask the chance to inject the variable web3.
1 if (typeof(web3) === "undefined") {
2 error("Unable to find web3, please run MetaMask");
3 } else {
4 web3 = new Web3(window.web3.currentProvider);
5 }
Listing 2.14: Creating an instance of Web3 using MetaMask
Now that we know a bit more about how Solidity works, we can show a better way
to interact with smart contracts. Remember what we said about view functions: their
body does not mutate the contract’s state. At a first glance this modifier seems unuseful,
since the compiler does nothing to enforce it (at the time of writing, Remix just gives a
warning), but it is extremely important for application interacting with a smart contract.
Not mutating any state means that view functions can be safely computed by any node
with an up-to-date copy of the blockchain, without even requiring a transaction. This
makes view function calls fast and free (no gas beforehand payment is required). On
the other hand, functions mutating a contract’s state require sending a transaction to
the blockchain and waiting for confirmation. When they are invoked from the front-
end of a DApp, MetaMask will prompt the user to approve the transaction, including
the attached gas and the gas price. Figure 2.4 depicts such approval request.
Figure 2.4: MetaMask asking for a transaction confirmation: (1) represents the
Ethereum network the transaction is being sent to (a number of test networks are avail-
able to test contracts before deploying them to the “official” one); (2) represents our
account (i.e. the one sending the transaction); (3) is the recipient; (4) allows users to
change the maximum amount of gas and the price for one unit of gas and shows the
amount of Ether being sent; and lastly (5) sums up the maximum cost of the current
transaction (i.e. Amount + Max Transition Fee).
To conclude this Chapter, Example 2.10 define a blood bank smart contract (written
in Solidity) and shows how to invoke view and non-view functions in web3.js.
Example 2.10 (A basic DApp). Listing 2.15 models a blood bank.
1 contract BloodBank {
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2 mapping (address => bool) private healty;
3 address public doctor;
4 uint public blood;
5
6 constructor() public {
7 doctor = msg.sender;
8 }
9
10 function setHealth(address _donor, bool _isHealty) public {
11 require(msg.sender == doctor);
12 healty[_donor] = _isHealty;
13 }
14
15 function isHealty(address _donor) public view returns (bool) {
16 require (msg.sender == doctor);
17 return healty[_donor];
18 }
19
20 function donate(uint _amount) public returns (bool) {
21 uint donorBlood = Donor(msg.sender).blood();
22 if (healty[msg.sender] && donorBlood > 3000 && donorBlood
- _amount > 0) {
23 blood += _amount;
24 return true;
25 }
26 return false;
27 }
28 }
29
30 contract Donor {
31 uint public blood;
32 BloodBank public bank;
33
34 constructor(address _bank) public {
35 blood = 5000;
36 bank = BloodBank(_bank);
37 }
38
39 function donate(uint _amount) public {
40 if (bank.donate(_amount)) {
41 blood -= _amount;
42 }
43 }
44 }
Listing 2.15: Donor and BloodBank contracts in Solidity syntax
Since not every donor is allowed to donate, BloodBank contains a mapping
address => bool to keep track, for each possible donor, of their health state, here
represented by a bool (set by default to false). Only the doctor may change such
values, as shown in setHealth(). If such function is called by someone else, the
execution is stopped with an error. This is a common pattern in Solidity, where access
control is modeled keeping track of the addresses allowed to do something and aborting
the transaction if there is a mismatch. To explain how to call view functions from an
external application, we also defined a function isHealty() to query the healthiness
of a donor.
Allowed donors may donate an amount of blood of their choice. A donation might
not succeed for two reasons: either the donor is not in health or they have too low blood
in their body. The blood() function is a getter automatically generated by Solidity.
Every successful donation increments the state variable blood.
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Donor represents a human donor, characterized by an amount of blood (blood,
set to five liters for the sake of simplicity) and by an explicit reference to its blood
bank. This reference is set in Donor’s constructor from a value of type address. A
donor donates by invoking donate(), which in turn attempts to call BloodBank’s
donate() function. If the donation was successful, the amount of blood is reduced.
Note that the function donate() in BloodBank might be invoked also by EOAs
or any other contract instances, instead of Donor’s. In this case, as pointed out in
Example 2.8, the cast would still be successful, but, if no function blood() was
defined by the caller, the runtime would throw a revert, thus aborting the transaction.
Now consider Listing 2.16, representing a very basic DApp using the two contracts
defined above. First, we compile and deploy them, as we did in Example 2.1, and
then we show two different interactions, from two different EOA: the doctor (identified
by doctorAddress), and the donor (identified by humanDonorAddress). The
following scenario is shown:
• a doctor (the same doctor stored in the instance of BloodBank) checks the
health status of a patient and afterwards sets it to true;
• the very same patient attempts to donate 500ml of blood using the functions
exposed by Donor.
Generally, the same DApp shows two different interfaces to, respectively, the doctor
and the donor, allowing them to carry out different operations. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we omit the specifications of gas parameters. Furthermore, we wrap the interaction
with smart contracts in JavaScript functions: in a normal application, the latter are
meant to be invoked as a reaction to an event (such as a pressed button).
1 // for the sake of simplicity gas parameters are not shown here
2
3 // Compilation
4 var bankCode = fs.readFileSync(’BloodBank.sol’).toString();
5 var donorCode = fs.readFileSync(’Donor.sol’).toString();
6 var solc = require(’solc’);
7 var compiledBankCode = solc.compile(bankCode);
8 var compiledDonorCode = solc.compile(donorCode);
9
10 var bankByteCode = compiledBankCode.contracts[’:BloodBank’].
bytecode;
11 var bankAbi = JSON.parse(compiledBankCode.contracts[’:BloodBank’].
interface);
12 var donorByteCode = compiledDonorCode.contracts[’:Donor’].bytecode
;
13 var donorAbi = JSON.parse(compiledDonorCode.contracts[’:Donor’].
interface);
14
15 // EOA addresses
16 var doctorAddress = ’0x...’;
17 var humanDonorAddress = ’0x...’
18
19 // Deploy
20 var BloodBank = web3.eth.contract(bankAbi);
21 var deployedBank = BloodBank.new({
22 data: bankByteCode,
23 from: doctorAddress
24 });
25
26 var Donor = web3.eth.contract(donorAbi);
27 var deployedDonor = Donor.new(
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28 deployedBank.address, {
29 data: donorByteCode,
30 from: humanDonorAddress
31 }
32 );
33
34 // contract instances
35 var bloodbank = BloodBank.at(deployedBank.address);
36 var donor = Donor.at(deployedDonor.address);
37
38 /*
39 Simulating interaction from different parties:
40 1) a doctor checks the health status of a patient and
afterwards sets it to ‘true‘.
41 2) a patient donates 500ml of their blood.
42 The sequence of calls is chained using the mechanism of callbacks.
43 */
44
45 // party 1: the doctor
46 // check the health status without any transactions
47 function isHealty() {
48 bloodbank.isHealty.call(deployedDonor.address, {from:
doctorAddress}, function (err, healthStatus) {
49 if (err) {
50 // do something to handle the error
51 } else {
52 // do something with ‘healthStatus‘
53 }
54 });
55 }
56
57 // set the health status to ‘true‘ via a transaction
58 function setHealth() {
59 bloodbank.setHealth.sendTransaction(deployedDonor.address,
true, {from: doctorAddress},
60 function (err, hash) {
61 if (err) {
62 // do something to handle the error
63 } else {
64 // wait for the transaction confirmation checking
its status via the method
65 // web3.eth.getTransactionReceipt(hash, callback)
66 }
67 }
68 );
69 }
70
71
72 // party 2: the human donor
73 function donate() {
74 donor.donate.sendTransaction(500, {from: humanDonorAddress},
75 function (err, hash) {
76 if (err) {
77 // do something to handle the error
78 } else {
79 // wait for the transaction confirmation checking
its status via the method
80 // web3.eth.getTransactionReceipt(hash, callback)
81 }
82 }
83 );
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84 }
Listing 2.16: Basic DApp using BloodBank and Donor
Starting from the doctor, note the difference between a view function call, isHealty(),
and a non-view one, setHealth(). In Example 2.1 we used a different way to
call a smart contract, omitting call() and sendTransaction(): this is all right
and simply let the run-time choose whether to send a transaction or not, if it is not
necessary. Consider the call to isHealty() at Line 48: specifying call() af-
ter the name of the function, we tell the run-time that we do not want to send a
transaction. Bearing in mind that isHealty() is marked as view, any node can
immediately execute it without mutating the blockchain, and hence the result is im-
mediately available. On the contrary, when invoking setHealth() (Line 59), a
transaction is necessary since the function modifies the contract’s state, and we make
it explicit with sendTransaction(). In this case, what we get in the callback
is not the value returned from setHealth(), but simply the transaction’s hash,
which can be used to monitor the transaction status (has it been processed? was it
successful?) with the function web3.eth.getTransactionReceipt(hash,
callback). This method calls a callback with two parameters, error and receipt,
where the latter is null as long as the transaction is pending. Also note that we specify
deployedDonor.address as a parameter. We could have used humanAddress
instead, but the contract Donor is intended to mediate between an EOA (here repre-
sented by humanAddress) and an instance of BloodBank. During the donation, it
will be an instance of Donor that invokes donate() on an instance of BloodBank:
setting the health status of humanAddress is then incorrect. Furthermore, if we had
used donor instead of deployedDonor.address, that would have been incor-
rect too, since the parameter of the function setHealty() in BloodBank is of
type address.
The donor part is no different, with an EOA calling a function of Donor via a
transaction.
This example went deeper on how web3.js works and explained the difference in
usage between view and non-view functions. It also confirmed a very interesting
thing: web3.js allows us to specify the sender of a function invocation programmati-
cally with the from property. We shall see shortly that this possibility inspired and
guided us while modeling our calculus.
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Chapter 3
Related work
In this chapter we outline various paper that address, in one way or another, the relia-
bility of smart contracts. We aim to give a comprehensive view of all the related work,
focusing on, but not limiting to, the formal aspect.
3.1 Blockchain and design of smart contracts
Delmolino et al. [17] outline many differences between normal programs and smart
contracts. They analyzed the most common errors that introduce vulnerabilities or
bugs in Solidity code, and they have been the first group to prove that writing smart
contracts is by far more sensitive than implementing normal programs.
Parizi, Dehghantanha, et al. [36] have conducted a usability and vulnerability study
comparing Solidity with other programming languages, Pact1 and Liquidity2, designed
for two different blockchains. Measuring these two parameters is important because
it tells us how intuitive a language is and how probable is to introduce bugs during
its usage. The results say that Solidity is more usable than the others, with a very
low average implementation time, but it is also the most vulnerable. Indeed, Pact and
Liquidity contracts developed during the experiment did not have any vulnerabilities,
whereas Solidity ones suffered from reentrancy (the same vulnerability as The DAO)
and Denial of Service caused by unexpected reverts. Sad to say, Solidity is the most
popular and most used among the three. Hence, studying and formalizing it is a very
good way to develop tools and methods to help programmers reduce the number of
vulnerabilities in their code.
As common in programming languages, a set of patterns exist to limit the threats
a smart contract can suffer from. The official documentation of Solidity lists a couple
of them, but Wo¨hrer and Zdun [52] state and explain a series of design pattern to help
programmers avoid common errors or wrong designs. The idea is exactly the same as
in object-oriented programming, where design patterns are widespread: each contract
should accomplish a single functionality and it should have a single responsibility. De-
coupling the code makes it easier to read and modify it, reducing the risk of including
vulnerabilities. Using design patters is a solution of an higher level than the one we
address: patters might make the code simpler, but in Solidity there is the need of being
100% sure that a contract does not contain any backdoor. The good properties of these
patters should be formally proven, and our work can help in this direction.
1http://kadena.io/#pactModal
2http://www.liquidity-lang.org/
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Atzei, Bartoletti, and Cimoli [6] provide a list of many smart contract vulnerabili-
ties in Ethereum. Along with reentrancy and exceptions are many other subtle bugs that
can make a contract misbehave, such as casts or a poor design. In recent years, many
works have focused on developing tools aiming to detect some of these vulnerabilities.
However, the vast majority does so by using heuristics, with false positives and nega-
tives, that cannot be used to be 100% sure about the absence of bugs. Tikhomirov et al.
[49] provide an in-depth classification of many issues Solidity code can suffer from,
classifying them into four categories: security (they can lead to malicious exploits),
functional (the intended functionality is not achieved), operational (they can lead to
run-time problems, such as poor performance), and developmental (making the code
difficult to read, maintain, and improve).
Sergey and Hobor [44] give practical examples of concurrent behaviors at the level
of the blockchain during the execution of smart contracts. In fact, the order of the trans-
actions included into a block is not determined when a transaction runs, and, thus, the
outcome can largely depend on the ordering with respect to other transactions, as al-
ready pointed out by Luu et al. [31]. Sergey and Hobor make the parallelism “Accounts
using smart contracts in a blockchain are like threads using concurrent objects in shared
memory”, and identify many issues that can arise from this (implicit) concurrency.
Pettersson and Edstro¨m [37] propose a library for the programming language Idris3
that allows for the development of secure smart contracts using dependent and poly-
morphic types. They extend the existing Idris compiler with a generator for Serpent4
code (a Python-like high-level language for Ethereum smart contracts). This compiler
is a proof of concept and fails in compiling more advanced contracts (as it cannot han-
dle recursion). Furthermore, Serpent is explicitly not recommended for developing
smart contracts.
Mavridou and Laszka [33] design a kind of graphical editor for collaborative devel-
opment of smart contracts based on finite state machines. Automata are a well known
tool in computer science, and this type of development process could be more intuitive
for some programmers. The tool also provides some built-in patterns to avoid common
vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, the work lacks formal foundations and there is no proof
of correctness of the translation from the state machines to Solidity. FS could help in
this way: a similar tool generating FS code could be developed. Thanks to our formal-
ization, every translation step (graphical editor → FS → Solidity/bytecode) could be
proven correct. We believe that this path is a very promising one, as programmers often
do not know what they are doing: an intuitive, well designed, and correct by construc-
tion, graphical editor could reduce the number of bugs and security vulnerabilities.
3.2 Formalizations of the Ethereum Virtual Machine
KEVM [23], by Hildenbrandt et al., is the first fully executable semantics for the EVM.
It has been created in theK framework [42], and various tools for contracts verification
have been generated from it. K is an executable semantic framework in which pro-
gramming languages, type systems and formal analysis tools can be defined. Taking
such formal language definitions as input, K generates a variety of tools for the de-
fined language, without any other piece of knowledge about the given language except
its formal syntax and semantics. KEVM not only has served as a verification tool for
smart contracts, but it has also revealed many ambiguities and potential sources of er-
3https://www.idris-lang.org/
4https://github.com/ethereum/serpent
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ror in the existing formalization of the EVM semantics [53], such as delegatecall
or overflows. KEVM have passed all the tests for EVM implementations. Before this
work, no rigorous and complete formalization of the virtual machine had existed, leav-
ing a lack of rigor to base verification tools on.
KEVM is not the only existing formalization. Hirai [24] does the same thing us-
ing Isabelle/HOL5, a higher-order logic theorem proving environment well suited for
formal verification of software (i.e. proving properties of computer languages and
protocols). Hirai proves safety properties and invariants of Ethereum contracts in the
presence of reentrancy. As a side effect, 13 inconsistencies (with respect to [53]) have
been discovered. This work has posed the basis for many other works. In particu-
lar, Amani et al. [4] extended [24] covering smart contract correctness properties and
giving a separate universal treatment of termination based on Ethereum’s concept of
execution “gas”. This program logic allows the verification of smart contracts at the
bytecode level.
A third work [21], by Grishchenko, Maffei, and Schneidewind, formalizes a small-
step semantics for EVM bytecode and a formalization in F*6 of a large part of this
semantics. The aim is the same as before: formalizing, and validating, security proper-
ties on smart contracts.
Formalizing the virtual machine is a research path running in parallel with the for-
malization of Solidity. The two are strictly related, since Solidity code is compiled
down into bytecode, and expressing properties on the latter is of great utility. How-
ever, we believe that programmers do not have to do directly with the virtual machine.
Instead of aiming for correction by construction (i.e. writing smart contracts and then
analyzing the bytecode they produce), ameliorating the languages operating on a high
level, closer to programmers, could be of greater utility in the direction of writing bet-
ter contracts. This the reason why FS formalizes the core part of Solidity, as well as its
semantics and type system, and proposes some improvements.
3.3 Smart contracts analysis
Many recent works address smart contract implementations from a formal point of
view. Two are the possible approaches: analyzing the EVM bytecode or working on
a higher level, taking into account, for example, Solidity code. Both have pros and
cons. The former, for example, has the advantage that the bytecode is stable and that
it does not change (or it does in a quite limited way) over time. Many high level
languages can be designed, but, in order to run in Ethereum, all have to be finally
“translated” into bytecode. Programmers, however, do no develop programs using the
bytecode. Instead, they use high level languages such as Solidity. Hence, formalizing
and working on these languages narrows the gap between programmers and Ethereum.
Pattern and best practices can be tailored in one language, and formal methods can
help programmers in writing code respecting these patterns. Nonetheless, languages
like Solidity are less mature, and changes may introduce deep modifications from one
release to another. Furthermore, also the compiler have to be analyzed and proven bug-
free. Currently, the Solidity compiler is written in C++, and importing its definition
in a theorem prover is nearly impossible. In fact, the definition of the whole C++11
language has not been formalized yet, although some of the hardest aspects of the
language, such as concurrency [7] or inheritance [41], have been addressed. Hence,
5https://isabelle.in.tum.de/
6https://www.fstar-lang.org/#introduction
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formal verification of Solidity code has to operate outside theorem provers: this is
possible, but rather difficult, since many aspects of Solidity’s semantics might change
over time. The way we chose is to formalize a calculus modeling the core part of this
language, proving properties of its type system and proposing extensions addressing
some of its flaws.
Program analysis can be either static or dynamic. The latter is basically like testing,
and can reveal only the presence of bugs, not prove their absence. The former, instead,
examines the code without running it. The process provides an understanding of the
code structure, and can help ensure that the code adheres to certain properties. Usually,
static analysis behaves as follows:
1. an intermediate representation (IR), such as an abstract syntax tree, is built from
the source code;
2. the IR is enriched with additional information, using algorithms such as control-
and dataflow analysis, taint analysis, symbolic execution, or abstract interpreta-
tion, depending on what the IR is used for;
3. vulnerability detection with respect to a database of patterns, which define vul-
nerability criteria in IR terms.
3.3.1 Static analysis
Le et al. [29] address the conditional termination of smart contracts. Even though So-
lidity uses gas to make sure that every function eventually terminates (possibly with a
revert due to an out-of-gas exception), a mechanism to prove conditional termina-
tion can be useful in other languages compiling down into EVM bytecode. Further-
more, it can be applied also to Solidity contracts to solve the problem by construction:
letting a contract compile when one, or more, of its functions will for sure terminate
only thanks to gas is a waste of money and also an error that should be corrected as
soon as possible. FS assumes every program as a terminating one, but we could include
this work to prove conditional termination.
One of the first static analysis tools for Solidity is OYENTE [31]. Luu et al. [31]
provided a list of common vulnerabilities, proposing a better design (which requires
all clients in the network to upgrade) and a tool to help programmers develop better
contracts. OYENTE is based on symbolic execution, which represents each program
variable as a symbolic expression. Each execution path is then expressed in terms of a
logic formula built over the symbolic expressions. In order for the execution to follow
the path, all the actual values must satisfy that formula. Of course, if there are no
values satisfying those constraints, the path will never be taken at run-time. Symbolic
execution can achieve, in principle, a better precision and a lower false positives rate
(with respect to, for example taint or data flow analysis) but, in general, it also gets a
lower code coverage. OYENTE’s main aim was to prove that the semantics of Solidity
is subtle, and that the vulnerabilities Luu et al. identified actually happened in practice.
Their thoughts were confirmed: out of 19366 analyzed contracts, 8833 contained at
least a vulnerability (according to OYENTE). It was possible to collect the actual code
of only 175 of these contracts, and the false positives rate was of 6.4% (i.e. 10 cases
out of 175).
OYENTE has been extended in many ways. One of them is ETHIR [2], by Albert
et al., a tool for decompilation of EVM bytecode into a high-level representation in a
rule-based form. This form makes it easier to apply the existing tools to infer properties
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of the bytecode, because the control and the data flow are explicit. It does so by initially
using OYENTE to produce a set of blocks that store the information needed to represent
the control flow graph of a set of EVM instructions. It then translates this graph (or
better, each block of this graph) into a rule-based representation.
Rosu [43] collects the recent progress in using the K framework to verify smart
contracts semantics. The work formalized the semantics of Vyper in K, and found
several bugs and inconsistencies. Vyper7 is a novel programming language, compil-
ing to EVM, for smart contracts that aim for increased security, simplicity, and human
readability. Along with Vyper, a novel consensus protocol, Casper [11], is being de-
veloped. It is meant to save wasteful electricity expenditures and at the same time
provide greatly increased security. Verifying Casper behavior and Vyper code is very
important, since they will play a key role for Ethereum in the near future. Rosu are also
formalizing the actual protocol in Coq8 and Isabelle.
Chen et al. have identified first 7 [13] and then 24 [12] anti-patterns in smart con-
tract design. They define an anti-pattern as an EVM operation sequence that can be
replaced with another one that has the same semantics but needs less gas. Hence, their
work focus on finding methods to detect and reduce the waste of gas, making Ethereum
users spend less money. It might seem that detecting gas waste is not as crucial as de-
tecting other vulnerabilities, but this is not true. Smart contracts are so critical that
their implementation should be deeply reasoned about and optimized, in order not to
perform unnecessary operations that may introduce bugs. Chen et al. [12] have de-
veloped GASREDUCER, a tool that analyzes contracts looking for these anti-patterns.
They have analyzed all the deployed smart contracts (i.e., 599,959 as of 10 June, 2017),
and detected 9,490,768 instances of anti-patterns wasting 2,040,892,224 units of gas.
The calculus we are to propose can integrate these anti-patterns definitions for proving
that a given contract does not suffer from any of them. In fact, currently GASREDUCER
works on the bytecode. “Merging” it with Featherweight Solidity would mean reducing
the gap between EVM code and Solidity code.
Tikhomirov et al. [49] provide a static analysis tool, SMARTCHECK, using lexical
and syntactical analysis on Solidity source code. It generates an XML parse tree as an
intermediate representation, and detects vulnerability patterns by using XPath9 queries
on it. The tool thus provides full coverage: the analyzed code is fully translated to the
IR, and all its elements can be reached with XPath matching. The advantage of this
method is that new languages can be added leaving the IR-level algorithms unchanged.
On the other hand, XPath queries can easily lead to false positives (when applied, for
instance, to reentrancy or timestamp dependencies). The result of their experiment,
conducted on 4600 contracts, reveals that SMARTCHECK incurs in more true positives
than OYENTE and SECURIFY. This means that SMARTCHECK is well suited to detect
certain kind of vulnerabilities, but it also incur in more false positives due to the use of
XPath.
In blockchain, an invocation is a run of a smart contract. Depending on the actual
input values, the execution path may vary. Hence, looking at a single invocation is not
enough to discover all the vulnerabilities a contract can suffer from. An alternative
approach consists of looking at a trace of invocations. Nikolic et al. [35] have devel-
oped a tool, MAIAN, using systematic techniques to find contracts that violate specific
properties of traces. Violations are either of liveness properties, asserting that there ex-
ists a trace from a specified blockchain state that causes the contract to violate certain
7https://github.com/ethereum/vyper
8https://coq.inria.fr/
9https://www.w3schools.com/xml/xml_xpath.asp
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conditions, and of safety properties, asserting whether some actions cannot be taken in
any execution starting from a specified blockchain state. They defined three categories
of contracts:
• the greedy, those contracts that remain alive and lock Ether indefinitely, allowing
it be released under no conditions;
• the prodigal, those contracts returning funds to accounts they had never had to
do before, that is, an arbitrary address;
• the suicidal, those contracts invoking the SUICIDE instruction (that terminates
a contract’s life) transferring Ether to an account they had never had to do before.
Their approach extends OYENTE adding a semantics taking into account invocation
traces. They also formalize, into logical formulas, properties characterizing greedy,
prodigal, and suicidal contracts, and use symbolic execution to check their satisfiabil-
ity. They analyzed 970,898 smart contracts, obtained by downloading the Ethereum
blockchain from the first block until block number 4,799,998. Out of these, it was only
possible to download the code 9,825 contracts (about 1% of the total), highlighting the
usefulness of analyzing the bytecode. The percentage of true positives, with respect
to prodigal and suicidal contracts, is 97% and 99%, respectively. On the other hand,
greedy contracts have a false positive rate of 31%, quite high. This is due to many
causes, but in general finding a trace that leads to an Ether transfer may require three
or more traces.
Another static analyzer is SECURIFY [51], by Tsankov et al. It was born from two
key observations: first, symbolic execution, on which other tools are based on, has
many false positives, requires a long time to inspect large contracts and usually gets a
low code coverage; secondly, many security properties can be expressed as patterns on
the data flow graph. SECURIFY states such properties with two kinds of patterns: com-
pliance patterns, which imply the satisfaction of the property, and violation patterns,
which imply its negation. This tool works as follows: first it parses the EVM code,
decompiling it into a static single-assignment form, then it looks for violation patterns.
Such patterns are, for example, writing to storage after having invoked another func-
tion, or not validating the arguments. The results of their experiments show that this
approach is more effective than symbolic execution.
Alongside these tools are many others static analyzers well suited for certain secu-
rity properties. Examples are Zeus [27], by Kalra et al., and EtherTrust [22], by Gr-
ishchenko, Maffei, and Schneidewind. They operate at different levels, either analyzing
Solidity code, abstract implementations of the latter, or EVM bytecode. However, static
analysis often puts in practice heuristics, leaving room for false positives or negatives.
Furthermore, the adoption of these tools could be limited: many programmers could
ignore them, making the research progresses useless. We think that security properties,
as well as contract invariants or safety properties, have to be checked directly by the
compiler whenever it is possible. Smart contracts are not like normal programs that
may be patched if something turns out to be wrong. Once a contract is deployed, no
modifications or patches can be applied. These programs must be correct by construc-
tion, and we strongly believe that analysis tools should play a fundamental role during
the development phase. This is the reason why we decided to rely on the compiler. By
operating on the type system we make the compilation (as well as the compiler itself)
more complex and selective, but, on the other hand, we are able to rule out or detect
dangerous patterns. Of course, not every property is enforceable at compile-time, or
it is without making the language excessively complex. “Heavy” type systems have
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the only effect of making a language too verbose, thus giving programmers a reason to
abandon it. As we saw in this section, many are the static analysis tools working on the
code after its development, but none of them targets the type system. Solidity has the
precise and explicit aim to be a type-safe language, and, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work aiming to prove so also proposing some modifications to make the
language sounder.
3.3.2 Dynamic analysis
Jiang, Liu, and Chan [26] have developed CONTRACTFUZZER, a tool analyzing smart
contracts with fuzzing in order to detect common vulnerabilities. Fuzzing is based
on the dynamic generation of a set of values used as an input for the program to test.
Along with reentrancy and gasless send (i.e. invoking a fallback function that requires
more than 2300 gas), it is designed to detect other, less common, vulnerabilities, such
as timestamp or block number dependency (i.e. using the block timestamp or number,
respectively, for critical operations, such as a random number generation) as well as
the dangerous use of delegatecall (about which we discussed in Section 2.4.2).
The results of CONTRACTFUZZER, applied to 6991 contracts, are very good: it falls
into false positives very rarely, and only when detecting timestamp or block number
dependency. When compared to OYENTE, CONTRACTFUZZER has a lower rate of
false positives and an higher rate of false negatives. The former is due to the difficulty,
for OYENTE, of symbolically analyze certain types of operations. On the other hand,
CONTRACTFUZZER relies on the dynamic generation of input to dynamically test a
smart contract, a process that could require a long time to detect something. Hence,
with a limited analysis time, some bugs are not detected. Furthermore, dynamic anal-
ysis can only prove the presence of vulnerabilities, not their absence, and this is an
important limitation in this context.
A similar work, even though very preliminary and limited to reentrancy vulnera-
bilities, comes from Liu et al. [30]. They have developed a fuzzing tool, REGUARD,
focused on finding reentrancy, and analyzed 5 contracts, each for 20 minutes, com-
paring their results with the ones of OYENTE. It turned out that REGUARD suffers
from false positives and negatives less than OYENTE. Even though the results are en-
couraging, the test is not significant enough to say that REGUARD may be a useful (or
complementary) tool.
Fuzzing (and dynamic analysis in general) is very dependent on the amount of test
time, which cannot be too high. However, tools like REGUARD or CONTRACTFUZZER
may serve as a first alarm. They are for sure more lightweight than more complex
tools operating, statically, on the source code (including bytecode), but they are not a
replacement.
3.4 Translating Solidity into other languages
The first work in this direction comes from Bhargavan et al. [8], that translate both
Solidity and EVM (when Solidity code is not available) info F*, a general-purpose
functional programming language with effects aimed at program verification. Its type-
system includes dependent types, monadic effects, refinement types, and a weakest
precondition calculus. Together, these features allow expressing precise and compact
specifications for programs, including functional correctness and security properties.
Although this was only a preliminary work, it first tranced the path to verify, statically,
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smart contracts implementations.
Instead of analyze Solidity or EVM code, Sergey, Kumar, and Hobor [45] pro-
pose a brand new intermediate language, SCILLA, that provides a clean separation
between the communication aspect of smart contracts on a blockchain and a program-
ming component. SCILLA is not meant to be a high-level language, but instead to
be a target for Solidity code, to perform analysis and verification before compiling it
down to bytecode. The key point is that communication is separated from computa-
tion: each contract is represented by an automaton where computations are carried out
as standalone (i.e. not involving any other parties) transitions. These transitions end
whenever the interaction with another party is required. Such separation enables for
a much clearer reasoning about contracts. They implement SCILLA into Coq and use
the latter to reason about the properties of a contract. Once the contracts is formalized
in Coq, SCILLA allows programmers to prove many different properties, from contract
invariants or temporal properties (including liveness). Being able to reason about con-
tracts behavior at the point of proving invariants is a great achievement: programmers
can now be sure that their programs will behave in a given way, having a mathematical
proof of this. However, at the time of writing, there is no tool to compile Solidity code
down to SCILLA, as well as there is no automated way to translate the latter into Coq.
These are important limitations, because SCILLA is not meant to be a language directly
used by programmers. Furthermore, even supposing an automated way to translate
smart contracts written in Solidity into Coq (using SCILLA as a man-in-the-middle),
programmers would have to learn how Coq works deep enough to become capable of
proving things. Such knowledge is non-trivial at all, and many programmers could
find it difficult to acquire it, with the only consequence of a limited use of SCILLA,
which would then be useless, since a lot of buggy smart contracts would be deployed
anyways.
IELE [28], by Kasampalis et al., is another intermediate language specifically de-
signed to serve five different purposes:
• security, eliminating, by construction, many vulnerabilities, such as integer over-
flow and execution of data as code, to remove possible attack vectors;
• formal verification, to help programmers detect software bugs and prove the cor-
rectness of the contracts they write;
• human readability, storing readable code helps different parties agree on the
behavior of a given contract;
• determinism, the virtual machine specification defines everything, leaving no
room for undefined or implementation-dependent behavior;
• a gas model different than Ethereum’s one, where there is no limit to execution,
but the cost increase as long as the contract requires more resources.
The language is formalized into K, and a compiler exists to generate IELE code from
Solidity, as well as an IELE Virtual Machine to execute the former. Thanks to these
tools, Kasampalis et al. have successfully deployed and executed IELE smart contracts
on a Ethereum-based blockchain. The language has been proven secure, complete and
correct, and it represents a great improvement of the execution environment (i.e. the
virtual machine). By avoiding the drawbacks of the EVM pointed out by Hildenbrandt
et al. in the formalization of KEVM [23], it set a new, higher, level for the development
and design of blockchain virtual machines. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, it has
not been used for real-world contracts.
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The use of intermediate languages to validate properties of smart contracts is a
good way to help Solidity grow. When developing or formalizing an alternative lan-
guage, many limits of the original one come up, but we believe that before diving into
brand new intermediate languages we should have a formal foundation of Solidity. FS
attempts to provide such formal foundation, even though it is not its aim to validate
arbitrary security properties or help programmers detect flaws. More important, it is
an abstract calculus that can be extended in many ways to investigate the soundness
of new features before adding them in the “real” language. Running behind an imma-
ture language such as Solidity could be an energy loss. On the other hand, using a
formal foundations to prove, by construction, the safeness of a certain aspect could be
much more useful. This is the reason why we chose to focus on Solidity itself, without
working on alternatives that have to continuously adapt to a living language.
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Chapter 4
Syntax
Featherweight Solidity (FS) is a minimal core calculus for Solidity [48]. It is intended
to study various aspects of smart contract programming, such as new contracts deploy-
ment, interaction among deployed contracts, and money transfers. It takes inspiration
from other calculi, such as DJ [1] and FJ [25]. The grammar of FS is presented in
Figure 4.1. The syntax is intended to be liberal: ill-formed terms, such as balance(5),
are ruled out by type rules.
4.1 Grammar of FS
(Contract declaration) SC ::= contract C {T˜ s; K F˜}
(Constructor declaration) K ::= C (T˜ x) {this.s˜ = x˜}
(Function declaration) F ::= T f (T˜ x) {return e} | unit fb () {return e}
(Contract table) CT ::= ∅ | CT · [C 7→ SC]
(Blockchain) β ::= ∅ | β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)] | β · [x 7→ v]
(Program) P ::= (CT, β, e)
(Expressions) e ::= v | x | this | this.f | msg.sender | msg.value |
balance(e) | address(e) | e.s | e.transfer(e) |
new C.value(e)(e˜) | C(e) | e; e | T x = e; e |
x = e; e | e.s = e; e | e[e] | e[e→ e] |
e.f.value(e)(e˜) | e.value(e)(e˜) | revert |
e.f.value(e).sender(e)(e˜) | if e then e else e
(V alues) v ::= true | false | n | a | u |M | c | c.f
(Types) T ::= T˜ → T | bool | uint | address |
unit | mapping(T ⇒ T ) | C
Figure 4.1: The static syntax of the Featherweight Solidity language
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The language presented here contains only a subset of Solidity. To simplify the formal
system and associated proofs we removed looping primitives, arrays, structs, events,
modifiers, and subtyping. Nevertheless, we include conditional expressions, and loop-
ing is allowed by recursion. We do not take into account the different types of visibility
(represented in Solidity with external, internal, public, and private). We
removed pure and view from function declaration, since Solidity’s documentation
explicitly states that restrictions associated with those two modifiers are not enforced
yet. Lastly, we consider every function as payable, and we do not model gas.
As we shall explain later on, contracts in FS model both externally owned and code-
driven Ethereum accounts. We also include primitives to initiate a transaction that are
the only FS code not included in a contract definition.
Below we explain in detail the user syntax; runtime syntax (i.e. those terms occur-
ring only at run-time, and thus that cannot be written by programmers as part of their
source code) will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Remark (Tuple notation in FS syntax). Figure 4.1 contains many different notations
about tuples. In general, we identify a tuple of elements by means of the symbol ˜,
that is e˜ represents a tuple e1; . . . ; en, for some n ∈ N. Similarly, T˜ → T indicates a
type like the following: T1; . . . ;Tn → T , where T1; . . . ;Tn;T are all types as defined
in Figure 4.1. The same applies also when ˜ is in the middle of two characters, such
as in T˜ s. It indicates a tuple like T1 s1; . . . ;Tn sn, for some n ∈ N. this.s˜ = x˜
represents, in constructor declarations, a sequence of assignments as the following:
this.s1 = v1; . . . ; this.sn = vn. Lastly, s˜:v in the definition of β represents a tuple
of the following form: s1 : v1; . . . ; sn : vn, ∃n ∈ N. This means that for every si,
1 ≤ i ≤ n there is a vi corresponding to it.
Contract declaration We write contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} to denote a smart con-
tract declaration. It indicates that contract C contains a sequence, possibly empty,
T1 s1; . . . ;Tn sn; of typed state variables, whose names are different to each other, a
constructor K, and some function definitions F˜ . unit fb () {return e} is the so-called
fallback function, and it is mandatory in order to allow C to receive an amount of
Ether. In Solidity, it takes no parameters and returns no value, and is implicitly invoked
whenever C receives money. Note that our definition of fb actually returns unit. As
we said, the syntax is intended to be liberal, and type rules enforce various restrictions
(such as forcing fb to return a value of type unit). Functions in Solidity are very simi-
lar to methods in usual object-oriented programming languages. T f (T˜ x) {return e}
defines a function named f that takes a sequence, possibly empty, of typed parameters
(T1 x1, . . . , Tn xn) and whose body returns a value of type T . Functions in Solid-
ity may return tuples (i.e. sequences of typed values) or structures, but, for the sake
of simplicity, we chose not to model this behavior. Generalizing the syntax, and the
corresponding rules, to those cases is trivial.
In FS, fb is a reserved identifier identifying the fallback function, whereas f is a
metavariable for function names. For the sake of simplicity, we give an identifier to the
fallback function even if in Solidity it does not have one.
In Solidity an account can be either controlled by a an external party or by code. In
the latter case we talk about contracts. We chose not to add explicitly this difference in
FS, and the former category is defined by Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Externally owned account). We consider an externally owned account as
an empty contract, that is, one containing only a constructor and a fallback function,
both empty. Its form is the following:
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contract EOC {
EOC() {}
unit fb() {return u}
}
Where EOC stands for Externally Owned Contract, that is an Externally Owned Ac-
count modeled as a contract.
We assume that at every instant the blockchain contains as many EOC instances
as the number of active externally owned accounts. This definition reflects what can
be done by EOAs in Ethereum: starting a transaction or receiving an amount of Ether.
The former is accomplished via the expression c.f.value(n).sender(aEOC)(e˜), where
c is a reference to the contract to interact with, f is one of its functions, n is an amount
of Ether (potentially 0), and aEOC is the address of an instance of EOC. Furthermore,
sinceEOC defines no functions, it can be used only for the two ends mentioned above:
its code does not interact with any other contracts, and no function, but the fallback fb,
can be invoked. Note that there is no rule in FS limiting what can be done with EOC:
its limitations are a consequence of its definition.
Contract table A contract table, CT , is a mapping from contract names to contract
definitions. As in Ethereum, each contract definition is unique in the blockchain. A
contract table is inductively defined with the concatenation operator ·, allowing a new
entry to be appended to CT . Definition 2 defines its domain.
Definition 2 (Domain of a contract table). The domain of a contract tableCT is defined
as follows:
dom(∅) = ∅
dom(CT · [C 7→ SC]) = {C} ∪ dom(CT )
Blockchain β represents the blockchain. As pointed out by Definition 3, β maps
pairs (c, a) to triples (C, s˜:v, n), and variable identifiers x ∈ Var to values v, where
Var represents an infinite set of variable identifiers. This formalization follows the
Ethereum’s one: as we said in Section 2.3.2, accounts contain a nonce, a balance,
the contract’s code, and the storage. β indeed associates to any pair (c, a) the name
of the contract (C, used to retrieve the code, when necessary), a basic storage with
the contract’s state variables (s˜:v), and its balance (n). c and a are, respectively, a
contract reference and its address. Note that this pair must be unique in the domain
of β, as we pointed out in Section 2.3.2. In other words, once a contract has been
deployed on the blockchain only one address corresponds to it, and, vice versa, an
address uniquely identifies only one contract deployed on the blockchain. Formally,
∀(c, a), (c′, a′) ∈ dom(β), c = c′ ⇒ a = a′ and a = a′ ⇒ c = c′. Leveraging this
uniqueness property, we shall abuse the access notation as follows:
β(c) , β(c, a) ∃! a . (c, a) ∈ dom(β)
β(a) , β(c, a) ∃! c . (c, a) ∈ dom(β)
In the rest of this work, we shall often need to retrieve a reference to a contract
knowing its address or vice versa. We define such operation as follows:
βˆ(c) = a if (c, a) ∈ dom(β)
βˆ(a) = c if (c, a) ∈ dom(β)
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Lastly, we define another abuse of notation to retrieve the code of a contract given
either its address or its reference:
βC(c) = βC(a) = C if β(c, a) = (C, s˜:v, n)
We chose not to model the possibility of saving arbitrary variables on the blockchain.
As said in Section 2.4.2, in fact, variables may be stored either in the storage or in the
memory area, but our definition of β does not support this feature. For simplicity we
do not model an explicit difference between memory and storage; otherwise, we would
have to complicate the formalization to keep track of scopes. Hence, the only differen-
tiation is the following:
• the storage keeps state variables, contract balances and code. Nonetheless, it
does not contain any variables except the state ones;
• the memory contains local variables only, and they are added to β each time a
function declares them. Differently from Ethereum, we do not garbage-collect
the local variables. However, since we assumed an infinite set Var of variable
identifiers, not removing them from β is not a problem.
Definition 3 formally defines dom(β).
Definition 3 (Domain of β).
dom(∅) = ∅
dom(β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]) = {(c, a)} ∪ dom(β)
dom(β · [x 7→ v]) = {x} ∪ dom(β)
β’s codomain contains the persistent state (i.e. what is, in Ethereum, stored in the
blockchain) of each contract and a set of values referenced to by variable identifiers.
The former comprises the name of the contract (C), the values of its state variables
(s˜:v) and its balance (n). Again, we shall use the concatenation operator to append
new entries to the blockchain.
Program P denotes a program composed by an expression e operating on the
blockchain β, which contains instances of the contracts defined in CT . In Ethereum,
the operations interacting with the blockchain (i.e. the transactions) can be either calls
to contract functions, money transfers, or contract instantiations. As we said in Chap-
ter 2, they are not written in Solidity; instead, usually they are JavaScript code (or code
written in another language supported by Ethereum) interacting with an Ethereum Vir-
tual Machine (EVM) thanks to the web3.js library (see, for instance, Listing 2.3 in Ex-
ample 2.1 or Listing 2.16 in Example 2.10). Hence, a sort of two-level syntax exists:
one for the expressions allowed at the top-level (i.e. to model the code interacting with
the blockchain) and one for the ones used to define smart contracts (i.e. to model the
Solidity code). For the sake of simplicity, this is not true anymore in FS. We unify the
syntax and suppose that not only contracts, but also transactions, follow the grammar
given in Figure 4.1. Hence, an FS program has the form (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en), where
e1; . . . ; en is a sequence of operations interacting with the blockchain β, possibly mod-
ifying its state. In the paragraph below we clarify the meaning of e.
In brief, P represents a DApp: it comprises a list of transactions, the contract table
containing, for any given contract name its code, and an initial blockchain. The ex-
ecution operates and modifies the latter, which thus can grow as long as the program
runs. Differently from Ethereum, our blockchain does not contain the bytecode of the
deployed contracts.
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Expressions The metavariable e ranges over expressions. v denotes a value, x a vari-
able, this a local variable referring to the contract being invoked. We assume an infinite
set of variable names Var and such that x ∈ Var , and x may also be this, msg.value,
or msg.sender. this is local to functions, and makes no sense outside a function def-
inition. this.f is a pointer to a function defined in the context of the current contract
(referenced to by this). We shall further explain the meaning of such function point-
ers below. msg is a variable containing information about the current function call:
msg.sender contains the address of the caller, while msg.value represents the amount
of Wei (the smallest Ether’s sub-unit) sent to the callee: its scope is a transaction. As-
suming e evaluates to a contract reference c, address(e) explicitly gives its address, e.s
reads the value of the state variable s. The expression e.f.value(e2)(e˜′) is the func-
tion call, which not only calls f in c, but also transfers e2 Wei from msg.sender to
c. We shall use e.f(e˜′) as a short form of e.f.value(0)(e˜′). The variant with sender
(e.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜)) is allowed only in a very specific scenario, and we shall
further discuss it in Chapter 5. When e evaluates to an address, balance(e) returns its
balance, that is, the amount of Wei it currently contains and e.transfer(e2) transfers n
Wei to it, supposing e2 evaluates to n. The expression new C.value(e2)(e˜) deploys a
new contract C on the blockchain, with an initial balance of e2, whereas C(e) retrieves
the reference to the contract identified by the address obtained evaluating e, if any. As
we said before, there is always at most only one contract reference corresponding to an
address, and vice versa. Again, new C(e˜) is a short form for new C.value(0)(e˜). The
expression e; e is sequential composition, T x = e; e′ is variable declaration (binding x
in e′), x = e and e.s = e are variable assignment and state variable assignment, respec-
tively. When e evaluates to a mapping value, e[e′] reads the value corresponding to the
evaluation of key e′, whereas e[e′ → e′′] modifies it. The expression if e then e else e
defines the usual if expression. For the sake of simplicity, FS does not include any
boolean or arithmetic operators: their behavior is well known, and so is their type
safety. e1.value(e2)(e˜) represents a call to a function used as a value, supposing e1
evaluates to c.f and e2 to n. This expression not only invokes the function f in c with
parameters e˜, but also sends n Wei to c. Lastly, revert is a term used to signal erro-
neous situations. It is very similar to exceptions, but it cannot be caught. Hence, when
a revert is thrown the current transaction is aborted, and every partial result is discarded
(to maintain the consistency and atomicity properties of transactions). We shall further
discuss it in Chapter 5. revert can be thrown both by the runtime and by programmers
(thus modeling Solidity’s revert, require, and assert).
Types T ranges over types. bool and unit have the expected meaning. uint indicates
unsigned integers, formally defined by N+ = {n ∈ N | n ≥ 0}. address represents
Ethereum’s addresses, whose values range in setA = {0x nhex | n ∈ N∧|nhex| = 40}.
In brief, A is the set of all the natural numbers, taken in their hexadecimal represen-
tation, whose length (computed as the number of hexadecimal digits) is equal to 40.
Clearly this is a finite set, but there are 2160 addresses in total, and they are practically
enough not to worry about their exhaustion.
We allow three complex types: functions, mappings and contracts. The latter is
represented by C. T˜ → T indicates functions, taking as input a tuple of typed values
and returning a single value of type T . unit is used as a return type when the function
does not return anything. mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) indicates a total function T1 → T2. T1
can only be a simple type, i.e. unit, bool, address, and uint. In Solidity, a mapping
is similar to a hash table, where every possible key is initialized to the “zero” value of
the corresponding value type. This “zero” function is defined by Definition 4. This is
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also the reason why we represent mappings as total functions: for each value v1 in T1
there is always one and only one value v2 in T2 matching v1: v2 is either the “zero” (or
default) value, or a value previously set. Assigning another value v′2 in T2 to the key v1
simply overwrites the previous one, exactly as what happens when changing the value
corresponding to a given key in a hash table.
Definition 4 (Zero). The zero function is inductively defined over types as follows:
zero(bool) , false
zero(unit) , u
zero(uint) , 0
zero(address) , 0a
zero(C) , null
zero(T˜1 → T2) , 0T2
zero(mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)) , 0{}
Where 0a represents the address composed by only zeros and 0T2 a constant function
returning the “zero” value of T2. 0{} indicates the total function mapping every value
k of type T1 in 0T2 .
Values v ranges over values. true and false have the expected meaning. n represents
unsigned integers and a ∈ A indicates an address. u is the only value allowed for
type unit. M indicates a mapping (i.e. a total function) and can be thought of as a
set of key-value pairs, where the value can either have been defined by a user or be
the “zero” one. Keys and values are, from a syntactic point of view, values v in FS.
Lastly, c denotes references to contract instances and c.f indicates a reference to a
function defined in the declaration of the contract c. Solidity does not allow lambda
expressions yet, and the only possible values for the function type are represented by
“references” to contract functions. This is the meaning of c.f . Note there can be no
ambiguity between such “function pointers” and function calls, not even considering
the short syntax. When f is followed by either value or parenthesis, and possibly some
parameters, that is a function call. When it is not, then it is a function pointer. In both
cases, type rules will allow only functions defined in the contract declaration of c. Also
note that programmers can reference fb.
4.2 Auxiliary functions
Here we define some auxiliary functions that extract information from FS programs:
• The function fv extracts the free variables of an expression in FS. Its full defini-
tion is given in Figure 4.2.
• The function fn extracts the free names (free references and free addresses) of an
expression in FS. Its full definition is given in Figure 4.2.
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Term fv fn
true = ∅ ∅
false = ∅ ∅
n = ∅ ∅
a = ∅ {a}
u = ∅ ∅
M = ∅ ∅
c = ∅ {c}
c.f = ∅ {c}
x = {x} ∅
this = this ∅
msg.sender = msg.sender ∅
msg.value = msg.value ∅
balance(e) = fv(e) fn(e)
address(e) = fv(e) fn(e)
e.s = fv(e) fn(e)
e1.transfer(e2) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2)
new C.value(e1)(e˜); e2 = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪
⋃
fv(ei) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪
⋃
fn(ei)
C(e) = fv(e) fn(e)
e1; e2 = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2)
e1.f.value(e2)(e˜3) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪
⋃
fv(e3i) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪
⋃
fn(e3i)
e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜4) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪ fv(e3) ∪
⋃
fv(e4i) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪ fn(e3) ∪
⋃
fn(e4i)
e1.value(e2)(e˜3) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪
⋃
fv(e3i) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪
⋃
fn(e3i)
T x = e1; e2 = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2)\{x} fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2)
x = e = {x} ∪ fv(e) fn(e)
e1.s = e2 = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2)
e1[e2] = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2)
e1[e2 → e3] = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪ fv(e3) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪ fn(e3)
if e1 then e2 else e3 = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) ∪ fv(e3) fn(e1) ∪ fn(e2) ∪ fn(e3)
∅ = ∅ ∅
β · [x 7→ v] = fv(β) ∪ {x} fn(β) ∪ fn(v)
β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, b)] = fv(β) fn(β) ∪ {c} ∪ {a} ∪ fn(v)
Figure 4.2: Free variables and names
Lastly, Figure 4.3 defines the substitution of free variables in an expression in
FS. In such definition x is meant to be a variable identifier, and it may also be this,
msg.sender, and msg.value.
Remark (Syntactic assumptions). We make some assumptions regarding what can be
written in FS. As we said, the syntax is intended to be liberal, with the type system
ruling out the ill-formed expression. However, some syntactic restrictions, analogous
to the ones in Solidity, are not checked with types:
• the expression e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) models the invocation of a transac-
tion. Hence, we assume it cannot be contained within the code of FS contracts,
but only in the top-level expression e of a given program (CT, β, e);
• the expressions e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) and e1.transfer(e2) can be contained only into
FS contracts and thus, given a program (CT, β, e), they cannot appear in the
expression e.
For instance, the first one models the syntax of web3.js requiring an explicit specifica-
tion of the sender (which it indicates with from) of each transaction. This parameter
will be the first value for the variable msg.sender. On the other hand, such variable
will be automatically set by the runtime for every further function (i.e. message) call,
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true{x := e′} = true
false{x := e′} = false
n{x := e′} = n
a{x := e′} = a
u{x := e′} = u
M{x := e′} = M
c{x := e′} = c
c.f{x := e′} = c.f
x{x := e′} = e′
y{x := e′} = y (y 6= x)
this.f{x := e′} = this.f (x 6= this)
this.f{this := e′} = e′.f
balance(e){x := e′} = balance(e{x := e′})
address(e){x := e′} = address(e{x := e′})
e.s{x := e′} = e{x := e′}.s
(e1.transfer(e2)){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}.transfer(e2{x := e′})
(new C.value(e1)(e˜)){x := e′} = new C.value(e1{x := e′})(ei{x := e′}1≤i≤n)
(C(e)){x := e′} = e{x := e′}
(e1; e2){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}; e2{x := e′}
(T y = e){x := e′} = T y = e{x := e′} if y /∈ fv(e′)
(y = e){x := e′} = y = e{x := e′}
(e1.s = e2){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}.s = e2{x := e′}
(e1[e2]){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}[e2{x := e′}]
(e1[e2 → e3]){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}[e2{x := e′} → e3{x := e′}]
(e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}.f.value(e2{x := e′})(ei1≤i≤n{x := e′})
(e1.value(e2)(e˜)){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}.value(e2{x := e′})(ei1≤i≤n{x := e′})
(e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜)){x := e′} = e1{x := e′}.f.value(e2{x := e′}).
sender(e3{x := e′})(ei1≤i≤n{x := e′})
(if e1 then e2 else e3){x := e′} = if e1{x := e′} then e2{x := e′} else e3{x := e′}
revert{x := e′} = revert
return e{x := e′} = e
Figure 4.3: Substitution of free variables in FS expressions
and will not be settable by programmers. Similarly, transfer may be invoked only
in the context of a contract (i.e. within one of the functions it defines), and may not be
called explicitly from the code interacting with the blockchain (e.g. the one written in
JavaScript).
Differently from Ethereum, our new does not allow the specification of a top-level
sender. As with any other transaction, in Ethereum a new has to specify the address of
the initiating account (e.g. the parameter from in web3.js) that pays the transaction fee
as well as may send Ether to the newly deployed instance. For the sake of simplicity
we model only one version of new, new C(e˜).
4.3 FS by example
We now informally compare the expressiveness of Solidity and FS. Example 4.1 ana-
lyzes the implementation of the functionality of a basic bank contract allowing users
to deposit, withdraw or transfer an amount of Ether. Example 4.2 highlights deeper
differences between the two languages. It models a blood bank, where donors may do-
nate blood upon explicit doctor authorization. It shows how two contracts can interact
together. Lastly, in Example 4.3, we demonstrate how to use function as values.
Example 4.1 (The first FS smart contract). Listing 4.1 shows a very basic bank contract
written in Solidity. It contains only one state variable, balances, representing the
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balance for each account. An amount of Wei is sent via the deposit function (indeed
marked as payable), which reads the amount of money from msg.value and increments
the balance of msg.sender. A getter function, getBalance, allows each user to get to
know their balance. withdraw and transfer are very similar to each other, and allow
users to transfer an amount of Wei to their own Ethereum account (that is from an
account internal to Bank to an Ethereum account) or someone else’s Bank account
(that is from an account internal to Bank to another), respectively. Note that there is
no fallback function, since the only legal way to send money to this bank is through
the deposit function (thus incrementing someone’s balance). As a final note, when an
account’s balance is insufficient to accomplish either a withdrawal or a money transfer,
no error or exception is thrown: functions simply do nothing.
1 contract Bank {
2 mapping (address => uint) private balances;
3
4 constructor() public {}
5
6 function deposit() external payable {
7 balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
8 }
9
10 function transfer(address to, uint amount) external {
11 if (balances[msg.sender] >= amount) {
12 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
13 balances[to] += amount;
14 }
15 }
16
17 function getBalance() external view returns (uint) {
18 return balances[msg.sender];
19 }
20
21 function withdraw(uint amount) external {
22 if (balances[msg.sender] >= amount) {
23 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
24 msg.sender.transfer(amount);
25 }
26 }
27 }
Listing 4.1: Basic Bank contract in Solidity syntax
Listing 4.2, on the other hand, shows the same contract, but written using FS syntax.
The very first big difference is that FS, in contrast to Solidity, explicitly has to initialize
every state variable, including a mapping. Note also the use of this to disambiguate the
formal parameter and the state variable. Secondly, the syntax for defining functions is a
little different, the one of FS being more similar to Java. Furthermore, unit is explicitly
used to represent void. Function bodies consist of a single expression, return e, where
e is composed in an inductive way, following the rules given in Figure 4.1. Taking
transfer’s body as an example, note that the if expression is used right after return and
that u (the only value of type unit) is explicitly added as a last term.
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contract Bank{
mapping(address⇒ unit) balances;
Bank(mapping(address⇒ unit) balances) {
this.balances = balances;
}
unit deposit() {
return this.balances = this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender] + msg.value]; u
}
uint getBalance() {
return this.balances[msg.sender]
}
unit transfer(address to, uint amount) {
return
if this.balances[msg.sender] >= amount
then
this.balances = this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender]− amount];
this.balances = this.balances[to→ this.balances[to] + amount];
u
else
u
}
unit withdraw(uint amount) {
return
if this.balances[msg.sender] >= amount
then
this.balances = this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender]− amount];
msg.sender.transfer(amount);
u
else
u
}
}
Listing 4.2: Basic Bank contract in FS syntax
Example 4.1 clearly shows that our small language is expressive enough to encode,
with slight modifications, a simple though powerful, Solidity contract.
Example 4.2 (DApp translation in FS). We translate the code in Example 2.10 in FS
syntax. The syntax we have defined is a bit more restrictive than Solidity’s, and does
not allow some of these things. This is clearly shown in Listing 4.3.
contract BloodBank{
mapping(address⇒ bool) healty;
address doctor;
uint blood;
BloodBank(mapping(address⇒ bool) healty, address doctor, uint blood) {
this.healty = healty;
this.doctor = doctor;
this.blood = blood;
}
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unit setHealth(address donor, bool isHealty) {
return
if msg.sender == this.doctor
then this.healty = this.healty[donor → isHealty]; u
else revert
}
bool isHealty(address donor) {
return
if msg.sender == this.doctor
then this.healty[donor]
else revert
}
unit donate(uint amount) {
return
uint donorBlood = Donor(msg.sender).getBlood();
if this.healty[msg.sender]&&donorBlood > 3000&&donorBlood− amount > 0
then this.blood = this.blood+ amount; true
else false
}
address getDoctor() {
return this.doctor
}
uint getBlood() {
return this.blood
}
}
contract Donor {
uint blood;
address bank;
Donor(uint blood, address bank) {
this.blood = blood;
this.bank = bank;
}
unit donate(uint amount) {
return
if BloodBank(this.bank).donate( amount)
then this.blood = this.blood− amount; u
else u
}
BloodBank getBank() {
return this.bank
}
uint getBlood() {
return this.blood
}
}
Listing 4.3: Donor and BloodBank contracts in FS syntax
Starting from BloodBank, first note that each state variable value must be explic-
itly passed as a parameter to the constructor, since there is no default value. Thus, both
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healty and blood become parameters. Secondly, a constructor body is limited to a se-
quence of initializations, and arbitrary expressions (what we called e in Figure 4.1) are
not allowed. Hence, the doctor (i.e. msg.sender) becomes a parameter, too. Thirdly,
no getter function is automatically added (remember FS does not take into account vis-
ibility keywords), so two new functions, getDoctor and getBlood, have to be explicitly
implemented. To disambiguate, we name them with the usual nomenclature, instead
of using the same name as the variables they refer to. Donor shows another limita-
tion. As we said, no expression is allowed in a constructor body, so we cannot just use
BloodBank(bank) to initialize this.bank. We chose to retrieve the contract reference
each time donate is called. In general, due to this limitation, contracts in FS do not
contain state variables with a contract type. Instead, those variables have type address,
and an explicit cast is used to obtain the required functionality. This may decrease
the global efficiency, but is semantically equivalent to what is shown in Listing 2.15.
Lastly, require has to be “expanded” in FS, using an if expression and explicitly
issuing a revert in one branch.
In Example 5.1 we shall show the evaluation of the following expression:
e := EOC xdoctor = new EOC();
EOC whumanDonor = new EOC();
BloodBank ybank = new BloodBank(0{}, address(xdoctor), 0);
Donor zdonor = new Donor(5000, address(ybank));
ybank.setHealth.sender(address(xdoctor))(address(zdonor), true);
zdonor.donate.sender(address(whumanDonor))(500)
With a few changes, e is the translation in FS of Listing 2.16. First we deploy two
instances ofEOC, xdoctor andwhumanDonor. This was different in our DApp, because
in Ethereum EOAs do not correspond to any contracts, but the use we make of these
two instances is exactly the same, as we shall see soon. Then we deploy an instance
of BloodBank specifying the address of xdoctor as a parameter. This notation may
seem a little heavy, but corresponds to the use of the variable doctorAddress in
Listing 2.16 (Line 16). Lastly, we deploy an instance of Donor (Lines 26-32).
e does not contain the call to isHealty, but it does contain the one to setHealth
to set at true the health status of zdonor. This is an example of a top-level code
(and of a top-level transaction), and translates in web3.js as a function call using
sendTransaction. Note how our syntax slightly differs from the one we saw be-
fore: in FS everything is a transaction and there are no view functions, thus there is
no need to specify call or sendTransaction. We have also modeled less trans-
action parameters than web3.js: the value (i.e. the amount of Wei to be sent) and the
sender (i.e. from in web3.js) are explicitly written before the function to be called.
Here our syntax is a little heavier than the one we have seen before, since we have to
pass address(xdoctor) instead of just doctorAddress. However, this is unavoid-
able since we modeled EOAs with contracts, and find a direct correspondence with the
web3.js way to get an address given a contract instance
(Contract.at(deployedContract.address)). In fact, notice that the way
we pass the address of the donor as a parameter of setHealth: in Listing 2.16, at
Line 59, we used deployedDonor.address as well as in ewe used address(zdonor).
Afterwards, we deploy another instance of EOC, corresponding to
humanDonorAddress in Listing 2.16, and specify it as a sender of a second top-
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level call (i.e. a transaction) to Donor.donate to donate 500ml of blood. Again, we
have to specify the sender explicitly using address(whumanDonor).
In Example 4.2 we went deeper in the functionality offered by Solidity. We high-
lighted the differences with FS, but figured out that the latter is still expressive enough
to encode a more complex contract.
Example 4.3 (Functions as values in FS). Here we show how to translate Example 2.4
in FS. The main difference is that we do not take into account any function modi-
fiers, and thus the code becomes simpler. The specification of the function type is also
more readable, changing from function (uint) view external returns
(uint) f to uint→ uint. The contracts are listed in Listing 4.4.
contract Applier {
uint state;
Applier(uint state) {
this.state = state;
}
unit apply(uint→ uint f) {
return f(this.state)
}
}
contract Test {
Applier app;
Test(Applier app) {
this.app = app
}
unit f1() {
return this.app.apply(this.square)
}
unit f2() {
return this.app.apply(this.double)
}
unit square(uint n) {
returnn ∗ n
}
unit double(uint n) {
returnn+ n
}
}
Listing 4.4: Functions as values in FS syntax
In Example 5.3 we shall show the evaluation of the following expression:
e := EOC xeoa = new EOC();
Applier yapp = new Applier(10);
Test ztest = new Test(yapp);
ztest.f1.sender(address(xeoa))()
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Chapter 5
Operational Semantics
In this chapter we describe the operational semantics of FS. Before going into the rules,
we introduce the run-time syntax of FS, explain the form of our judgments and formally
define transactions. We then introduce some lookup functions extracting information
from a contract definition and auxiliary predicates used to evaluate expressions. Lastly,
we formalize the semantics and give some evaluation examples.
5.1 Run-time syntax
Figure 5.1 presents the run-time syntax of the FS language.
(Call stack) σ ::= β | σ · a
(Configuration) C ::= 〈β, σ, e〉
Figure 5.1: The run-time syntax of the Featherweight Solidity language
The paragraphs that follow explain in detail σ, and C.
Call stack σ is a call stack tracking the nesting of function calls (actually, the ad-
dresses of their enclosing contracts) within the execution of a transaction. To simplify
the operational semantics when executing a transaction, we require the initial element
of the call stack to be a blockchain, namely a copy of the blockchain at the time the
(top-level) transaction starts. Such a copy, held at the bottom of the call stack, will
be useful in case of abort, when the state of the blockchain has to be unrolled to the
beginning of the transaction itself. On the other hand, if the transaction successfully
commits, the modified blockchain will be copied over the σ’s copy.
Hence, the call stack is initially empty (β) and grows as long as contracts interact
with one another. If a top-level call targets a contract C1 with address a1, σ is β before
the top-level call and becomes β · a1 when the function of C1 is executed. If, later on,
C1 interacts with another contract C2 at address a2, σ becomes β ·a1 ·a2 in the context
of C2, and so on and so forth. When a function returns an element is popped from σ,
until it becomes β again.
Configuration At any moment the state of the execution is described by a triple
〈β, σ, e〉, comprising a temporary working copy of the blockchain, the call stack, and
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the expression to be evaluated. Note how, at the beginning of each (top-level) transac-
tion, the configuration is of the form 〈β0, β0, e〉. A successfully evaluated transaction
ends in 〈β, β0, v〉 and the updated blockchain β is committed. Otherwise, if an er-
ror occurs, a configuration of the form 〈β, β0 · a˜, revert〉 is reached, and the modified
blockchain β is discarded in order to restore the initial one (β0), thus modeling the
rollback of the aborted transaction.
5.1.1 Free variables and names
Now that we have explained the run-time syntax, we can extend the definitions of
functions fv and fn, given in Figure 4.2, to support σ.
Term fv fn
σ · a = fv(σ) fn(σ) ∪ {a}
〈β, σ, e〉 = fv(β) ∪ fv(σ) ∪ fv(e) fn(β) ∪ fn(σ) ∪ fn(e)
Figure 5.2: Free variables and names for FS run-time syntax
5.2 Judgments
The transition relation and the operational semantics of FS are formally defined by
Definition 5 and Definition 6, respectively.
Definition 5 (Transition relation). The transition relation representing one step of the
evolution of an expression in FS has the following form:
C −→ C
that is:
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉
Where β and σ change according to the actual expression represented by e. This tran-
sition relation is inductively defined over the axioms and rules in Section 5.5.
Given a program P = (CT, β, e), the initial configuration is 〈β, β, e〉.
Definition 6 (Operational semantics). The operational semantics is defined as the re-
flective, transitive closure of −→. It is indicated with −→∗ and formally defined as
follows:
C −→∗ C
C −→∗ C′ C′ −→ C′′
C −→∗ C′′
The semantics for transactions defined in this way is simple: a top-level expression
(i.e. a transaction) ei operates on the blockchain, modifying it. If there is another
expression ei+1, the latter operates on this modified copy. Otherwise, if there is no
ei+1, ei evaluates to the final state. Definition 7 formalizes this transition relation.
Definition 7 (Transition relation for transactions). The transition relation representing
the evaluation of a list of transactions in FS has the following form:
〈βi−1, ei; . . . ; en〉 =⇒ 〈βi, ei+1; . . . ; en〉
Where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ei represents a single transaction. The initial state for a program
P = (CT, β, e) is 〈β, e〉. Note that the tuple e1; . . . ; en represents the sequence of
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top-level transactions to be executed. The transition relation⇒ models the operational
semantics of the Ethereum nodes, and is inductively defined over the axioms and rules
in Figure 5.3.
(SUCCESS)
〈β, β, e〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β, v〉
〈β, e〉 =⇒ 〈β′, v〉
(FAILURE)
〈β, β, e〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β, revert〉
〈β, e〉 =⇒ 〈β, revert〉
(COMMIT)
〈β, β, e1〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β, v1〉
〈β, e1; e2〉 =⇒ 〈β′, e2〉
(ABORT)
〈β, β, e1〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β, revert〉
〈β, e1; e2〉 =⇒ 〈β, revert〉
Figure 5.3: Operational semantics rules for transactions in FS
The initial configuration for P is, as we said, 〈β, e1; . . . ; en〉, and the evaluation
may lead to either a value or a revert. In the former case everything was successfully
evaluated and the program terminates with a final value; in symbols: 〈βn, v〉. In the
latter, something went wrong and the evaluation could not further proceed: 〈βi, revert〉.
In Ethereum, miner nodes discard erroneous transactions and do not include them into
their blocks; validation nodes, on the other hand, discard the entire block if any trans-
actions return an error. The semantics in Definition 7 formalizes the latter behavior.
COMMIT models a successful transaction: e1 evaluates toward a value v1 and
makes β become β′. v1 is discarded and the execution proceeds with e2, evaluated
over β′. ABORT models the opposite. Here e1 evaluates toward a revert: any changes
made to β are discarded and the execution does not further proceed. Bearing in mind
what we said in Section 2.3.4, =⇒ actually models the behavior of validation nodes: if
any transactions returns a revert the entire process is stopped without further proceed-
ing with the subsequent transactions.
Lastly, Definition 8 formalizes the operational semantics for transactions in FS.
Definition 8 (Operational semantics for transactions). The operational semantics for
transactions is defined as the reflective, transitive closure of =⇒. It is indicated with
=⇒∗ and formally defined as follows:
〈β, e〉 =⇒∗ 〈β, e〉
〈β, e〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉 〈β′, e′〉 =⇒ 〈β′′, e′′〉
〈β, e〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′′, e′′〉
5.3 Lookup functions
Here we define the following three functions:
• sv(C), defined over contract names and returning the tuple of state variables
defined in the declaration of C;
• fbody(C, f, v˜), returning a pair (x˜, e) corresponding to the formal parameters
and the body of the function f in the definition of C. It also checks whether
|x˜| = |v˜|;
• ftype(C, f), returning the type of the function f contained in C;
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These functions are formally defined in Figure 5.4.
State variable lookup:
CT (C) = contract C {T˜ s; K F˜}
sv(C) = T˜ s
Function body lookup:
CT (C) = contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} T f (T˜ x) {return e} ∈ F˜ |x˜| = |v˜|
fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, return e)
CT (C) = contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} f /∈ F˜ ∨ (T f (T˜ x) {return e} ∈ F˜ ∧ |v˜| 6= |x˜|)
fbody(C, f, v˜) = ({}, return revert)
Function signature lookup:
CT (C) = contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} B f (A˜ x) {return e; } ∈ F˜
ftype(C, f) = A˜→ B
Figure 5.4: Lookup functions
fbody is a bit complex and its definition is not trivial. Consider the first case,
fbody(C, f, v˜). It checks whether the function f appears in the list of functions F
of C. If so, it also checks the length of the actual parameters tuple (v˜), comparing
it with the one of the formal parameters tuple (x˜). If they match, everything is fine
and the body of f is correctly returned, together with the list of formal parameters.
Otherwise, the function is undefined, either because f does not appear in F or because
of a mismatch in the tuples length. In this case no body can be retrieved and we signal
the error by throwing a revert.
5.4 Auxiliary predicates
Here we define some predicates used to make the rules simpler and more readable.
They extract information from the components of a configuration C, in particular:
• uptbal(β, a, n) (Figure 5.5) returns a blockchain where the balance of a has
been incremented/decremented of n;
• Top(σ) (Figure 5.6), defined on σ, returns the top of the call stack, if any (i.e.
σ = σ′ · a), or ∅, if the call stack is empty.
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uptbal(β, a, n) =

β[(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n′ + n)] if βˆ(a) = c∧
∧β(a, c) = (C, s˜:v, n′)∧
∧n′ + n > 0 (n ∈ Z)
⊥ if βˆ(a) = c∧
∧β(a, c) = (C, s˜:v, n′)∧
∧n′ + n < 0
⊥ if a /∈ dom(β)
⊥ if a = ∅
Figure 5.5: Balance update
Note that dom(uptbal(β, a,±n)) = dom(β). In other words, it is not defined
over addresses not contained in β. Before decrementing, updatebalance also checks
whether the balance is greater or equal to n. Here, we suppose n ∈ Z, and return ⊥
if the balance is not sufficient to accomplish the decrement as well as if the address a
is not known (i.e. a /∈ dom(β) or a = ∅). As we shall see soon, this will result in a
revert at run-time.
Top(σ) =
{
a if σ = σ′ · a
∅ if σ = β
Figure 5.6: Top of the call stack
5.5 Operational semantics rules
In this section we list the operational semantics rules of the FS language. For a com-
prehensive view of them, see Appendix A.
Remark. In the following rules, whenever the call stack is empty (σ = β, or, alter-
natively, Top(σ) = ∅) the expression poses as a transaction. When necessary, the
rules will make a distinction between empty and non-empty stack. If no distinction is
explicitly done, the rule applies to both cases.
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If expression The rules modeling the if expression are as follows:
(IF-TRUE)
〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e1〉
(IF-FALSE)
〈β, σ, if false then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e2〉
These rules have the standard meaning. The only thing that is worth to point out is
that both the branches (then and else) are mandatory and cannot be omitted.
Sequential composition The rules for sequential composition are as follows:
(SEQ-C)
σ = β0
〈β, σ, v; e〉 −→ 〈β, β, e〉
(SEQ-R)
σ = β0
〈β, σ, revert; e〉 −→ 〈β0, σ, revert〉
(SEQ)
Top(σ) = a
〈β, σ, v; e〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e〉
These rules have to take into account different scenarios. First, when an expression
like v; e is found at the top level (Top(σ) = ∅) then the last transaction was success-
ful. In fact, it evaluated to a value v, which can be discarded to proceed with the next
transaction e. Furthermore, since evaluating to a value is equivalent to a commit, we
apply the changes and proceed with β. This scenario is modeled by SEQ-C. Secondly,
v; e might be at an inner level (Top(σ) = a). In this case (SEQ) we cannot apply any
changes, since the transaction is not over yet. Hence, we just proceed with the evalu-
ation of e, discarding v. Lastly, a revert may have been thrown during the evaluation,
so instead of v; e the expression involving sequential composition is revert; e (SEQ-R).
In this case we do not further proceed in evaluating the other transactions: this models
the behavior of validation nodes, as said before.
We shall see later on in this Chapter how we handle a revert occurring not at the
top level.
74
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
Variables The rules regarding variables are as follows:
(DECL)
x /∈ dom(β)
〈β, σ, T x = v; e〉 −→ 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v; e〉
(VAR)
〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉
(ASS)
x ∈ dom(β)
〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→ v], σ, v〉
When a variable x is declared we add it to β: this behavior is modeled by DECL.
VAR and ASS simply access β to read or modify, respectively, the value corresponding
to a variable x.
Mappings The rules regarding mappings are as follows:
(MAPPSEL)
〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉
(MAPPASS)
M ′ = M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪ {(v1, v2)}
〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉
As we said, a mapping can be seen as a total function T1 → T2, where ∀v ∈
dom(M),∃v2 such that M(v1) = v2. dom(M) = {v | v is a value of type T1}, and
v2 is either a user-defined value or the “zero” value, according to Definition 4. Lever-
aging this property, MAPPSEL evaluates M [v1] by retrieving the corresponding v2.
MAPPASS works in a similar way. Considering M as a set of key-value pairs (M =
{ ˜(v,M(v))}), we define a new mappingM ′ where every pair remains the same, except
for the one having v1 as a key. It is updated so that it becomes (v1, v2).
BALANCE and ADDRESS The rules regarding the expressions balance and address
are as follows:
(BALANCE)
β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n)
〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉
(ADDRESS)
βˆ(c) = a
〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉
In Solidity, balance is a property of address values returning the balance of the
account referred to by each address. To avoid confusion with contract state variables,
we chose to define balance as an expression of the language. Note the short form
in the abuse of notation to query β without an explicit reference to a contract. The
complete form of this hypothesis is as follows: β(c, a) = (C, s˜:v, b), ∃c such that
(c, a) ∈ dom(β). Furthermore, in Solidity an implicit cast is applied whenever a
contract reference is used instead of an address value. To model such a behavior in FS,
which does not have any implicit casts, we defined an explicit global function, address,
extracting the address corresponding to a given reference, as said in Section 4.1.
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Contract instantiation The rules regarding contract instantiation are as follows:
(NEW-1)
(c, a) /∈ dom(β) sv(C) = T˜ s |v˜| = |s˜| Top(σ) 6= ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉
(NEW-2)
(c, a) /∈ dom(β) sv(C) = T˜ s |v˜| = |s˜| Top(σ) = ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉
(NEW-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥ Top(σ) 6= ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
NEW rules deploy a new contract on the blockchain. The number of typed values
provided as input must be the same as the number of state variables in C. This is
consistent with the definition of K, whose body contains only a sequence of assign-
ments. This is slightly different from what Solidity allows. For example, we cannot
explicitly reference either msg.sender or msg.value, or initialize the state starting from
values with different types. In FS there must be a one-to-one correspondence between
parameters and state variables. We already saw this behavior in Example 4.2, where
BloodBank’s constructor contained more parameters then the one written in Solidity.
A contract may be deployed with an initial balance. To this end we allow programmers
to specify the amount of Wei to send along with the call to new. Again, we shall omit
the value(n) part whenever n == 0. NEW-1 appends to β a pair (c, a), where c is a
fresh contract reference and a is a fresh address. In this context, “fresh” means “not in
the domain”. As we already pointed out, the uniqueness of the single components of
the pair is ensured by definition. The rule ensures that the creator’s balance is greater
than the amount of Wei being sent. If not, the instantiation fails and a revert is thrown
(rule NEW-R). NEW-1 requires the stack to be non-empty (i.e. Top(σ) 6= ∅). This
means that the call to new happens in the context of a contract (i.e. a function f of
the contract at address Top(σ) is being executed). Hence, the creator (i.e. the contract
calling new) is always well defined, and the balance update operates on an address
Top(σ) ∈ dom(β). On the contrary, if the call stack is empty (i.e. Top(σ) = ∅), rule
NEW-2 applies. In this case we suppose the amount of Wei comes from an external
source and do not check any balances. In Ethereum, instead, the balance of the contract
posing as a sender is decreased.
Cast The rules about casts are as follows:
(CONTRRETR)
βC(a) = C βˆ(a) = c
〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉
(CONTRRETR-R)
βC(a) = C ′ C ′ 6= C
〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
Solidity allows programmers to retrieve a reference to a deployed contract: one can
think of this operation as a cast. Given an address a, if it is stored on the blockchain,
76
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
C(a) returns the contract reference c corresponding to a (CONTRRETR). If a corre-
sponds to a contract with a different definition (C ′ 6= C), a revert is thrown (CONTRRETR-
R).
State variables The rules to read and mutate state variables are as follows:
(STATESEL)
β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) s ∈ s˜
〈β, σ, c.s〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉
(STATEASS)
β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) s ∈ s˜
〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 −→ 〈β[c.s 7→ v′], σ, v′〉
Given a contract reference and a state variable identifier, STATESEL returns the
value of the required variable. In a similar way, STATEASS enables the mutation of
such value.
Money transfer Money transfers are modeled by the following rules:
(TRANSFER)
βC(a) = C fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, e)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n)
〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉
(TRANSFER-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥
〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
Money transfers are modeled by TRANSFER. In Solidity, whenever a contract
sends Wei to another, the recipient’s fallback function is invoked (note fb in the call of
fbody). If the latter is not defined, fbody returns a revert. A call to transfer modifies
the balance of both the caller and the callee in the expected way, decreasing the former
and increasing the latter. What we said before about σ and e applies here, too. This
rule requires σ to be non-empty (thus, if empty the evaluation goes stuck). This could
seem a limitation, since also the top level contract may send Wei to another contract,
but actually it is not: from the top-level the fallback function is directly invokable and
allows programmers to send n Wei to a specific contract.
Again, we throw a revert if the balance is not enough (TRANSFER-R).
As said in Section 2.4.2, Solidity actually provides another way to send Wei: the
function send. We also said transfer is the safe counterpart of send: if something fails
during the fallback evaluation, a revert is thrown and then propagated until the top level
to make the entire transaction fail. send does not do that, and simply returns a boolean
flag, which is false if an exception had happened while running the fallback function.
Except for this, their behavior is the same. Hence, we chose to model transfer because
it is safer: the use of send is discouraged and may lead to harmful situations as well as
subtle bugs.
Function calls Function calls are modeled by the following rules:
77
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
(CALL)
βˆ(c) = a βC(c) = C fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e) x˜ /∈ dom(β)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [x˜ 7→ v˜]
es = e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, es〉
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
βˆ(c) = a βC(c) = C fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e) x˜ /∈ dom(β)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(βw, a, n), a′,−n) · [x˜ 7→ v˜] Top(σ) = ∅
es = e{this := c,msg.sender := a′,msg.value := n}
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, es; e′〉
(CALL-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(RETURN)
〈β, σ · a, return v〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉
(CALLTOPLEVEL-R)
uptbal(β, a′,−n) = ⊥ Top(σ) = ∅
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert; e′〉
(RETURN-R)
〈β, σ · a, return revert〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
Function calls are modeled by CALL. value has the same meaning as before, and
allows programmers to indicate the amount of Wei to send along with the invocation.
The blockchain is modified by changing the balances of both the caller and the callee
(decrementing, and respectively incrementing, their balance by n Wei). σ is extended
in the expected way, by pushing the callee’s address. Note that σ has to be non-empty.
The purpose of RETURN is to pop an element from σ. We apply this behavior not only
in the context of a “successful” return, but also when the expression being returned is
a revert (RETURN-R).
CALLTOPLEVEL is a particular rule allowed only in a very specific scenario. CALL
allows contracts to invoke functions, but it cannot be applied from the top level since
there is no address to use as a sender. Hence, we let programmers specify the callee
address a′ in a function invocation so that we can pretend a′ to be the actual callee. This
way of calling functions is intended to modelEOC contracts, which do not contain any
code, invoking other deployed contracts. Thus, it models transactions started by EOAs.
Note that this rule only applies at the top level, since only there the runtime operates
on an empty stack (i.e. σ = β, or, alternatively, Top(σ) = ∅).
Again, before proceeding with the evaluation of the function’s body, we check the
callee’s balance to see if it is grater that the amount of Wei being sent. If not, we throw
a revert (CALL-R and CALLTOPLEVEL-R).
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We assume a correct use of top and inner-level calls: a simple static inspection of
the program can detect such violations and stop the compilation process.
Computation rules The only two FS computation rules are as follows:
(CONG)
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉
〈β, σ,E[e]〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉
(REVERT)
〈β, σ,E[revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
In the two rules above we made use of evaluation context, formally defined by
Figure 5.7, to reduce the number of computation rules. Contexts contain a single hole,
written [], inside them. E[e] represents the expression obtained by replacing the hole
in context E with the expression e.
E ::= [] | balance(E) | address(E) | E.s | E.transfer(e) | a.transfer(E) |
new C.value(E)(e˜) | new C.value(n)(v˜, E, e˜) | C(E) | E; e |
E.f.value(e)(e˜) | c.f.value(E)(e˜) | c.f.value(n)(v˜, E, e˜) | E.value(e)(e˜) |
E.f.value(e).sender(e)(e˜) | c.f.value(E).sender(e)(e˜) |
c.f.value(n).sender(E)(e˜) | c.f.value(n).sender(a)(v˜, E, e˜) | T x = E; e |
x = E | E.s = e | c.s = E | E[e] |M [E] | E[e→ e] |M [E → e] |
M [v → E] | if E then e else e | returnE
Figure 5.7: Evaluation context
5.6 Operational semantics by example
This section shows how the above rules are applied. Example 5.1 is about the evalu-
ation of contract creations and function calls, Example 5.2 describes money transfers,
and Example 5.3 shows how function values are used.
Example 5.1. We make use of the FS code listed in Example 4.2, and show how the
following expression is evaluated in 〈∅, ∅, e〉:
e := EOC xdoctor = new EOC();
BloodBank ybank = new BloodBank(0{}, address(xdoctor), 0);
Donor zdonor = new Donor(5000, address(ybank));
ybank.setHealth.sender(address(xdoctor))(address(zdonor), true)
Where EOC was defined by Definition 1.
〈∅, ∅, EOC xdoctor = new EOC(); e′〉 −→
〈∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)], ∅, EOC xdoctor = cdoctor; e′〉 −→
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〈∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor], ∅, cdoctor; e′〉 −→SEQ-C
〈∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor],
∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor],
BloodBank ybank = new BloodBank({}, address(xdoctor), 0); e′′〉 −→∗
We omit the evaluation of BloodBank ybank = new BloodBank(0{},
address(xdoctor), 0) and Donor zdonor = new Donor(5000, address(ybank)), which
is as before. Let
β1 = σ1 = ∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor]
· [(cbank, abank) 7→ (BloodBank, healty = 0{}; doctor = adoctor; blood = 0, 0)]
· [ybank 7→ cbank] · [(cdonor, adonor) 7→ (Donor, blood : 5000; bank : abank, 0)]
· [zdonor 7→ cdonor]. The evaluation goes on as follows:
〈β1, σ1, ybank.setHealth.sender(address(xdoctor))(address(zdonor), true)〉 −→∗
〈β1, σ1, cbank.setHealth.sender(adoctor)(adonor, true)〉 −→CALL
〈β1 · [ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true], σ1 · abank,
return if adoctor == cbank.doctor then
cbank.healty = cbank.healty[ donor → isHealty]; u
else revert〉 −→∗
〈β1 · [ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true], σ1 · abank,
return cbank.healty = cbank.healty[ donor → isHealty]; u〉 −→
〈β1 · [ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true], σ1 · abank,
return cbank.healty = 0{}[adonor → true]; u〉 −→
〈β1 · [ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true], σ1 · abank,
return cbank.healty = {(adonor, true)}; u〉 −→
〈∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (BloodBank, healty = {(adonor, true)};
doctor = adoctor; blood = 0, 0]
·[ybank 7→ cbank] · [(cdonor, adonor) 7→ (Donor, blood : 5000; bank : abank, 0)]
·[zdonor 7→ cdonor] · [ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true], σ1 · abank,
return u〉 −→
Let β2 be the blockchain at this point.
〈β2, σ1, u〉
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Note the application of CALLTOPLEVEL when
ybank.setHealth.sender(xdoctor)(address(zdonor), true) is evaluated. Thanks to this
rule, programmers may explicitly control msg.sender, thus pretending xdoctor to be the
actual sender. Also note the call-by-value semantics, where all the actual parameters
must be reduced to values before the function call.
e evaluates to u, so it does not actually return anything to the caller. Instead, it
modifies the blockchain β by allowing cdonor to donate blood. Below we list the
evaluation steps for e′ = zdonor.donate.sender(address(whumanDonor))(500), where
EOC whumanDonor = newEOC(). Let β3 = σ3β2·[(chumanDonor, ahumanDonor) 7→
(EOC, , 0)] · [whumanDonor 7→ chumanDonor].
The transition relation =⇒ behaves as follows:
〈β2, chumanDonor; e′〉 =⇒COMMIT 〈β3, e′〉
And e′ is evaluated in the following way:
〈β3, σ3, zdonor.donate.sender(address(whumanDonor))(500); u〉 −→∗
〈β3·[ amount 7→ 500], σ3·adonor,
(return if cbank.donate( amount) then cdonor.blood = cdonor.blood− amount; u
else u)〉 −→ 〈β3 · [ amount 7→ 500]·[amount′ 7→ 500], σ3 · adonor·abank,
(return if
(return uint donorBlood = Donor(adonor).getBlood();
if cbank.healty[adonor]&&donorBlood > 3000
then cbank.blood = cbank.blood+ amount
′; true
else false)
then cdonor.blood = cdonor.blood− amount; u else u)〉 −→∗
〈β3 · [ amount 7→ 500] · [amount′ 7→ 500]·[donorBlood 7→ 5000], σ3 · adonor · abank,
(return if
(return if true&&5000 > 3000 then cbank.blood = cbank.blood+ amount
′; true
else false)
then cdonor.blood = cdonor.blood− amount; u else u)〉 −→∗
〈β3 · [ amount 7→ 500], σ3 · adonor · abank,
(return if
(return cbank.blood = 0 + 500; true)
then cdonor.blood = cdonor.blood− amount; u else u)〉 −→∗
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〈∅ · [(cdoctor, adoctor) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xdoctor 7→ cdoctor]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (BloodBank, healty = {(adonor, true)};
doctor = adoctor; blood = 500, 0)] · [ybank 7→ cbank]
·[(cdonor, adonor) 7→ (Donor, blood : 4500; bank : abank, 0)] · [zdonor 7→ cdonor]
·[ donor 7→ adonor] · [ isHealty 7→ true] · [(chumanDonor, ahumanDonor)
7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [whumanDonor 7→ chumanDonor] · [ amount 7→ 500], σ3, u〉
Note that we added a new EOC contract, pointed to by whumanDonor, to start
the transaction. whumanDonor is intended to represent the person behind the contract
zdonor, even though zdonor does not contain any reference to them. Actually, anybody
could call zdonor.donate() on whumanDonor’s behalf. Here, we were not interested in
showing how to implement access control mechanisms, shown in set Healty(), but in
giving an example of how the interaction between contracts behaves.
Example 5.2. Here we make use of the code listed in Example 4.1, and show the
evaluation of the following expression:
e := EOC xeoa = value(1000).new EOC();
Bank ybank = new Bank(0{});
ybank.deposit.value(500).sender(address(xeoa))();
ybank.withdraw.sender(address(xeoa))(100)
Basically, xeoa first deposits 500 and then withdraws 100 Wei.
〈∅, ∅, EOC xeoa = new C.value(1000)(); e′〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa],
∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa],
Bank ybank = new Bank(0{}); e′′〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, 0{}, 0)]
·[ybank 7→ cbank], ∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, 0{}, 0)] · [ybank 7→ cbank],
ybank.deposit.value(500).sender(address(xeoa))(); e
′′′〉 −→∗
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〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank) 7→
(Bank, 0{}, 0)] · [ybank 7→ cbank], ∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 1000)]
·[xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, 0{}, 0)] · [ybank 7→ cbank] · abank,
(return cbank.balances[aeoa] = cbank.balances[aeoa → cbank.balances[aeoa]+
500]; u); e′′′〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 500)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank)
7→ (Bank, {(aeoa, 500)}, 500)] · [ybank 7→ cbank], ∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC,
, 500)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, {(aeoa, 500)}, 500)]
·[ybank 7→ cbank], ybank.withdraw.sender(address(xeoa))(100); u〉 −→∗
Let β = σ = ∅· [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 500)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(cbank, abank) 7→
(Bank, {(aeoa, 500)}, 500)] · [ybank 7→ cbank].
〈β · [amount 7→ 100],
σ · abank,
(return if cbank.balances[aeoa] >= 100
then
cbank.balances[aeoa] = cbank.balances[aeoa → cbank.balances[aeoa]− 100];
aeoa.transfer(100); u
else u); u〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 500)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, {(aeoa, 400)}, 500)]
·[ybank 7→ cbank] · [amount 7→ 100], σ · abank,
(return aeoa.transfer(100); u); u〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 600)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, {(aeoa, 400)}, 400)]
·[ybank 7→ cbank] · [amount 7→ 100], σ · abank · aeoa,
(return ((return u); u))〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 600)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa]
·[(cbank, abank) 7→ (Bank, {(aeoa, 400)}, 400)]
·[ybank 7→ cbank] · [amount 7→ 100], σ, u〉
Example 5.3. This example uses the code listed in Example 4.3 and shows the evalu-
ation of the following expression:
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e := EOC xeoa = new EOC();
Applier yapp = new Applier(10);
Test ztest = new Test(yapp);
ztest.f1.sender(address(xeoa))()
In this latter evaluation we shall skip the vast majority of the steps to show only the
ones more concerned with function pointers.
〈∅, ∅, e〉 −→∗
〈∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(capp, aapp)
7→ (Applier, state = 10, 0)] · [yapp 7→ capp] · [(ctest, atest) 7→
(Test, app = capp, 0)] · [xtest 7→ ctest], ∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→
(EOC, , 0)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(capp, aapp) 7→
(Applier, state = 10, 0)] · [yapp 7→ capp] · [(ctest, atest) 7→
(Test, app = capp, 0)] · [xtest 7→ ctest],
ztest.f1.sender(address(xeoa))(); u〉 −→∗
Let β = σ = ∅ · [(ceoa, aeoa) 7→ (EOC, , 0)] · [xeoa 7→ ceoa] · [(capp, aapp) 7→
(Applier, state = 10, 0)] · [yapp 7→ capp] · [(ctest, atest) 7→ (Test, app = capp, 0)] ·
[xtest 7→ ctest]. The evaluation proceeds as follows:
〈β, σ · atest, (return ctest.app.apply(ctest.square)); u〉 −→∗
〈β · [f 7→ ctest.square], σ · atest · aapp,
(return (return ctest.square(capp.state))); u〉 −→∗
〈β · [f 7→ ctest.square] · [n 7→ 10], σ · atest · aapp · atest,
(return (return (returnn ∗ n)))〉 −→∗
〈β · [f 7→ ctest.square] · [n 7→ 10], σ, 100〉
This evaluation shows that function pointers behave like normal functions.
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Chapter 6
Type system
In this chapter we describe the type system of FS, first giving the form of the judgments
and then the rules. FS is strongly and statically typed, meaning that all the types of an
expression are known before evaluating it, and that programmers cannot work around
the restrictions imposed by our type system. This is slightly different in Solidity, where
some expressions, for instance inline assembly or call, may break type safety. FS does
not model these aspects.
6.1 The goals of the type system of FS
Usually, type systems are used to give programmers some guarantees. In particular,
they help in rejecting all the ill-formed expressions, that is the ones having a sort of
“undefined” meaning, such as balance(5) or true.transfer(false). Taking the former as
an example, the implicit function balance is defined only over addresses and makes
no sense on natural numbers. One of the most important guarantees is type safety.
Informally, in a type-safe language, if an expression is closed (i.e. it does not contain
any free variables) and well-typed (i.e. not ill-formed) then it does not go stuck, which
means that the computation is not blocked (but it may still not terminate due to, for
example, an infinite loop or an ill-founded recursion). On the other hand, a stuck
expression cannot be further evaluated, and the computation is blocked. Normally, this
is a serious issue, because the program does not terminate correctly.
In Solidity, at run-time, the following errors may appear:
1. accessing a state variable or function not defined by the contract;
2. wrong parameters passing, either in number or type. This category includes not
only function calls, but also if expressions, mapping reads and writes, assign-
ment, and so forth;
3. transferring an amount of Wei to a contract without a (payable) fallback function;
4. sending an amount of Wei to a non-payable constructor during a contract instan-
tiation;
5. wrong cast C(a). This happens when a refers to an instance of a contract C ′,
with C 6= C ′;
6. transferring an amount of Wei from a contract with an insufficient balance;
85
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
7. the transaction ran out of gas.
Solidity’s compiler rules out Errors 1, 2, and 4. Solidity actually allows a workaround
that makes them possible. In fact, programmers can invoke functions either in the
usual way (i.e. on a variable mapping to a contract reference) or by using call,
delegatecall, or callcode. We explained in detail their behavior, and the harm-
ful consequences, in Example 2.2: in fact, the documentation [48] explicitly states to
use them with care and as a last resort, since they break the type safety of Solidity.
Unfortunately, except for this textual advice, the compiler does not warn programmers.
This may, of course, lead to unexpected behaviors, and FS does not contain such prim-
itives. Hence, we shall consider only Solidity code not using any of them, and thus
ruling out Errors 1, 2, and 4.
Errors 1 and 2, in particular, correspond to the “message not understood” error in
the object-oriented programming paradigm. The proof of the typing properties of FS
(see Appendix E) is the first formal proof that well-typed Solidity contracts do not
contain such errors.
Errors 3 and 5 have to do with clumsy uses of addresses. Starting with Error
3, an amount of Wei can be transfered from one account to another by using either
transfer or send. The latter is actually the low-level counterpart of the former
(returning a bool to indicate whether or not the transfer was successful), and its use
is discouraged. They are both defined on values of type address. This choice enables
msg.sender to have type address and simplifies the writing of contracts. Furthermore,
EOAs in Solidity do not correspond to contracts, thus trying to give a contract type to
msg.sender might pose some problems. On the other hand, this could introduce errors
of the third category. As we said, a contract must define a payable fallback function in
order to receive any amount of Wei, but Solidity does not check which code is associ-
ated with an address when transfer (or send) is invoked1. Hence, it may happen
that the recipient does not define such a function, thus causing Error 3. Error 5 orig-
inates from a similar issue. When we compile a contract we cannot know if a given
address will correspond to a given contract definition C. If it does, the cast will be
successful at run-time, but if it does not, the behavior entirely depends on the actual
contract pointed to by the address, as we saw in Section 2.4.2.
Lastly, Error 6 appears when a contract is transferring money to another, but its
balance is insufficient. Since contracts cannot have negative balances, the execution
cannot further proceed.
Solidity solves these issues by introducing the concept of errors and reverts. When-
ever something goes wrong and a transaction cannot terminate, Solidity can cause a re-
vert, thus aborting the transaction itself. This happens, for instance, when the amount
of gas is not enough to make the code run to completion or when an amount of Wei is
sent to a contract without a (payable) fallback function. Programmers also can abort the
current transaction. Usually, this is done either implicitly, with require or assert,
which validate preconditions, or explicitly, with revert.
We shall differentiate the two categories as follows:
• “internal” reverts issued by Solidity are referenced to as errors;
• reverts issued by programmers are referenced to as exceptions. They appear
explicitly into the code and (should) entirely depend on the business logic. For
instance, an auction contract might require that a new bid is greater than the
1Actually, transfer and send can be invoked also on contract references, but the compiler gives a
warning saying it is deprecated.
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current one. If such entry guard is false, the amount of Wei sent along with the
function invocation is sent back to the caller. The miner, on the other hand, still
receives a payment corresponding to the effort it took to validate the condition.
These reverts cannot be avoided using only a type system, because they depend
on values known only at run-time.
With this solution, transactions always terminate, either with a value or with an
abort. Remember that, in Solidity, a transaction cannot loop indefinitely thanks to the
system of gas. Nonetheless, an abort still leaves tracks of the transaction: any changes
to the blockchain (both to state variables and balances) are reverted, except for the price
paid to the miner. In fact, miners keep the amount of Wei corresponding to the amount
of gas needed to mine the transaction, even if the latter actually failed.
FS presents the same run-time errors as Solidity, except for the out-of-gas one.
We assume that every program runs with an amount of gas sufficient to make it run
to completion. This assumption is not too strict, since providing enough gas is just a
matter of paying more Wei to execute a transaction. These errors are dealt with in the
same way as Solidity does: Errors 1, 2, and 4 are ruled out by the type system, whereas
Errors 3, 5, and 6 raise a revert and abort the transaction. Note that every function
in FS is implicitly payable, and so we do not check this aspect when looking for a
fallback function.
6.2 Judgments
Definition 9 defines the context Γ, a list of typed variables, addresses, and contract
references.
Definition 9 (Context).
(Type environment) Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : T | Γ, a : address | Γ, c : C
Definition 10 then extends Definition 2 and Definition 3 to include Γ.
Definition 10 (Domains with type environment). Let Γ be well formed (see Sec-
tion 6.3). Then its domain is defined as follows:
dom(∅) = ∅
dom(Γ, x : T ) = {x} ∪ dom(Γ)
dom(Γ, a : address) = {a} ∪ dom(Γ)
dom(Γ, c : C) = {c} ∪ dom(Γ)
Hence, dom(Γ) is defined as the set of variables, addresses, and contract references
contained in Γ.
The main goal of a type system is to give types to expressions. We use the following
types of judgments:
• Type environment (Γ ` 〈〉), to indicate that Γ is well formed;
• Contract and function (T2 f ( ˜T1 x) {return e} OK in C and
contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} OK), to indicate that both contract and function defini-
tions are well formed;
• Blockchain (Γ ` β), to indicate that β is compliant with its type definition;
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• Transaction (Γ ` σ), to indicate that σ is well-formed;
• Configuration and program (Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T and Γ ` (CT, β, e)T ), to ensure
that programs and configurations are well formed;
• Expressions (Γ ` e : T ), to give a type to each meaningful expression of the FS
language.
In the rules that follow, T , T1, and T2 range over expression types, as defined in
Figure 4.1, whereas C represents contract names.
6.3 Type rules
In this section we list all the rules defining the type system of FS. Most of them are
standard and have the expected meaning. Others reflect some peculiarities of Solidity.
Note that FS does not support subtyping. For a comprehensive view of all these rules,
see Appendix B.
Remark (Tuple notation in FS type judgments). As said in Chapter 4, the symbol ˜
represents a tuple: in the rules that follow we shall make further use of this symbol in
various ways. Γ ` v˜ : T˜ represents n ∈ N distinct judgments with the form Γ ` vi : Ti,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is every value vi is required to have a type Ti possibly different than all
the others Tj in T˜ . On the other hand, Γ ` v˜ : T also represents n distinct judgments,
but the type T is fixed and does not vary, that is: Γ ` vi : T , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Lastly, we use
˜{(k, v)} to indicate a tuple of pairs (k, v): (k1, v1); . . . ; (kn; vn).
Well-formedness of Γ The rules to check the well-formedness of the type environ-
ment Γ, and making sure that every element in dom(Γ) is unique, are as follows:
(EMPTYENVIRONMENT)
∅ ` 〈〉
(VARIABLEENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 x /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, x : T ` 〈〉
(ADDRESSENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 a /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, a : address ` 〈〉
(CONTRACTENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 c /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, c : C ` 〈〉
Well-formedness for contracts and functions The following rules give a type to
contract and function definitions. Note that T f (T˜ x) {return e} OK in C captures
also fb.
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(F OK IN C)
this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T2
T2 f ( ˜T1 x) {return e} OK in C
(C OK)
K = C (T˜ x) {this.s˜ = x˜} F˜ OK in C
contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} OK
Well-formedness for blockchains The rules used to check the well-formedness of β
are the following:
(EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN)
Γ ` ∅
(VARIABLE)
Γ ` β x /∈ dom(β) Γ ` x : T Γ ` v : T
Γ ` β · [x 7→ v]
(CONTRACT)
Γ ` β (c, a) /∈ dom(β) Γ ` c : C Γ ` a : address
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` v˜ : T˜ Γ ` n : uint |s˜| = |v˜|
Γ ` β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]
VARIABLE makes sure that every “new” variable is unique in β (i.e. @x ∈ dom(β))
and that the type of x is the same of the one of v, the value being associated to x.
CONTRACT is similar: we check the type of c and a (respectively, a contract reference
of C and an address), that the balance n is of type uint and that the state variables s˜
match in number and type with the values v˜ associated with them.
Well-formedness for call stacks The rule used to give a type to a call stack is defined
as follows:
(CALLSTACK)
Γ ` σ Γ ` a : address
Γ ` σ · a
σ is composed of two parts: a blockchain β and a sequence of addresses a pushed upon
the latter. CALLSTACK, which checks the type of each of these addresses, eventually
reaches its base case, Γ ` β. At this point, the rules to give a type to β apply.
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Well-formedness for configurations and programs The rules used to check config-
urations and programs well-formedness are defined as follows:
(CONFIGURATION)
Γ ` β Γ ` σ Γ ` e : T
Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
(PROGRAM)
C OK ∀ C ∈ CT Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T
Γ ` (CT, β, e) : T
CONFIGURATION is used to give a type to C in FS. Its formalization aims to be general:
note, indeed, the first premise Γ ` β. It may seem redundant, since it is also implied
by Γ ` σ (remember the base case of CALLSTACK), but this is not always true. In fact,
the first element of C is equal to the β in σ only at the beginning of the execution, but
after that it may change. A rule without this first premise would fail in giving a type to
the evolving β.
PROGRAM gives a type to an FS program, starting from the configuration 〈β, β, e〉.
Types of expressions We now state the rules to give a type to FS expressions.
Axioms The axioms have all a standard meaning. Note how we require Γ ` 〈〉 in
all of them, to make sure that the context we operate on is well-formed.
(REF)
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` c : C
(VAR)
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` x : T
(TRUE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` true : bool
(FALSE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` false : bool
(ADDRESS)
Γ, a : address,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, a : address,Γ′ ` a : address
UNIT
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` u : unit
(REVERT)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` revert : T
(NAT)
n ∈ N+ Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` n : uint
Γ ` revert : T is well-typed regardless of T . We do not give a unique type to
this expression, since it may be used in any context whatsoever. For instance, Γ `
if true then 10 else revert : uint and Γ ` if false then u else revert : unit are both valid
expression in FS, but the former has type uint and the latter has type unit.
Standard rules Rules with a standard meaning are listed below. They comprise
the if expression, variable assignment and declaration as well as sequential composi-
tion. BAL and ADDR are about the expressions balance(e) and address(e), respec-
tively. As said in Section 2.4.2, the former operates on addresses, whereas the latter is
used to explicitly get the address identifying a given contract reference.
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(BAL)
Γ ` e : address
Γ ` balance(e) : uint
(ADDR)
Γ ` e : C
Γ ` address(e) : address
(RETURN)
Γ ` e : T
Γ ` return e : T
(SEQ)
Γ ` e1 : T1 Γ ` e2 : T2
Γ ` e1; e2 : T2
(DECL)
Γ ` e1 : T1 Γ, x : T1 ` e2 : T2
Γ ` T1 x = e1; e2 : T2
(IF)
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : T Γ ` e3 : T
Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T
(ASS)
Γ ` x : T Γ ` e : T
Γ ` x = e : T
Mappings The following rules give a type to mapping values, as well as to read
and write accesses on them. As we said at the beginning of this section, Γ ` v˜ : T
represents n ∈ N distinct judgments where the type T is fixed and does not vary, that
is: Γ ` vi : T , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(MAPPING)
M = ˜{(k, v)} Γ ` k˜ : T1 Γ ` v˜ : T2
Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(MAPPASS)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T1 Γ ` e3 : T2
Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(MAPPSEL)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T1
Γ ` e1[e2] : T2
Contract instantiation and access The following rules are about the instanti-
ation (i.e. deploy) of a new contract as well as the access (read/write) to its state
variables.
(STATESEL)
Γ ` e : C sv(C) = T˜ s si ∈ s˜
Γ ` e.si : Ti
(STATEASS)
Γ ` e1.s : T Γ ` e2 : T
Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T
(NEW)
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` e˜ : T˜ |e˜| = |s˜| Γ ` e′ : uint
Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C
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Functions The following rules regard functions.
(FUN)
Γ ` c : C ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2
(CALL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e˜ : T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
Γ ` e3 : address Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
(CALLVALUE)
Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e2 : uint Γ ` e˜ : T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
Rule FUN imposes that what we called a “function pointer” (c.f ) must be defined
in the code of c. It retrieves the type of f via ftype, defined in Figure 5.4. If f /∈ F˜ ,
ftype(C, f) is not defined, and FUN does not apply anymore. Thus, to use a function
pointer as a value, it must appear in the code of c. Note how CALLVALUE’s first
premise, Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2 reduces to FUN.
CALL and CALLTOPLEVEL have the expected meaning; the latter also checks that
the expression specified as sender is of type address.
Casts and money transfers The following rules are about casts and money trans-
fers.
(CONTRRETR)
Γ ` e : address warning
Γ ` C(e) : C
(TRANSFER)
Γ ` e1 : address Γ ` e2 : uint
Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : unit
Note the limitation in TRANSFER. The transfer operation is defined on addresses
(its definition on contract references is deprecated in Solidity), and at compile-time,
when type rules are enforced (remember FS is statically typed), we have no information
about the contract residing at a given address. Hence, we cannot check if the code of
c contains a fallback function. Lastly, the type system does not ensure that a top-level
function call (the one specifying the sender) actually appears only at the top level.
Furthermore, Solidity does not contain such distinction, since top-level calls actually
come from a different programming language (typically from JavaScript through the
web3.js library). Hence, we assume a correct use of top and inner-level calls: a simple
static inspection of the program (prior to the type check) can detect such violations and
stop the compilation process.
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CONTRRETR raise a warning when a cast is compiled. As we explained in Sec-
tion 2.4.2, Ethereum adopts a very liberal policy when it deals with casts from address
to contract types. Furthermore, Solidity’s compiler does not give any warnings to sig-
nal that something strange may happen at run-time. We chose, instead, to warn pro-
grammers at compile-time and to adopt a more conservative behavior when evaluating
expressions like C(a). As shown in Section 5.5 (Rule CONTRRETR-R), we raise a
revert when we detect that a refers to an instance of C ′ 6= C. With this type system
this is all we can do. We shall see soon, in Chapter 7, a possible way of making casts
really type-safe.
These limitations inspired and convinced us to investigate a better version of the
type system, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
Example 6.1 shows the type derivation for a simple FS expression.
Example 6.1. In this example we shall prove the well-typing of a program using the
code of Example 4.1. Remember that a program is a triple (CT, β, e), where CT
contains the code ofEOC (Definition 1) and ofBank (Listing 4.2) and e is as follows:
e := EOC x = new EOC.value(500)();
Bank y = new Bank(0{});
y.deposit.value(100).sender(address(x))()
We suppose β = ∅ and depict the type derivation for this program. We make use of
placeholders (such as (1)) to indicate a derivation which is shown separately.
(1)
C OK ∀ C ∈ CT
(2)
∅ ` 〈∅, ∅, EOC x = new EOC.value(500)(); e′〉 : unit
∅ ` (CT, ∅, e) : unit
Where (1) is as follows. We show only the derivation for Bank and omit the one
for EOC, which is trivial.
X
K = Bank(mapping(address⇒ unit) balances) {. . . }
(6)
F˜ OK in C
Bank OK
Regarding the premise F˜ OK in C, we shall show only the derivation of the first
one, deposit .
Let ed = (this.balances = this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender]+
msg.value]), eassd = this.balances[msg.sender → this.balances[msg.sender] +
msg.value], Tmap = mapping(address⇒ unit), and
Γ = this : Bank,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint; (2) is as follows:
(3)
Γ ` this.balances : Tmap
(4)
Γ ` eassd : Tmap
Γ ` ed : Tmap
X
Γ ` u : unit
Γ ` ed; u : unit
F˜ OK in C
Where (3) is as follows:
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X
Γ ` this : Bank balances ∈ sv(Bank)
Γ ` this.balances : Tmap
And (4) is as follows:
(3)
Γ ` this.balances : Tmap
X
Γ ` msg.sender : address (5)
Γ ` eassd : Tmap
Supposing the existence of a rule giving a type to an addition of integers, (5) is the
following derivation tree:
(3)
Γ ` this.balances : Tmap
X
Γ ` msg.sender : address
Γ ` this.balances[msg.sender] : uint
X
Γ ` msg.value : uint
Γ ` this.balances[msg.sender] + msg.value : uint
We can now look at the derivation of the expression e ((6)).
X
∅ ` 500 : uint
Γ ` new EOC.value(500)() : EOC
(7)
∅, x : EOC ` e1 : unit
∅ ` EOC x = new EOC.value(500)() : unit; e1
(7) is the following derivation tree:
(8)
∅, x : EOC ` new Bank(0{}) : Bank
(9)
∅, x : EOC, y : Bank ` e2 : unit
∅, x : EOC ` Bank y = new Bank(); e2 : unit
Where (8) is as follows:
X
∅, x : EOC ` 0{} : mapping(address⇒ uint)
∅, x : EOC ` new Bank(0{}) : Bank
For the sake of clarity, in (7) and (8) we omitted the trivial premises regarding the
instantiation of EOC and Bank.
Let Γ = ∅, x : EOC, y : Bank; (9) is as follows:
X
Γ ` x : EOC
Γ ` address(x) : address
X
Γ ` y : Bank
X
Γ ` 100 : uint
Γ ` y.deposit.value(100)() : unit
Γ ` y.deposit.value(100).sender(address(x))() : unit
Γ ` y.deposit.value(100).sender(address(x))() : u
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In (9), while giving a type to y.deposit.value(100)() we omitted the premises re-
garding the parameters of deposit because there were no formal parameters.
If Example 6.1 showed how the type system gives a type to a legitimate expression,
Example 6.2 does the opposite, showing how, in FS, ill-formed expressions are ruled
out.
Example 6.2. This example is based on the very same CT as Example 6.1, and thus
we omit the proof of its well-formedness. We shall show how the following e is rules
out, since incorrect.
e := EOC x = new EOC.value(500)();
Bank y = new Bank(0{});
y.deposit.value(100).sender(address(x))(10)
Note that e is as in Example 6.1, with the only difference that deposit is given an
argument, 10. Since this function does not accept any parameters, e should not be
accepted by the type system. The type derivation until (9), as well as the context
Γ, is as in Example 6.1: we shall only show the difference in the judgment Γ `
y.deposit.value(100)(10) : unit.
X
Γ ` y : Bank
X
Γ ` 100 : uint ftype(Bank, deposit) = {} → unit Γ ` 10 : ∅ 0 = 1
Γ ` y.deposit.value(100)(10) : unit
The rule fails when it comes to give a type to the parameter 10. This cannot be
done, since the type of deposit in Bank is {} → unit.
6.4 Properties of the type system
We can now state some important properties of our type system. Our main goal is
to prove the type safety of FS, of which we give two versions: one applying to FS
configurations (Theorem 1) and one applying to programs (Theorem 2). In order to
define closed programs we need an additional function retrieving the contract names in
β (Definition 11).
Definition 11 (Contract names in β).
cn(∅) = ∅
cn(β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]) = {C} ∪ cn(β)
cn(β · [x 7→ v]) = cn(β)
We can now define closed programs (Definition 12) and configurations (Defini-
tion 13).
Definition 12 (Closed programs). Let P = (CT, β, e) be an FS program. P is closed
if fv(e) ∪ fn(e) ⊆ dom(β) and cn(β) ⊆ dom(CT ).
Definition 13 (Closed configurations). Let e be an FS expression and consider the
configuration 〈β, σ, e〉. The latter is closed if fv(e)∪ fn(e) ⊆ dom(β), that is, any free
variables or names appear in β. The same applies to 〈β, e〉.
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Lemma 1 explicits a property connecting closed programs and configurations.
Lemma 1 (Closedness).
Let P = (CT, β, e) be a closed FS program. Then 〈β, e〉 and 〈β, β, e〉 are closed, too.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the first property of closed programs. In
fact, P implies fv(e) ∪ fn(e) ⊆ dom(β), which in turn means that 〈β, e〉 and 〈β, β, e〉
are closed.
Definition 12 and Definition 13 slightly abuse the notation of⊆, because fn(e) does
not return pairs (c, a), but only one component of such pair (i.e. c or a, depending on
e). Hence fn(e) = {c} ⊆ dom(β) actually means ∃a such that (c, a) ∈ dom(β), and,
respectively, fn(e) = {a} ⊆ dom(β) actually means ∃c such that (c, a) ∈ dom(β).
Theorem 1 (Type safety for configurations).
If Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T , 〈β, β, e〉 is closed, and ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, β, e〉 −→∗
〈β′, σ′, e′〉, with 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 6−→, then either e′ = v, where v is a value, or e′ = revert.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix E.6.
Theorem 2 (Type safety for programs).
Let P = (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) be an FS program. If Γ ` (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) : T , P
is closed, and ∃(β′, e′) such that 〈β, e1; . . . ; en〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉, with 〈β′, e′〉 6=⇒, then
either e′ = v or e′ = revert.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix E.7.
In order to prove these two theorems, we need many other results: Inversion, Per-
mutation, Weakening, Substitution, and Canonical Forms lemmas are formalized by
Lemma 2 to 6.
Lemma 2 (Inversion).
1. If Γ ` true : T can be derived, then T = bool and Γ is well-formed.
2. If Γ ` false : T can be derived, then T = bool and Γ is well-formed.
3. If Γ ` n : T can be derived, then T = uint and Γ is well-formed.
4. If Γ ` u : T can be derived, then T = unit and Γ is well-formed.
5. If Γ ` revert : T can be derived, then Γ is well-formed.
6. If Γ ` a : T can be derived, then T = address and Γ = Γ′, a : address,Γ′′ is
well formed.
7. If Γ ` c.f : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2,
ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, and Γ ` c : C is derivable.
8. If Γ `M : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
9. If Γ ` c : T can be derived, then T = C and Γ = Γ′, c : C,Γ′′ is well formed.
10. If Γ ` x : T can be derived, then Γ = Γ′, x : T,Γ′′ is well formed.
11. If Γ ` balance(e) : T can be derived, then T = uint and Γ ` e : address is
derivable.
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12. If Γ ` address(e) : T can be derived, then T = address and Γ ` e : C is
derivable.
13. If Γ ` return e : T can be derived, then Γ ` e : T is derivable.
14. If Γ ` e.s : T can be derived, then Γ ` e : C and ∃Ti such that sv(C) = T˜ s
and T = Ti.
15. If Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : T can be derived, then T = unit, Γ ` e1 : address, and
Γ ` e2 : uint.
16. If Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : T can be derived, then T = C, Γ ` e′ : uint, and
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ , where sv(C) = T˜ s.
17. If Γ ` C(e) : T can be derived, then T = C and Γ ` e : address.
18. If Γ ` e1; e2 : T2 can be derived, then Γ ` e2 : T2 and ∃T1 such that Γ ` e1 : T1.
19. If Γ ` T1 x = e; e′ : T2 can be derived, then Γ, x : T1 ` e′ : T2 and Γ ` e : T1.
20. If Γ ` x = e : T can be derived, then Γ ` x : T and Γ ` e : T .
21. If Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T can be derived, then Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e1.s : T , and
Γ ` e2 : T .
22. If Γ ` e1[e2] : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = T2,
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and Γ ` e2 : T2.
23. If Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e2 : T1, Γ ` e3 : T2, and
T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
24. If Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T˜1, T2 such that
T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e2 : uint, and
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ .
25. If Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2,
Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e2 : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ .
26. If Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such
that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e2 : uint,
Γ ` e3 : address, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ .
27. If Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T can be derived, then Γ ` e1 : bool and
Γ ` e2, e3 : T .
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the type rules for FS expressions rules
given in Section 6.3.
Lemma 3 (Permutation).
If Γ ` e : T can be derived and ∆ is a permutation of Γ, then the judgment ∆ ` e : T
can be derived and the derivation has the same height of the previous one.
Proof. We prove this lemma in Appendix E.1.
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Lemma 4 (Weakening).
Let Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩
dom(∆) = ∅ (i.e. Γ and ∆ have no elements in common). Then Γ ·∆ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous one.
Proof. We prove this lemma in Appendix E.2.
Lemma 5 (Substitution).
If Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint ` e : T , Γ ` c : C,
Γ ` a : address, and Γ ` n : uint, then Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value :=
n} : T .
Proof. We prove this lemma in Appendix E.3.
Lemma 6 (Canonical forms).
1. If v is a value of type bool, then v is either true or false.
2. If v is a value of type uint, then v is an non-negative integer number n.
3. If v is a value of type unit, then v is u.
4. If v is a value of type mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), then v is a total function from T1 to
T2.
5. If v is a value of type C, then v is a contract reference c.
6. If v is a value of type T˜1 → T2, then v is a pointer to a function defined into a
contract reference c.
7. If v is a value of type address, then v is an address a.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the type rules for FS expressions in Sec-
tion 6.3 and Lemma 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the theorems of Progress and Preservation, formalized
by Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 3 (Progress).
If 〈β, σ, e〉 is closed (Definition 13) and well-typed (i.e. ∃Γ such that Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
is derivable), then either e = v, e = revert, or ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→
〈β′, σ′, e′〉.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix E.4.
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction).
If Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T with 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then ∃∆ such that Γ′ = Γ · ∆ and
Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T .
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix E.5.
In other words, Theorem 2 states that a well-typed group of transactions is never
stuck in the middle of a transaction: it either evaluates toward a final value (i.e. it
reaches the final state 〈βn, v〉) or throws a revert somewhere during the evaluation (i.e.
〈βi, revert〉).
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Chapter 7
Extending the type system
What we have defined so far formalizes a version of FS where every terminating pro-
gram terminates either successfully or with a revert. The type system we have defined
rules out some errors, but cannot do anything against the following ones:
1. transferring Wei to a contract without a (payable) fallback function;
2. wrong cast C(a). This happens when β(a) = (C ′, s˜:v, n), with C ′ 6= C;
3. transferring Wei from a contract with an insufficient balance;
4. the transaction ran out of gas.
As we said before, we do not take into account Case 4, since we do not model gas.
Furthermore, we cannot deal with Case 3 at compile-time, since we do not have any
information about any balances. Fortunately, we can actually do something to make
the behavior of FS more predictable for what concerns Cases 1 and 2. In fact, an
extension of the type system can propagate the information about the contract definition
corresponding to each address, thus making it possible to check, without executing the
program, if transfers and casts are correct.
To this end, we propose an extension of FS, FS+, in which the address type is anno-
tated with a contract name, so that it will be easy to get the actual code corresponding
to it. In this way, given an address a, we are able to know the exact interface exposed
by the contract reference pointed to by a. We shall introduce subtyping on contract and
address types, by means of which we shall provide retro-compatibility with the legacy
code. We shall discuss in more detail the impact of our changes later on in this chapter.
7.1 Syntax
FS+ requires some changes in the syntax of FS. As we said, we introduce nominal
subtyping for contract definitions and we replace the type address with a new type
address〈C〉 keeping track of the contract definition corresponding to each address. Fig-
ure 7.1 lists the modifications applied to the syntax.
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(Contract declaration) SC ::= contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜}
(Constructor declaration) K ::= C ( ˜T1 y, ˜T2 x) {super(y˜); this.s˜ = x˜}
(Function declaration) F ::= T f〈C〉 (T˜ x) {return e} |
unit fb〈C〉 () {return e}
(Types) T ::= T˜ → T | bool | uint | address〈C〉 | unit |
mapping(T ⇒ T ) | C
Figure 7.1: Changes to the syntax in FS+
The new SC reflects the nominal subtyping, where the supertype is specified in the
contract declaration after the keyword is. contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} means C
inherits from (or extends) D, where D must also be declared in the contract table CT .
C inherits any fields and functions declared in D, and we assume that the identifiers
x˜ are not used in D, so that there is no shadowing of state variables. As we will see,
overriding is supported. The constructor K now includes also the parameters, ˜T1 y,
for the constructor of the supertype, invoked via super(y˜). F changed, too. Note
how we modify the signature with the annotation 〈C〉: this is to explicitly state the
required maximum supertype allowed for the implicit variable msg.sender. We shall
validate this constraint at compile-time, supposing msg.sender as an expression of type
address〈C〉 and checking the subtyping for each call of f . Lastly, types T have been
modified replacing address with address〈C〉. No further modifications are needed to
implement our extension.
Note that mutually recursive definitions are allowed. In other words, it may happen
that two contracts C and D are defined as follows:
contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜}, and
contract D is C {T˜ s; K F˜}
Even if this not explicitly forbidden by the grammar, we assume non-mutually recursive
contract definitions. A violation in this sense can be easily found (and consequently
ruled out) via a static code inspection.
As pointed out by Section 2.4.4, Solidity supports multiple inheritance: we dis-
cussed about the issues related to this choice and the existing solutions. It is not the
aim of FS+ to provide a detailed formalization of Solidity’s subtyping, and indeed we
do not introduce any multiple inheritance, interfaces of abstract contracts. In FS+ the
subtyping (for what concerns smart contracts programmers) is really simple: when a
contract is defined, it must specify its direct supercontract, with no exceptions. The
following Section explains it in detail.
7.2 Subtyping
From the definition of SC in Figure 7.1 follows that any contract in FS+ now must
extend one and only one contract. We assume the existence of two contracts, Top
and Topfb. The former is similar to Object in Java, in the sense that each hierarchy
begins with Top, but there is no declaration for it in CT and there are no Top instances
100
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
on the blockchain. Contracts implementing a fallback function also implicitly extend
Topfb. Such extension is actually defined by structural subtyping and is handled by the
compiler, which checks if the contract being compiled defines a fallback. This kind of
subtyping is named “structural” since it is based on the structure of a contract (i.e. its
definition), and not explicitly declared by means of a keyword (e.g. is in FS). Thus,
programmers can neither control it in any ways nor create hierarchies by structural
subtyping. The reason behind Topfb will be clarified later on in this chapter.
Definition 14 defines the subtyping relation in FS+.
Definition 14 (Subtyping relation). Subtyping (<:) in FS+ is a reflexive and transitive
relation inductively defined as follows:
(TOP)
C <: Top
(CONTRACT)
contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜}
C <: D
(REFLEXIVITY)
C <: C
(TRANSITIVITY)
C <: D D <: E
C <: E
Where TOP and REFLEXIVITY are the base cases. If C <: D we say that D is a
supercontract for C and, vice versa, C is a subcontract of D. We define the relation as
covariant on expressions of type address〈C〉, that is address〈C〉 <: address〈D〉 if and
only if C <: D. Bearing in mind the Liskov substitution principle in object-oriented
programming1, an expression of type address〈C〉 should be correctly used whenever
an expression of type address〈D〉 is required, if C <: D. One may wonder why
covariance is correct instead of contravariance. The reason is that, in FS, as well as
in Solidity and FS+, addresses are used to carry out casts and money transfers (i.e.
expressions like C(a) and a.transfer(n), respectively, where a is an address and n
an integer). As we have already said, these operations require a knowledge about the
interface of the contract pointed to by a given address. In the former case , C(a), the
operation should be successful if and only if a points to a contract that is at least C
(or better, that expose at least the same interface as C does). The very same applies to
a.transfer(n), that requires the contract pointed to by a (say, an instance ofC) to define
a fallback function. However, C may not define a fallback itself, but it may inherit it
from one of its supercontracts. If this is the case, the operation can be compiled and
executed with no worries, since the hierarchy provides a valid definition of the fallback.
In brief, for address〈C〉 <: address〈D〉 to be true, C must present at least the same
interface as D does, that is C <: D. This is known as covariance. Contravariance,
on the other hand, says the opposite: address〈C〉 <: address〈D〉 is true if and only if
D <: C, but this would mean that addresses pointing to a supertype could be used
when an address pointing to a subtype is required. Taking D(a) as an example, this
would have the consequence that a would refer to a contract whose interface is at most
D’s one. Covariance translates in symbols as follows:
(ADDRESS-COVARIANCE)
C <: D
address〈C〉 <: address〈D〉
1Let φ(x) be a property provable about objects x of type T . Then φ(y) should be true for objects y of
type S where S is a subtype of T .
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Lastly, whenever a contract C implements a fallback function, it automatically extends
Topfb, as follows:
(STRUCTURAL FALLBACK - 1)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} unit fb () {return e} ∈ F˜
C <: Topfb
(STRUCTURAL FALLBACK - 2)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} D <: Topfb
C <: Topfb
7.3 Operational semantics
Some changes are due in the lookup functions defined in Figure 5.4: C’s state variables
are not only the ones declared in C, but also those defined in the contract C inherits
from. We have supposed no variable shadowing, so identifiers are assumed as unique.
A similar reasoning applies to function lookup (both of type or body), and overriding
is implemented in the expected way: when a function f of C is called, we first look for
it in C. If C defines f , its body is executed. Otherwise, we go up in the hierarchy to
find a suitable definition of f , if any. Figure 7.2 shows the new definitions.
State variable lookup:
sv(Top) = ∅
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} sv(D) = ˜T1 r
sv(C) = ˜T1 r; ˜T2 s
Function body lookup:
fbody(Top, fb, v˜) = ({}, return revert)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} T f〈C〉 (T˜ x) {return e} ∈ F˜ |x˜| = |v˜|
fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, return e)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} T f〈C〉 (T˜ x) {return e} /∈ F˜ ∨ |x˜| 6= |v˜|
fbody(C, f, v˜) = fbody(D, f, v˜)
Function signature lookup:
CT (C) = contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} B f (A˜ x) {return e; } ∈ F˜
ftype(C, f) = A˜→ B
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} T f〈C〉 (T˜ x) {return e} /∈ F˜
ftype(C, f) = ftype(D, f)
Figure 7.2: Redefined lookup functions
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Function sv is as described: it takes the state variables from C and recursively from
all the contracts above it in the hierarchy. The base case is defined on Top, that has no
state variables. fbody(C, f, v˜) looks for f in C as in Figure 5.4. If no suitable f is
defined in C (i.e. due to no definition of f at all or different number of parameters),
fbody recursively tries to look f up in its supercontract D. As before, if a fallback
function lookup get to Top a revert is thrown. ftype behaves in a similar way, as
expected.
In order to prove that FS+ is safer than FS, we leave almost unaltered the semantics
given in Figure 5.3 and Section 5.5: in this way, the conditions under which reverts are
thrown remain the same. However, the type system will be more sophisticated and
consequently able to check Cases 1 and 2 (of the list at the beginning of this chapter).
The only change we make regards rules CONTRRETR and CONTRRETR-R, whose new
version is given below.
(CONTRRETR)
βC(a) = D′ βˆ(a) = c D′ <: D
〈β, σ,D(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉
(CONTRRETR-R)
βC(a) = D′ D′ 6<: D
〈β, σ,D(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
7.4 Type system
The vast majority of the changes are applied to the type system, which has to be adapted
to the subtyping and to the new address〈C〉.
First, we adapt Γ as shown in Definition 15.
Definition 15 (Context).
(Type environment) Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : T | Γ, a : address〈C〉 | Γ, c : C
Definition 16 then extends Definition 2 and Definition 3 to include the new Γ.
Definition 16 (Domains with type environment). Let Γ be well formed (i.e. Γ ` 〈〉).
Then its domain is now defined as follows:
dom(∅) = ∅
dom(Γ, x : T ) = {x} ∪ dom(Γ)
dom(Γ, a : address〈C〉) = {a} ∪ dom(Γ)
dom(Γ, c : C) = {c} ∪ dom(Γ)
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Well-formedness for contracts and functions We now redefine the rules given in
Section 6.3 and add an additional predicate, override checking the well-formedness of
method overriding.
(F OK IN C)
this : C,msg.sender : address〈C′〉,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T ′2 T ′2 <: T2
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} override(f,D, T˜1 → T2)
T2 f〈C ′〉 ( ˜T1 x) {return e} OK in C
If ftype(f,D) = T˜1
′ → T ′2 then T˜1
′
= T˜1 and T ′2 = T2
override(f,D, T˜1 → T2)
(C OK)
K = C ( ˜T1 y, ˜T2 x) {super(y˜); this.s˜ = x˜} sv(D) = ˜T1 r
|r˜| = |y˜| F˜ OK in C
contract C is D { ˜T2 s; K F˜} OK
The definition of a contract C is well-formed if its constructor K calls the constructor
of the supercontract with the right parameters, correctly initializes all the state variables
of C, and all the functions in C are well-formed. A function f is well-formed in C if
its body respect its signature. Note how we use the additional annotation 〈C ′〉 on the
function signature: Γ is enlarged with the implicit variable msg.sender which is given
the type address〈C′〉. We shall check at every invocation that the actual sender has at
least this type. By subtyping, the dynamic type of msg.sender can be also a subtype of
C ′. Bearing this in mind, we can say that FS corresponds to FS+ where every function
is annotated with Top. The predicate override checks if a function override is well-
defined: if a function of type T˜1 → T2 overrides a function of the supercontract D,
then the signature of the same function in D is equal. Note how override is true also
for the functions declared by C itself.
Well-formedness for blockchains The new rules used to check the well-formedness
of β are listed below:
(EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN)
Γ ` ∅
(VARIABLE)
Γ ` β x /∈ dom(β) Γ ` x : T Γ ` v : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` β · [x 7→ v]
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(CONTRACT)
Γ ` β (c, a) /∈ dom(β) Γ ` c : C Γ ` a : address〈C〉
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′ T˜ ′ <: T˜ Γ ` n : uint |s˜| = |v˜|
Γ ` β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]
The main difference with respect to Section 6.3 is that now the actual types of the values
stored in the blockchain (for either user-declared or state variables) can be subtypes of
the declared ones.
Well-formedness for call stacks The new rule used to give a type to a call stack is
defined as follows:
(CALLSTACK)
Γ ` σ Γ ` a : address〈C〉
Γ ` σ · a
The only difference regards the introduction of the new type address〈C〉.
Well-formedness for configurations The main difference is the introduction of sub-
typing in e.
(CONFIGURATION)
Γ ` β Γ ` σ Γ ` e : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
Types of expressions The type system here defined is algorithmic: we do not give a
subsumption rule, but instead add directly and explicitly the subtyping in those rules
which need it. In this way there is always at most one type rule applying.
In the rules that follow we make use of one more lookup function, defined below:
Sender maximum type lookup:
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} T2 f〈C ′〉 ( ˜T1 x) {return e} ∈ F˜
fsender(C, f) = C ′
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} f /∈ F˜
fsender(C, f) = fsender(D, f)
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fsender(C, f) retrieves the required type of msg.sender. It looks for a definition of f
in C and, if none is found, it goes on the supercontract of C, and so on until Top.
In Section 6.3 we listed the rules used to give types to expressions in FS. We now
give the new ones in FS+. Some of the former have remained the same and are not
showed below. We use C and D to indicate contract types, whereas T , T1, T2, and so
on represent types as defined in Figure 7.1.
Changes due to the new address type or to algorithmic subtyping Below we
list the rules that have changed just to support subtyping or the new type address〈C〉.
(ADDRESS)
Γ, a : address〈C〉,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, a : address〈C〉,Γ′ ` a : address〈C〉
(ADDR)
Γ ` e : C
Γ ` address(e) : address〈C〉
(MAPPING)
M = ˜{(k, v)} Γ ` k˜ : T˜ ′1 Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′2 T˜ ′1 <: T1 T˜ ′2 <: T2
Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(IF)
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : T1 Γ ` e3 : T2 T1 <: T T2 <: T
Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T
(BAL)
Γ ` e : address〈C〉
Γ ` balance(e) : uint
(DECL)
Γ ` e1 : T ′1 T ′1 <: T1 Γ, x : T1 ` e2 : T2
Γ ` T1 x = e1; e2 : T2
(ASS)
Γ ` x : T Γ ` e : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` x = e : T ′
(STATEASS)
Γ ` e1.s : T Γ ` e2 : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T ′
(MAPPASS)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T ′1 Γ ` e3 : T ′2 T ′1 <: T1 T ′2 <: T2
Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(MAPPSEL)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T ′1 T ′1 <: T1
Γ ` e1[e2] : T2
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(NEW)
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′ T˜ ′ <: T˜ |e˜| = |s˜| Γ ` e′ : uint
Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C
Casts and money transfers Below we list the most interesting rules of FS+,
CONTRRETR and TRANSFER.
(CONTRRETR)
Γ ` e : address〈C〉 C <: D
Γ ` D(e) : D
(TRANSFER)
Γ ` e1 : address〈C〉 ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit Γ ` e2 : uint
Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, fb)
Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : unit
Consider CONTRRETR first. We now have a precise information about the actual
contract definition behind the expression e. Indeed, D(e) is correctly given type D if
and only if Γ ` e : address〈C〉, where C <: D is also true. In other words, we can cast
an address pointing to a subcontract of D to a reference of type D. If C <: D was not
true, then the cast would not be safe, since we would be trying to get a reference to a
contract of type D using an address pointing to a contract that has nothing to do with
D.
TRANSFER is similar. Note the different hypothesis about the recipient:
e1.transfer(e2) is safe if it exists aC such that Γ ` e1 : address〈C〉 and ftype(C, fb) =
{} → unit. In other words, e1 must be an address pointing to a reference of a contract
defining a fallback function. Note that if C itself does not define any fallback func-
tions, the recursive definition of ftype looks for it in its supertype, and so on until Top.
Nonetheless, provided that ftype is undefined on Top the expression does not compile,
as desired. The last hypothesis checks the type of the sender. This latter hypothesis
is the one ensuring the well-typing of msg.sender. Let this be an instance of C1, and
fsender(C, f) = C2. C1 <: C2 means that this refers to a contract that is subtype of
C2. f asks that every address used as a sender refers to a contract which is at least C2.
Since this : C1 and C1 <: C2 then its use as a sender is safe. Note that if this was not
defined (i.e. the expression occurs as a top-level transaction), the expression would not
compile.
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Functions Below we list the rules giving a type to functions and function calls.
(FUN)
Γ ` c : C ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2
(CALL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1| Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1| Γ ` e3 : address〈C′〉
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
(CALLVALUE)
Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e2 : uint Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
The very same reasoning as TRANSFER applies to FUN and CALL. CALLTO-
PLEVEL is a bit different. Here, an expression is explicitly provided as a sender, e3,
which is supposed to be an address. We retrieve the required type for msg.sender in f ,
and check Γ ` e3 : address〈C′〉, where C ′ <: fsender(C, f).
7.5 Properties of the type system
Changing the type rules requires a change in the Inversion Lemma, too. We formalize
the new version in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 (Inversion).
1. If Γ ` true : T can be derived, then T = bool.
2. If Γ ` false : T can be derived, then T = bool.
3. If Γ ` n : T can be derived, then T = uint.
4. If Γ ` u : T can be derived, then T = unit.
5. If Γ ` a : T can be derived, then ∃C such that T = address〈C〉 and
a : address(C) ∈ Γ.
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6. If Γ ` c.f : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2,
ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, and Γ ` c : C. Furthermore, the signature of f re-
quires a msg.sender pointing to a contract of type at least C ′ = fsender(C, f),
and this refers to a subcontract C ′′ of such C ′: Γ ` this : C ′′ can be derived
and it is true that C ′′ <: C ′.
7. If Γ ` M : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2),
and all the keys and values are well-typed with a subtype of, respectively, T1 and
T2.
8. If Γ ` c : T can be derived, then T = C and c : C ∈ Γ.
9. If Γ ` x : T can be derived, then x : T ∈ Γ.
10. If Γ ` balance(e) : T can be derived, then T = uint and ∃C such that
Γ ` e : address〈C〉.
11. If Γ ` address(e) : T can be derived, then ∃C such that T = address〈C〉 and
Γ ` e : C.
12. If Γ ` return e : T can be derived, then ∃T ′ such that T ′ <: T and Γ ` e : T ′ is
derivable.
13. If Γ ` e.s : T can be derived, then Γ ` e : C and ∃Ti such that sv(C) = T˜ s
and T = Ti.
14. If Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : T can be derived, then T = unit, Γ ` e1 : address〈C〉,
and Γ ` e2 : uint. Furthermore ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit ensures that C
contains a fallback fb, whose signature requires a msg.sender pointing to a
contract of type at least C ′ = fsender(C, fb), and the current contract C ′′ is
a subcontract of such C ′: Γ ` this : C ′′ can be derived and it is true that
C ′′ <: C ′.
15. If Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : T can be derived, then T = C, Γ ` e′ : uint, and
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′, where sv(C) = T˜ s and T˜ ′ <: T˜ .
16. If Γ ` D(e) : T can be derived, then T = D and ∃C such that
Γ ` e : address〈C〉 and C <: D.
17. If Γ ` e1; e2 : T2 can be derived, then Γ ` e2 : T2 and ∃T1 such that Γ ` e1 : T1.
18. If Γ ` T1 x = e; e′ : T2 can be derived, then Γ, x : T1 ` e′ : T2 and ∃T ′1 <: T1
such that Γ ` e : T ′1.
19. If Γ ` x = e : T can be derived, then Γ ` x : T and ∃T ′ <: T such that
Γ ` e : T ′.
20. If Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T can be derived, then Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e1.s : T , and
∃T ′ <: T such that Γ ` e2 : T ′.
21. If Γ ` e1[e2] : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that T = T2,
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and ∃T ′1 <: T1 such that Γ ` e2 : T ′1.
22. If Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e2 : T1, T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and
∃T ′1 <: T1, T ′2 <: T2 such that Γ ` e2 : T ′1 and Γ ` e3 : T ′2.
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23. If Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T˜1, T2 such that
T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e2 : uint, and
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1, where T˜ ′1 <: T˜1. Furthermore, the signature of f requires a
msg.sender pointing to a contract of type at least C ′ = fsender(C, f), and this
refers to a subcontract C ′′ of such C ′: Γ ` this : C ′′ can be derived and it is
true that C ′′ <: C ′.
24. If Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such that
T = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e2 : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1, where
T˜ ′1 <: T1.
25. If Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T can be derived, then ∃T1, T2 such
that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : C, Γ ` e2 : uint,
Γ ` e3 : address, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ . Furthermore, the signature of f requires a
msg.sender pointing to a contract of type at least C ′ = fsender(C, f), and e3 is
an address referring to a subcontract of C ′: Γ ` e3 : address〈C′〉.
26. If Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T can be derived, then ∃T2, T3 such that
Γ ` e1 : bool, Γ ` e2 : T2, Γ ` e3 : T3 with T2, T3 <: T .
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the type rules for FS+ expressions in Sec-
tion 7.4.
Lemma 8 formalizes the canonical form for the new type address〈C〉.
Lemma 8 (Canonical forms).
1. If v is a value of type address〈C〉, for some C, then v is an address a.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the type rules for FS+ expressions in Sec-
tion 7.4 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 5 slightly changes as a consequence to the new type address〈C〉 as stated
in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 (Substitution).
If Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint ` e : T , Γ ` c : C ′,
Γ ` a : address〈D′〉, and Γ ` n : uint, with D′ <: D, then
Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value := n} : T .
Proof. We prove this lemma in Appendix F.3.
The other properties stated in Chapter 6, and recalled below, do not change and are
proven in Appendix F.
Theorem 3 (Progress).
If 〈β, σ, e〉 is closed (Definition 13) and well-typed (i.e. ∃Γ such that Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
is derivable), then either e = v, e = revert, or ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→
〈β′, σ′, e′〉.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.4.
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction).
If Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T with 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then ∃∆ such that Γ′ = Γ · ∆ and
Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T .
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Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.5.
Theorem 1 (Type safety for configurations).
If Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T , 〈β, β, e〉 is closed, and ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, β, e〉 −→∗
〈β′, σ′, e′〉, with 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 6−→, then either e′ = v, where v is a value, or e′ = revert.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.6.
Theorem 2 (Type safety for programs).
Let P = (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) be an FS program. If Γ ` (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) : T , P
is closed, and ∃(β′, e′) such that 〈β, e1; . . . ; en〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉, with 〈β′, e′〉 6=⇒, then
either e′ = v or e′ = revert.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.6.
In addition, we can prove two more theorems on this type system, as stated below.
Cast safety Definition 17 defines cast-safe programs.
Definition 17 (Cast-safe programs). Let P = (CT, β, e) be an FS+ program. P is
cast-safe if the evaluation of e does not make use of the rule CONTRRETR-R.
Example 7.1 shows two FS programs: the former is cast safe, whereas the latter is
not.
Example 7.1 (Cast safety). Consider the FS code in Listing 7.1, defining two very
simple contracts A and B.
contract A{
uint f() {
return 5
}
}
contract B{
uint g() {
return 0
}
}
Listing 7.1: Simple FS contracts to demonstrate cast safety
Suppose CT = A ·B, and consider now the following three programs:
P1 := (CT, ∅, e1)
P2 := (CT, ∅, e2)
Where e1, e2, and e3 are as follows:
e1 := address a = . . . ;
A(a).f.value().sender(. . . )()
e2 := address b = . . . ;
A(b).f.value().sender(. . . )()
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We used . . . as a sender since it is not important here. Supposing a points to an instance
of A and b points to an instance of B, P1 is cast safe. On the other hand, P2 is not:
it attempts to execute a wrong cast, since a does not point to an instance of B, ad
evaluates into a revert by rule CONTRRETR-R.
With cast-safe programs, programmers can be sure that each address they use points
to the intended contract reference, avoiding unexpected aborts and, consequently, money
loss. Theorem 5 formalizes which programs are cast-safe in FS+.
Theorem 5 (Cast safety).
If P = (CT, β, e) is closed and well-typed then P is cast-safe.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.7.
Transfer safety Definition 18 defines transfer-safe programs.
Definition 18 (Transfer-safe programs). Let P = (CT, β, e) be an FS+ program. P
is transfer-safe if the evaluation of e does not make use of the rule TRANSFER where
fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, return revert).
With transfer-safe programs, programmers can be sure that money transfers tar-
get only contracts defining a fallback function, thus avoiding unexpected aborts and,
consequently, money loss. Note that Definition 18 only takes into account reverts gen-
erated due to the lack of a fallback function: it does not consider either those thrown
due to an insufficient balance or those explicitly raised by programmers in the body
of a valid fallback function. Theorem 6 formalizes which program are transfer-safe in
FS+. Example 7.2 shows three FS programs: P1 and P2 are transfer safe, whereas P3
is not.
Example 7.2 (Transfer safety). Consider the FS code in Listing 7.2 defining three very
simple contracts A, B, and C.
contract A{
unit fb() {
return u
}
}
contract B{
unit fb() {
revert
}
}
contract C{}
Listing 7.2: Simple FS contracts to demonstrate transfer safety
Suppose CT = A ·B, and consider now the following three programs:
P1 := (CT, ∅, e1)
P2 := (CT, ∅, e2)
P3 := (CT, ∅, e3)
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Where e1, e2, and e3 are as follows:
e1 := A a = new A();
a.transfer(10)
e2 := B b = new B();
b.transfer(10)
e3 := C c = new C();
c.transfer(10)
For the sake of simplicity we suppose that transfer can be invoked at the top level. In
real FS code, the same behavior as e1 can be achieved with the statement
a.fb.value(10).sender(. . . )(), an similarly for e2 and e3. P1 is transfer safe, since
A correctly defines a fallback function. Also P2 is transfer safe, since revert is legiti-
mately thrown by programmers themselves as part of fb’s body. On the other hand, P3
is not transfer safe, because it does not define any fallbacks and the execution evaluates
toward a revert by rule TRANSFER (fbody(C, fb, {}) returns return revert).
Theorem 6 (Transfer safety).
If P = (CT, β, e) is closed and well-typed then P is transfer-safe.
Proof. We prove this theorem in Appendix F.8.
Benefits of cast- and transfer-safe programs are clear. As we said, these two errors
can lead to transaction aborts and money loss. The extension we are proposing can
effectively rule out both of such errors, making smart contracts sounder.
7.6 Detecting vulnerabilities
Many recent works aiming to detect vulnerabilities in smart contracts written in So-
lidity have been presented over the last few months. Most of them investigate on the
reentrancy bug, the one behind the DAO attack [47], or on Solidity’s way to deal with
exceptions. Some do so analyzing the EVM bytecode [31][2]; others look at the prob-
lem from a concurrent point of view [44] or compile down Solidity code into lan-
guages with more powerful type systems in order to benefit from their expressiveness
[8]. Atzei, Bartoletti, and Cimoli [6] provide a survey of attacks and vulnerabilities in
Solidity code. Alongside reentrancy and exceptions are many other subtle bugs that
can make a contract misbehave. To the best of our knowledge, there are no works
investigating the type safety of casts and transfers. As we said, aborting transactions
containing incorrect casts or transfers does not harm any account, but the sender of
the transaction itself. A malicious contract can clumsily implement such operations
with no other aim of making a miner richer and to make the accounts initiating the
transaction waste money. On the other hand, a sound contract would have all the inter-
est in providing an implementation enhanced with some additional safety guarantees.
Example 7.3 clarifies such a scenario.
Example 7.3 (Cast and transfer vulnerabilities in smart contracts). Consider the con-
tract Unsafe in Listing 7.3.
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contract A {
A(){}
uintf(){
return 5;
}
}
contract Unsafe{
mapping(address⇒ uint) balances;
Unsafe(mapping(address⇒ uint) balances) {
this.balances = balances;
}
unit deposit() {
return this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender] + msg.value]; unit
}
uint unsafeCast() {
returnA(msg.sender).f();
}
unit unsafeWithdraw() {
return uint b = this.balances[msg.sender];
this.balances[msg.sender→ 0];
msg.sender.transfer(b);
unit
}
}
Listing 7.3: Unsafe transfer and cast operations
It implements a basic form of the withdrawal pattern2 allowing users to deposit and
afterwards withdraw an amount of Ether. Suppose this contract has an invariant stating
that a user can always withdraw the amount of Ether they have deposited so far. The
problem here is that the function unsafeWithdraw calls transfer on msg.sender with-
out knowing if the contract corresponding to msg.sender actually defines a fallback.
Hence, the withdrawal may fail at run-time. Even worse is that the amount of Ether
that sender has deposited remains indefinitely locked in Unsafe, since a deployed con-
tract has no way to change itself to define a suitable fallback. Hence, Unsafe falls into
the category of the greedy contracts defined by Nikolic et al. [35]. In fact, Ether sent
to Unsafe from contract lacking a fallback cannot be withdrew, thus failing the afore-
mentioned invariant. Such behavior is surely not malicious, but Unsafe could provide
additional guarantees.
Another unsafe use of Solidity is in function unsafeCast. It is really trivial and
simply attempts to retrieve an instance of a contract A using msg.sender. For the sake
of simplicity,A defines just a function, f , returning the constant integer 5. The problem
here is that Unsafe does not know if msg.sender will actually point to an instance of
A. The documentation advices to make sure of that before going with the cast, but
provides no additional or automatic ways to ensure such constraint, and nor does the
compiler. Hence, if msg.sender corresponds to another contract, say B, a revert will
be raised at run-time, aborting the transaction and making that sender lose money just
2https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/common-patterns.html#withdrawal-from-contracts
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due to someone else’s clumsy (or not robust enough) implementation.
Consider now the snippet in Listing 7.4, showing the same Unsafe (now renamed
as Safe) contract using the full power of FS+. A has remained the same and is thus
omitted.
contract Safe is Top{
mapping(address〈Topfb〉 ⇒ uint) balances;
Safe(mapping(address〈Topfb〉 ⇒ uint) balances) {
this.balances = balances;
}
unit deposit〈Topfb〉() {
return this.balances[msg.sender→ this.balances[msg.sender] + msg.value]; unit
}
uint safeCast〈A〉() {
returnA(msg.sender).f();
}
unit safeWithdraw〈Topfb〉() {
return uint b = this.balances[msg.sender];
this.balances[msg.sender→ 0];
msg.sender.transfer(b);
unit
}
}
Listing 7.4: Safe transfer and cast operations
Note the major change in the function signatures and in the declaration of balances.
We impose that the key type must be address〈Topfb〉. We do the same in the functions
using this state variables (i.e. deposit and safeWithdraw). Similarly, we force callers of
safeCast to point to an instance ofA. The benefit is clear. Consider first the withdrawal
of money. Remember that, due to the possible lack of the fallback, with the unsafe
definition there was no chance to ensure that an amount of Ether would eventually
be withdrew. This has now changed. The compiler checks that every call either to
deposit or safeWithdraw comes from a contract defining a fallback. On the one hand
this reduces the addresses able to interact with Safe: any interaction coming from a
contract lacking a fallback will be ruled out at compile-time. On the other hand, the
contract’s invariant can be now proven and ensured for the entire life of an instance
of Safe. The job is done by rules FUN, CALL, and CALLTOPLEVEL in Section 6.3.
They take the sender (either this or an explicit expression) and make sure its type is
a subtype of the required one. Bearing in mind that the latter is Topfb, and looking at
rules StructuralFallback in Definition 14, it is clear that such a type will define
for sure a fallback: otherwise STRUCTURALFALLBACK (either 1 or 2) would not apply
and the subtyping relation would not hold, thus making the compilation fail.
A similar reasoning applies to safeCast, where we impose msg.sender to refer to
a subcontract of A. In this case the rules checking the subtyping is CONTRACT in
Definition 14 instead of STRUCTURALFALLBACK, but the result does not change: if
the subtyping does not hold the compilation fails. At run-time we will be sure that
msg.sender can be safely cast to an instance of A, since it points to a contract that also
is an instance of A.
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7.7 Impact on Solidity
Two are the main additions made by this extension: annotating addresses with contract
names and subtyping. The latter is a little more limited than Solidity’s one. It is not the
aim of this extension to investigate and formalize the way Solidity handles subtyping.
In fact, we did not include either multiple inheritance, abstract contracts, or interfaces.
In FS+, inheritance is only used for the sake of retro-compatibility and to make it pos-
sible a direct mapping from existing contracts to the new type system we are proposing.
The rules STRUCTURAL FALLBACK actually introduces a very limited form of mul-
tiple inheritance. In fact, a contract implementing a fallback function extends, at the
same time, both the contract indicated in its declaration (i.e. contract C isD), by nom-
inal subtyping, and Topfb by structural subtyping. Nonetheless, this form of multiple
inheritance is a very controlled one, and no ambiguities can arise (since Topfb is used
only to check a given property of C).
Consider now the new address type: address〈C〉. It tells the compiler that a value
of that type points to an instance of contract C, thus allowing it to inspect its interface.
This is, of course, not compatible with Solidity, where address does not keep any infor-
mation about the contract it refers to. Nonetheless, a direct default mapping is easily
definable: remember the contract Top, defined as the base contract for any hierarchy.
It is hence natural to map the type address to address〈Top〉. This provides no guar-
antees, since we actually still do not know which contract that address refers to. On
the other hand, the new code written using this extension allows the compiler to make
fine-grained checks. Thus, no changes are required to the already deployed contracts:
only the compiler has to be made more complex (as described above) to deal with the
additional binding. We will not be able to apply our fine-grained check to the existing
contracts, that cannot be modified, but we will be able to improve the reliability of the
new ones. We shall also provide a flag (--notopcast) in the new compiler to disable
rule CONTRRETR in Section 7.4 when C = Top and allow programmers to compile
using rule CONTRRETR in Section 6.3. We do this for the sake of retro-compatibility:
CONTRRETR in Section 7.4 would rule out any cast having address〈Top〉 as actual
type of e, since ∀D type . Top 6<: D. All the other casts will be correctly verified.
The major effort required to programmers is to annotate each function with the re-
quired type of its sender. This somehow reduces the flexibility provided by default by
Solidity, since programmers have to specify in advance, and without the possibility to
change it, a maximum supertype for the caller of their functions. This might seem an-
noying, but actually allows the definition of sounder contracts (as we saw above). One
of the most known benefits of types is that they get programmers to know which oper-
ations can be invoked on each value. The compiler then checks that every value is used
according to its type, i.e. that only allowed operations are invoked on it. Types might
sometimes be too rigid, but they are a fundamental tool to make the code clearer, more
readable and more correct. On the other hand, the flexibility of dynamically-typed
languages (where types are not checked at compile-time) is well-known and largely
appreciated by many programmers. Nonetheless, such languages provide weaker guar-
antees and allow for run-time errors, avoidable thanks to a compiler check. Even worse,
such errors might appear in certain executions and might not in others, making it ex-
tremely difficult to catch the bug. Catching (and correcting) bugs is almost impossible
in Solidity, where contracts may not be redeployed and the only (extreme) solution to
dangerous bugs is the suicide. The main problem in Solidity’s type safety is the type
address, that can be compared to a pointer to void (void *) in C. Such pointers
allow for an extreme flexibility, but are really difficult to deal with since the compiler
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does not give any hint on how to use them: programmers have to know what they
are doing and how to do so, in order to avoid subtle bugs. They are widely used to
implement generic functions, when the precise target type is not known in advance.
Nonetheless, the real question is: “Would you allow a void* to be cast to a com-
pletely arbitrary type, without knowing if that cast will cause run-time errors”? The
answer in C is yes, and that can lead to many bugs if not done carefully. Void pointers
are a dangerous backdoor in C’s type safety.
address is similar: it can refer to an instance of any accounts, and neither Solidity
nor the EVM provides additional information on that. As we saw above, this is quite
dangerous and can lead to Ether indefinitely locked into a contract or to unexpected run-
time reverts. Hence, the main benefit of specifying the most general required sender’s
supertype in a function’s signature is that the compiler has a precise knowledge about
the operations programmers wish to invoke on the contract the sender refers to. In the
context of function safeCast above, the compiler blocks any attempts to call it from
a contract not extending A, thus making sure that any successful invocation will not
raise any reverts due to an unsuccessful cast. In other words, we ask programmers
to specify the minimum required interface to accomplish the function’s postcondition.
Such specification makes the address type safe again, and simplify the task of proving
properties and invariants on Solidity’s smart contracts and their functions.
Functions in Solidity can, in general, be annotated in many ways: the visibility
(external, internal, public, and private), payable, and an indication of
what the body does not do (view if it does not modify the state or pure if it does
not read the state). Using such markers on function signatures is a common practice
in Solidity, and makes the code more readable. We provide the following two new
annotations as a syntactic sugar:
• payback to indicate that the function possibly sends Ether to the sender. This
annotation is translated requiring Topfb as a most general type;
• any to indicate that the function does not impose any restrictions to the sender.
This annotation is translated requiring Top as a most general type, and corre-
sponds to the default mapping of legacy code.
It will be then a compiler’s task to translate such annotation ensuring the constraints
they correspond to. In a similar way, address is translated into address<Top> and
payableaddress into address<Topfb>.
Example 7.4 compares the current Solidity with our enhanced version.
Example 7.4 (Comparison on transfer safety). Let us consider the contract Unsafe
in Example 7.3. The same contract (omitting, for the sake of clarity safeCast) would
be written in Solidity as in Listing 7.5. Listing 7.6, on the other hand, shows the very
same contract without our modifications.
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1 contract SafeWithdrawal {
2 mapping (payableaddress
=> uint) private
balances;
3
4 function deposit()
public payable
payback {
5 balances[msg.sender
] += msg.value;
6 }
7
8 function withdraw()
public payback {
9 uint b = balances[
msg.sender];
10 balances[msg.sender
] = 0;
11 msg.sender.transfer
(b);
12 }
13 }
Listing 7.5: Safe withdrawal in
Solidity
1 contract UnsafeWithdrawal {
2 mapping (address =>
uint) private
balances;
3
4 function deposit()
public payable {
5 balances[msg.sender
] += msg.value;
6 }
7
8 function withdraw()
public {
9 uint b = balances[
msg.sender];
10 balances[msg.sender
] = 0;
11 msg.sender.transfer
(b);
12 }
13 }
Listing 7.6: Unsafe withdrawal
in Solidity
The code looks very similar, with a few differences. First, the key type of balances
is payableaddress and not address anymore. This means that only addresses
referring to a contract with a fallback function may deposit money in (and successively
possibly withdraw from) the contract. Note that the key set space will remain the same:
we cannot know in advance which address will correspond to a suitable contract, and
thus the set of keys of the two mappings (the one in Listing 7.5 and the one in List-
ing 7.6) will be the same. Some keys will never be used in the former, but this is not a
problem since unused keys are not stored anywhere. Secondly, to enforce the constraint
on the mapping’s key type, payback is used on the two functions managing money.
With these additional annotations the code remains readable, and the effort required to
programmers is really limited.
Lastly, Example7.5 shows a use-case taking advantage of the full power of the new
type system.
Example 7.5 (Requiring a callback interface). This example shows the same appli-
cation as Example 2.9. Remember that we said there may be some troubles with the
interaction of Oracle and Room: the latter may not define callback or may use
a wrong address to initialize its state variable oracle. Listing 7.7 shows how our
extension solves the problem.
1 interface Oracle {
2 function execute<Callbackable>(string) external;
3 }
4
5 interface Callbackable {
6 function callback(uint) public;
7 }
8
9 contract ConcreteOracle is Oracle {
10 event Execute(address<Callbackable>, string);
11
12 function execute<Callbackable>(string url) external {
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13 emit Execute(msg.sender, url);
14 }
15 }
16
17 contract Room is Callbackable {
18 uint public temperature;
19 Oracle oracle;
20
21 constructor(uint _temperature, address<Oracle> _oracle) public
{
22 temperature = _temperature;
23 oracle = Oracle(_oracle);
24 }
25
26 function getTemperature() {
27 oracle.execute("...");
28 }
29
30 function callback(uint _temperature) public {
31 temperature = _temperature;
32 }
33 }
Listing 7.7: Asynchronous interaction of contracts in Solidity
There are two interfaces defining a set of minimum operations: Oracle exposes a
function execute() taking a string representing a URL and, ideally, getting the result
of the operation identified by such URL; Callbackable defines the function that
will be eventually invoked. ConcreteOracle then implements Oracle as we de-
scribed above, but note how simple is to specify that the caller of execute() must be
compliant with the Callbackable interface. The compiler will check for us that any
attempts to call execute() comes from a contract implementing Callbackable,
thus ensuring that the result can be eventually delivered to it.
An example of this is given by the contract Room. It imposes a constraint on a
parameter of its constructor, forcing the oracle to adhere to the Oracle interface:
consequently, the cast at line 23 will always be safe. It then implements the function
callback() and invokes the oracle via getTemperature(). Note that the func-
tion execute() is external: when getTemperature() calls it, the implicit
variable msg will change and its sender field will contain the address of the instance
of Room, instead of the one of the caller of getTemperature().
Again, ensuring properties on addresses using this extension is really simple, with
small and limited modifications in the source code (see Listing 2.13), but with large
benefits in terms of type safety and provable properties.
As a last note, EOAs in FS+ are modeled by means of contracts (EOC in Def-
inition 1), but in Ethereum are not. Hence, the compiler must block any attempt of
cast from an address pointing to an EOA. Internally, the former could still represent
these accounts with the type EOC and rule out erroneous casts (D(a)) by simply
adding the hypothesis C 6= EOC, where Γ ` a : address〈C〉. Using EOC to inter-
nally model EOAs also allows the latter to receive Ether via transfer: in fact, by rule
STRUCTURALFALLBACK-1, EOC <: Topfb.
7.8 Separated compilation of smart contracts
In Ethereum, smart contracts are deployed independently of each other. This arises
some difficulties for our paradigm, since when a contract is compiled the code of the
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contracts it communicates with is not available. This causes behaviors somewhat sur-
prising, as shown by Example 7.6.
Example 7.6 (Separated compilation of smart contracts in Solidity). Consider contract
A listed in Listing 7.8.
1 contract A {
2 uint private x;
3
4 function setX(uint _x) public {
5 x = _x;
6 }
7
8 function getX() view public returns (uint) {
9 return x;
10 }
11
12 function () public payable {}
13 }
Listing 7.8: Example of a deployed contract
This simple contract just exposes two functions, setX() and getX(), allowing pro-
grammers to manipulate state variable x. It also defines a fallback function. Now
consider contract B below (Listing 7.9).
1 interface AInterface {
2 function setX(uint) public;
3 function getX() public view returns(uint);
4 }
5
6 contract B {
7 AInterface private a;
8
9 constructor (address _addressA) public {
10 a = AInterface(_addressA);
11 }
12
13 function inc() public {
14 a.setX(a.getX() + 1);
15 }
16
17 function read() public view returns (uint) {
18 return a.getX();
19 }
20 }
Listing 7.9: Correct interaction with a deployed contract
Programmers of B cannot directly refer to A, since its code is not available nor is its
name known to the compiler compiling B. The pattern is then as follows:
• An interface (AInterface) is defined exposing the functions of A needed by
B. Such interface is compiled with the latter, which can thus see all the function
names it needs. As we saw in Example 2.1, the contract’s ABI can be used to
know what functions A exposes. However, the Solidity code of many contracts
is often available at etherscan.com.
• B interacts with A via AInterface. It declares, in this example, a state vari-
able (with static type AInterface), initialized through a cast from an address,
obtained as a parameter.
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• The code compiles, since the compiler checks B against AInterface, of which
it knows all it needs. Nonetheless, Solidity does not check the address used as
a parameter for the cast, and lets it compile. At run-time the behavior might be
unexpected. The address used as a parameter is known, and the cast is executed
regardless of the contract it refers to. If its definition contains a function with the
same signature of the one being invoked, the latter is executed. If, on the other
hand, no matching function is defined, a revert is raised.
Lastly, consider contract C below (Listing 7.10).
1 interface AWrongInterface {
2 function set(uint) public;
3 function get() public view returns(uint);
4 }
5
6 contract C {
7 AWrongInterface private a;
8
9 constructor (address _addressA) public {
10 a = AWrongInterface(_addressA);
11 }
12
13 function inc() public {
14 a.set(a.get() + 1);
15 }
16
17 function read() public view returns (uint) {
18 return a.get();
19 }
20 }
Listing 7.10: Incorrect interaction with a deployed contract
C has the same meaning as B, with an important difference: it uses AWrongInterface,
which is similar to AInterface above, but misnames the name of the two functions.
When either inc() or read() is invoked, no function is found in A with the same
signature. This throws a revert, even if A defines a fallback. Hence, the guarantees
given at compile-time fall at run-time, and different things may happen according to
the actual address being used as a parameter. This allows for unexpected behaviors and
is quite error-prone.
Our proposal makes it possible to solve this issue. Our type address〈C〉 keeps all
the information needed to ensure that a cast is correct. Every address is forced to refer
to a contract instance satisfying a given interface. If it does not, it is not compiled.
This works under two assumptions: having available all the contract interfaces and
implementing structural subtyping. The former is necessary, since we must know all
the functions exposed by every contract. The latter is necessary because subtyping has
to be handled implicitly by the compiler. When a cast AInterface(a) is carried out,
the compiler has to do the following things:
1. Retrieve the interface of the contract A referred to by a. Let I be such interface.
2. Compare every function f in I with those defined in AInterface.
3. If every function in AInterface matches with one function in I , then A is a
subtype of AInterface (A <: AInterface) and the cast compiles. At run-
time, we will be sure that the invoked function has a match in A, and it will be
executed.
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4. Otherwise, the cast does not compile, since A is not a subtype of AInterface.
Even though it is a non-trivial modification in the way of implementing smart contracts,
this works in any scenario. By always imposing such constraints we can be sure that
only acceptable addresses are used as parameters. This reasoning applies also for the
implicit variable msg.sender. Suppose A is deployed on the blockchain, and suppose
B contains a function with the following signature: uint f〈AInterface〉 () {. . . }.
f imposes the constraint on its sender since it aims to use the interface exposed by
AInterface. The key fact is that AInterface exposes the functions of A that B
needs. AInterface is defined together with B and is not deployed on the blockchain
together with A. A was, on the other hand, compiled and deployed on its own, without
taking into account the future contract potentially interacting with it. B andAInterface
are compiled together, so that the compiler can check B’s code against AInterface.
When, later on, an address a is input to B, the interface of the contract it refers to is
checked by the compiler as described above. By structural subtyping, if it defines all
the function in AInterface, we are sure that no reverts will be thrown. On the other
hand, if there are any mismatches, that invocation does not compile, thus avoiding a
run-time revert. This latter point is important: A, B, and AInterface successfully
compile. Only the invocation of f from a wrong sender does not.
This behavior is similar to Java RMI [1]. The first step in using RMI is to de-
fine remote interfaces (extending Remote), which are later on implemented by remote
objects. Such objects are afterwards deployed on an RMI registry, waiting for other ob-
jects to invoke their methods. Clients connects to the registry and look remote objects
up to use them. They know nothing about the actual implementation of the methods
they will invoke: they just know their signature. The code has eventually to be avail-
able, and it is usually distributed via a .jar file deployed somewhere and downloaded
by clients. What we propose is just a little different. The actual implementation is
not deployed somewhere, but is deployed on the blockchain and is available to every
miner. We can assume the interface is publicly available to programmers. This is not
too strict, since they have to know the signatures of the functions they want to invoke.
The last thing we need is a kind of RMI registry, which, in FS+, is the context Γ used
to give a type to programs. The compiler use it to look up any addresses referenced in
the source code and check their interfaces against the desired ones.
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, the type system we formalized above does not
take into account this kind of structural subtyping. However, it could be introduced by
adding the following rule:
(STRUCTURALSUBTYPING)
contract C is C ′ {T˜ s; K F˜C} contract D is D′ {T˜ r; K F˜D}
∀f ∈ F˜D . structural override(C,D, f)
C <: D
Where structural override is defined as follows:
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(STRUCTURALOVERRIDE)
If ftype(f, C) = T˜1 → T2 ∧ ftype(f,D) = T˜1′ → T ′2 then T˜1
′
= T˜1 and T ′2 = T2
structural override(C,D, f)
7.9 Coexistence of addresses and contract references
To conclude this chapter, it is worth to note that there is no need anymore for Solidity
to keep both contract references and addresses. These two constructs are, at the time
of writing, both included in Solidity because they represent two sides of the same
coin: they both allow programmers to refer to an account instance, but have some
subtle differences. As we have seen, addresses are not expressive enough to describe a
contract’s interface, whereas contract references are not expressive enough to be used
to refer to any Ethereum accounts. Our new type, address〈C〉, merges the good aspects
of both, and makes one of them redundant. Given a value a of type address〈C〉, it now
keeps all the necessary information about a contract interface and, at the same time, can
be used to refer to a contract instance on the blockchain. Furthermore, when it comes to
invoke a function on a, an implicit cast C(a) can be applied. The very same reasoning
applies to contract references c. They can be directly used to invoke functions, and
an implicit conversion address(c) might be carried out to obtain the corresponding
address, while preserving the information about the interface. Figure 7.3 depicts this
relation.
Figure 7.3: Circular relation between addresses and contract references in Solidity
These two ways of referring to an instance have a direct correspondence in how
two famous object-oriented programming languages manage heap-allocated objects:
C++ and Java. For the former, the new operation returns a pointer to the instance,
and the programmer can invoke functions by dereferencing it (for example, via the
-> operator). Also the latter contains pointers, but they are carefully taken out of
the programmer’s hands: new returns a contract reference, and the use of pointers to
manage the memory is hidden. Both solutions have pros and cons, although the way
Java handles references is less error-prone than C++’s one, mainly because it abstracts
from machine details programmers are, in general, not interested in. Note we are talk-
ing about heap-allocated objects: in fact, C++ also allows for objects to reside on the
stack, but this a different situation not handled by Java, where objects always reside on
the heap.
In Ethereum and Solidity we could imagine the blockchain as a enhanced type of
heap: any contract instance here deployed (allocated) is persistent and has got a unique
address (pointer), which allows other instances to communicate with it. The question
that arises is: if Solidity used one of the two aforementioned solutions, which one
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would be better? Java’s way is by far safer, since pointers are known to be harmful
and error-prone. On the other hand, C++’s way enables for more flexibility. Further-
more, removing contract references would be more “Ethereum-oriented”. Consider a
Solidity-like language, but without addresses (i.e. expressions like a : address〈C〉).
Such a language would lack one of the Solidity’s peculiarities, that is the possibility
to directly reference accounts only based on their unique identifier (i.e. their address).
Hence, no hard-coded addresses might be written, and interacting with EOAs would be
infeasible. On the other hand, a version without contract references (i.e. expressions
like c : C) would be easily usable and would preserve all the functionality of Solidity.
This C++-like version would make any new return an address instead of a reference.
Actually, no cast would be necessary, since a contract implementation may be retrieved
using only its address. Example 7.7 shows the same code as Listing 7.7, but without
contract references.
Example 7.7 (Oracle without contract references). Listing 7.11 omits the definition of
Oracle, Callbackable, and ConcreteOracle, and shows only the implemen-
tation of Room.
1 contract Room is Callbackable {
2 uint public temperature;
3 address<Oracle> oracle;
4
5 constructor(uint _temperature, address<Oracle> _oracle) public
{
6 temperature = _temperature;
7 oracle = _oracle;
8 }
9
10 function getTemperature() {
11 oracle.execute("...");
12 }
13
14 function callback(uint _temperature) public {
15 temperature = _temperature;
16 }
17 }
Listing 7.11: Room without contract references
There are two main changes. Note the state variable oracle has now type
address<Oracle> instead of just Oracle (Line 4). This allows us to remove the
cast in Line 7. No other changes are needed in this contract: getTemperature()
can invoke execute() as before, but on an address instead of on a reference.
This modification eliminates redundant casts: addresses are now treated as pointers
in C++, but are by far safer. Programmers can reference deployed contracts or EOAs
and, at the same time, impose on them the needed constraints. There are no leaks, since
nothing can be removed (de-allocated) from the blockchain, and there is nothing like
address-arithmetic that makes it difficult to reason about these identifiers. On the other
hand, a source code without casts is easier to read and to understand. An explicit type,
such as EOC is now mandatory in order to refer to EOAs.
Example 7.8 further shows the simplicity of the resulting code.
Example 7.8 (Blood bank contract with the extended syntax). Here we revise the
BloodBank and the Donor contracts first listed in Example 2.10. The new version is
shown in Listing 7.12. This example not only shows the new syntax, but clarifies what
we explained in Section 7.8.
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1 // Deployed on the blockchain at block number n
2
3 interface DonorInterface {
4 function blood() public view returns (uint);
5 }
6
7 contract BloodBank {
8 mapping (address<DonorInterface> => bool) private healty;
9 address public doctor;
10 uint public blood;
11
12 constructor() public {
13 doctor = msg.sender;
14 }
15
16 function setHealth(address<DonorInterface> _donor, bool
_isHealty) public {
17 require(msg.sender == doctor);
18 healty[_donor] = _isHealty;
19 }
20
21 function donate<DonorInterface>(uint _amount) public returns (
bool) {
22 uint donorBlood = msg.sender.blood();
23 if (healty[msg.sender] && donorBlood > 3000 && donorBlood
- _amount > 0) {
24 blood += _amount;
25 return true;
26 }
27 return false;
28 }
29 }
30
31 // Deployed on the blockchain at block number m > n,
32 // indipendently of DonorInterface and BloodBank
33
34 interface BloodBankInterface {
35 function donate<Donor>(uint _amount) public returns (bool);
36 }
37
38 contract Donor {
39 uint private blood;
40 BloodBankInterface public bank;
41
42 constructor(address<BloodBankInterface> _bank) public {
43 blood = 5000;
44 bank = _bank;
45 }
46
47 function donate(uint _amount) public {
48 if (bank.donate(_amount)) {
49 blood -= _amount;
50 }
51 }
52
53 function blood() public view returns (uint) {
54 return blood;
55 }
56 }
Listing 7.12: Donor and BloodBank contracts in extended Solidity syntax
At Blockn, BloodBank is deployed on the blockchain. It defines an interface,
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DonorInterface, exposing the required functionality for a donor (i.e. the func-
tion blood()) and then used to impose a type constraint on the mapping healty.
The expressiveness of the new syntax is shown in donate(). This function re-
quires its sender to refer to a contract satisfying DonorInterface, and calls
blood() without making any casts. Such invocation will be correct, at run-time,
since the constraint will be ensured when compiling the contract invoking donate(),
of which we know both static type and interface. For this end, consider the contract
Donor and the interface BloodBankInterface. The idea is the same, but note
the latter defines only a subset of the functions in BloodBank (just donate()).
Also note that neither BloodBank nor Donor explicitly inherits from, respectively,
BloodBankInterface and DonorInterface: the subtyping is implicitly han-
dled by the compiler. Again, Donor uses its state variable bank, of type
address<BloodBankInterface>, as if it was a contract reference, using it to
invoke the function donate(). It is in this function that the compiler checks the
compliance of Donor with DonorInterface, and it is also in this function that
the compiler makes sure the address bank points to a contract instance exposing a
function with the required signature. When the address bank in the constructor
is first used, the compiler checks the contract it refers to in order to see if it ad-
heres to BloodBankInterface. This address will likely point to an instance of
BloodBank, which has already been deployed and that defines all the functions listed
in BloodBankInterface. Hence, when donate() is later on invoked, the run-
time will for sure find a match in the actual contract being invoked.
Example 7.8 clearly shows how simple the new code is. A unique type working as
contract reference and identifier, address<C>, enables for many simplification, thus
making smart contracts more readable. Furthermore, the added expressiveness makes
the compiler able to effectively check if addresses refer to contracts with the required
functionality, avoiding unexpected and difficult-to-track reverts at run-time.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis proposed a new calculus, called Featherweight Solidity, to allow the for-
mal study of smart contracts. Our specific focus was to model the Solidity language,
that comprises non-trivial features and is widely used in practice in the context of the
Ethereum blockchain. Our formalization took into account the trickiest parts of this
language, and aimed to prove its type safety. Solidity code is not directly run. It is in-
stead compiled down into bytecode, which is afterwards executed by Ethereum’s nodes
known as miners. Many research works have been targeting the bytecode itself: this
makes sense, because Solidity is not stable yet. In fact, many (minor) changes have
been introduced since the beginning of this thesis, and much more (major) changes
will come. Nonetheless, we think that a simple, yet powerful and expressive, formal-
ization such as FS could be of great help and serve as a basis to explore more and more
functionality of both Ethereum and Solidity.
The FS calculus is a small object-oriented-like language with explicit conscience of
the blockchain. It has been inspired from two other calculi aiming to formalize, respec-
tively, Java and Java RMI: FJ [25] and DJ [1]. Distribution is not explicitly modeled,
even though FS is miner-aware. On the one hand, we omitted the consensus protocol
and made no difference between mining and validation nodes. On the other hand we
formalized a two-level semantics to execute lists of transactions (what we called top-
level expressions) and inner function calls. We strove to make our calculus simple and
easy to reason about, slightly simplifying the semantics, which has some small differ-
ences with respect to EVM’s one. For example, we supposed a unified compilation of
smart contracts, which is unreal. Furthermore, we omitted some constructs, such as
the primitives call, delegatecall, callcode, and send (which are discour-
aged by the documentation itself), functions and variables visibility, implicit variables
(for blocks and transactions), gas, memory and storage, events, and function modifiers.
Supposing every function as public is not too strict, and generalizing our work in this
direction is straightforward. The same applies to the implicit variables block and tx,
referring to, respectively, the current block and the current transaction. We showed the
behavior of msg, and the same techniques can be used to add the other two variables.
Function modifiers find a direct mapping using if expressions and revert, and adding
them would provide just a bit of syntactic sugar. Events are similar to function calls,
with the difference that they actually write something on the blockchain. Our defini-
tion of β does not resemble exactly a blockchain, since it also contains local variables,
and does not allow programmers to store events of interest. Furthermore, our β merges
the concepts of memory (for local variables) and storage (for state variables, balances,
and contracts code). Lastly, gas is, often, just a matter of paying more Ether to have a
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function executed, because transaction initiators may decide the amount they are will-
ing to pay beforehand. The only, notable, exception to this affirmation regards fallback
functions. When the latter is executed via transfer or send (not modeled), it does
so with a “balance” of 2300 gas. Such an amount is sufficient just for a few operations,
and does not allow contracts to write to storage (thus modifying state variables), creat-
ing other contracts, and sending Ether. If a fallback function does need to execute with
more that such an amount, programmers have to work around the type system using
call. This is, however, indeed just a workaround and should be used just as a last
resort because it breaks type safety.
To avoid a too complex formalization, we supposed Ethereum’s externally owned
accounts as controlled by code, defining a EOC contract. It may receive Ether and
may be used as a sender in top-level function calls. Another big difference is about
the separation of concern intrinsic in DApps. In fact, smart contracts are just passive
entities waiting for external (e.g. JavaScript) code to call them. This poses a big issue,
since to model an entire Ethereum “program” we also need to deal with this additional,
external, part. We decided to suppose that the entire program is written in FS. This is
the motivation behind the two types of function calls (top-level and non-top-level), and
the use of the stack to distinguish between them.
We stated and proved many properties of type theory, such as substitution, per-
mutation, progress, and subject reduction. We formalized a two-fold type safety, for
FS configurations and programs. Our aim was to show that no expression (and con-
sequently no transaction) can go stuck (i.e. the virtual machine cannot proceed any
further in its evaluation). We succeed, but figured out that Solidity’s type system pro-
vides poor guarantees and does not rule out many avoidable errors. Although the latter
is statically typed, the duality between contract references and addresses arises many
ambiguous (and consequently error-prone) situations. In particular, among the others,
no static check is done on the fallback function when a transfer, as well as a send,
operation is invoked. Similarly, and as aforementioned, the behavior in presence of ex-
plicit casts from “contract address” to “contract instance” is all but sound, with reverts
that may arise at any time, making room for bugs extremely difficult to cast out. Even
though we know that, so far, no serious problems have arisen from that, we strongly
believe that it is clue of a clumsy implementation. It also turned out that, to the best
of our knowledge and at the time of writing, no research work has addressed such sce-
narios. Furthermore, many recent papers have focused on many security flaws with
heuristic techniques. Type systems, on the other hand, do not have false positives: a
term is either well-typed, meaning that it will behave as expected, or it is not. In this
latter case the source code does not even compile, and hence the risk of run-time am-
biguities is reduced. However, they do have false negatives: if an expression does not
compile, it might not evaluate toward an error.
This is the reason why we went further and formalized a second version of our
calculus, which we named FS+, trying to fill the gap between references and addresses.
The main idea behind this is that the address type does not preserve any information
about the account it refers to. Thinking of this in a language like C, addresses are
like pointers to void: they refer to something, but there is actually no way to be sure
of what they point to. This is, of course, undesirable, because allows programmers
to work around the type system. We proposed to annotate addresses with the name
of the contract they refer to. This way we can always check the interface exposed
by a contract and provide additional guarantees. To make the new language more
expressive, we also introduced nominal subtyping, omitting, at the same time, many
unnecessary features, such as interfaces, abstract contracts, and multiple inheritance.
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A minimal form of subtyping describes the core of our idea and provides additional
flexibility. For instance, when a cast D(a) is found, it is successfully compiled if
and only if a refers to a subcontract of D. However, casts were not our main concern:
knowing a contract’s interface allows us to check for the presence of a fallback function
when a transfer is invoked. The main drawback is that any address has to be
annotated, including msg.sender. Unfortunately, forcing this implicit variable to be
of a given type would be too restrictive, because the sender (i.e. the caller of a function)
may be any other contract or even an externally owned account. Subtyping helps us out
here. We can annotate any function with a minimum required type, so that any, future,
sender must be respecting, and possibly specializing, its interface. We discussed for
long about the changes this would make on the legacy Solidity code, speaking about
the syntactic sugar to make the changes easier to implement. We also reasoned about
how to adapt our calculus to the separated compilation of smart contracts. In such a
context, the main limitation of our approach is that contracts cannot explicitly inherit
from other contracts: the compilation happens in a machine that is not necessarily
part of the blockchain. Hence, the compiler would find some unknown names and
could not guarantee the well-definition of function overrides. Hence, we formalized
structural subtyping, even though the main approach is based on the nominal one, to
simplify the compiler’s task. FS+ supposes that the interface of every contract being
used or referenced by name is known at compile-time. This assumption is only meant
to keep the calculus simple, and it would not be necessary in Solidity.
In the context of FS+, we aimed to prove the same properties we formalized for FS.
In addition, FS+ provides more guarantees in terms of cast safety and transfer safety. If
a contract successfully compiles, programmers are sure that any casts or transfers
in it will never raise a revert. This implies that no money is wasted (i.e. the amount
of gas due to the miner) as a consequence of a naive implementation.
8.1 Further work
This thesis is not meant to be a standalone work and opens many different research
branches: in this section we outline some possibilities.
8.1.1 Other Solidity features
As aforementioned, many are the Solidity features we did not take into account either
in FS or in FS+. On the one hand, some of them, such as function modifiers or visibility
and the other implicit variables, do not have a great impact on type safety, and hence
are not of interest. On the other hand, some may help in formalizing and enforcing
additional properties on Solidity code.
Gas We can think of gas as a kind of fuel to power functions, that can run only if
they are given a sufficient amount of gas. We said that providing the latter is only a
matter of paying more Ether, but inexperienced programmers could write unoptimized
functions wasting money. Since the cost for each low-level operation is known, and
tools are available to estimate gas consumption [50], we could enhance the function
type with an annotation of the maximum gas allowed, in order to warn, at compile-
time, developers if the expected amount exceeds the required one. This would help,
among the other things, in detecting those fallbacks exceeding the 2300 threshold.
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Interaction with events Events are an important, although not fundamental, fea-
ture in Solidity. They can be emitted anywhere in a function body, and will then ap-
pear in the transaction log. As we saw, other applications, such as oracles, monitor
the blockchain looking for events of interest to react to. Modeling them in FS could
be of great help in formalizing such interaction, possibly proving interesting proper-
ties. For instance, recalling Example 7.5, let CO and R be instances of, respectively,
ConcreteOracle and Room, and suppose that an external application oracle is as-
sociated with ConcreteOracle and monitors the blockchain looking for events of
“type” Execute. A desirable property could be the following:
Whenever R asks for the temperature of the room, it will eventually get the value via a
function call to callback.
This is likely the invariant for a contract of type Room: whenever an instance asks
for a temperature it gets it, sooner or later. However, this coarse-grained property
silently implies a sequence of calls involving CO: “asking for the temperature” trans-
lates to a function call to ConcreteOracle.execute(), which in turns emits an
event Execute. oracle, that is continuously monitoring the blockchain, detects the
latter, does something to get to know the final value (note that oracle does not even
need to know the value is a temperature) and eventually calls Room.callback(),
providing the value as a parameter. Being able to formally prove that this sequence of
operations always happens may be fundamental in a number of scenarios.
Lambda expressions At the time of writing, Solidity (v0.4.24) does not support
lambda expressions, although the documentation states their addition is planned. Be-
fore adding them to the language core, it could be a possibility to analyze their impact
on the existing semantics using FS or FS+, proving they do not break type safety. Cur-
rently, FS, as well as Solidity, treats functions as first class values, but they must be
defined by a contract; that is, function values are actually pointers to a function defined
somewhere in the context of a contract and have the form c.f , where c is a contract
reference and f is the name of the function. Thus, invoking such function value has the
same effect than invoking the function f of c explicitly, since the execution takes into
account the state variables of c, if any is referenced. With inline functions this would
be a little more complex, due to the need of a closure capturing any variables free in f .
Furthermore, lambda expressions could come from the outside (i.e. not from a smart
contract), in which case closing the free variables is even more important. Studying
the best way to introduce this construct in Solidity on an abstract calculus would avoid
many possible flaws.
Memory and storage As said in Section 2.4.2, smart contracts are given two memory
areas to store the values they operate on: memory and storage. FS does not explicitly
model this distinction, but it could, if we also formalized gas. Even though this does not
directly provide additional safety guarantees, it would help in making the type system
more expressive and powerful. We could do so relying not only on the type system,
but also on other static techniques. For example, a sound formalization of storage may
help in ensuring that a contract never messes up another contract’s storage, as we saw
in Example 2.2.
Such a formalization could also help formalize the garbage collection and the clean-
ing of the memory area.
130
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
8.1.2 Typestate-oriented programming
Typestate-oriented programming, first proposed by Aldrich et al. [3], consists of an
extension of the object-oriented programming paradigm. In fact, objects come with a
defined behavior, which does not change during their life: in brief, programmers cannot
enforce a given protocol. Files are a very familiar example to explain states. Two are
the main operations influencing a file’s state: open and close. In an open state, one
may read, write to or close it, but not invoke open again. In a close state, the file
may only be opened. open and close cause a state transition changing the intended
behavior of the file.
Being unable to capture things like this in a programming language is an important
limitation. Types are useful because they specify a set of operations allowed on a given
value. For example, if the value 5 was given the type of integer numbers, we would
know we could safely use it as a parameter of any arithmetical operation. Similarly, if
5 was given a string type, the set of operations would be completely different, with, for
instance, concatenation of strings replacing the sum of numbers. The object-oriented
paradigm allows programmers to define their own types, specifying the set of safe
operations and their intended behavior. However, programmers cannot specify when
such operations can be invoked.
This when dimension is well provided by states. Indeed, states are a widely used
abstractions in computer science, engineering and science in general: any system can
be described with a state machine and a set of transitions modifying its behavior. Hav-
ing a states-aware type system would be helpful for enforcing desired protocols on
objects: what would be the effect of reading a closed file or re-open an open file?
Ethereum is no different, and it would take benefit of a states-aware type system. In
fact, the official documentation of the Solidity language shows an example1 explaining
how to implement a state machine. Furthermore, a blockchain platform named Obsid-
ian [40] has been designed to support typestate-oriented programming by construction
[14] [15]. However it is more recent and “immature” than Ethereum: less documenta-
tion is available, the language is currently being designed, and less research work has
targeted it. For these reasons, migrating to it just for the support to states may be an
hazard: we propose to effectively integrate typestate programming in Solidity, making
it states-aware.
8.1.3 Block-aided programming
Leveraging the calculus we formalized, a research possibility is about the develop of
another, simpler, programming language for Ethereum. In fact, the main problem with
Solidity is that defining smart contracts is by far more difficult (and different) than
developing “usual” applications. As pointed out by Delmolino et al. [17], programmers
have to pay attention to a number of things that have an importance much more limited
in the other types of programs. Furthermore, bugs in smart contracts last (almost)
forever, and thus any small error could cause terrible issues. Even worse, not every
drawback and implementation flaw is known to date, and hence many bugs could (and
probably will) arise in the years to come. Indeed, the official documentation contains a
section describing common patterns to avoid known issues2, but there is no guarantee
on their use by programmers. This justifies, in part, the number of works on this topic
1https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.24/common-patterns.html#
state-machine
2https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.24/common-patterns.html
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that have been published over the last few months and years. Nonetheless, such a huge
amount of work (mostly focused on static analysis of either Solidity or EVM code)
creates confusion and will be likely ignored by “real-word” developers.
A feasible direction of future work could be simplifying the task of programming
smart contracts, reducing the expressiveness of the language itself. By using techniques
of visual programming, the new language could allow the definition of a smart contract
by simply combining a bunch of predefined blocks and generate, behind the scenes, the
real Solidity code. This way we could formally prove the compliance of the resulting
code to any security or design best practice, using FS as an intermediate step.
As we said in Chapter 3, there has already been an attempt of developing a graph-
ical tool to develop smart contracts [33], but, as we pointed out, it lacks any formal
foundations or correctness proof. Using FS as a formal basis for such a tool could be
an interesting research path.
8.1.4 Mining
At the time of writing, FS does not really formalize the two levels of a DApp. In Chap-
ter 5 we provided two types of semantics, one intended to operate on transactions (i.e.
operations coming from the “external world” invoking a contract) and one intended to
model the interaction among smart contracts. However, we did not model the fact that
the former is not necessarily executed by an Ethereum node, whereas the latter is. A
formalization going in this direction could result in a calculus for DApps, which, to the
best of our knowledge, nobody has studied yet. Furthermore, we could also include gas
to model the choice of the transactions to be included in a block as well as the waiting
time a DApp suffers when it waits for its transactions to be processed. Applications
with (strict) timing requirements could find this useful to estimate their worst execu-
tion time, or study the impact of writing on the blockchain. Lastly, remember that we
did not model the difference between call and transaction (see Example 2.10): with an
explicit concept of Ethereum node and miner it could be possible to do so.
8.1.5 Link with object-oriented programming
In Chapter 7 we introduced an important modification in the syntax of FS. In order to
control the caller (i.e. the sender), we annotated each function with a contract name.
This allowed us to impose a type constraint that, in brief, meant: “if a function f spec-
ifies as a minimum type for its sender C, a contract C ′ is allowed to invoke f if and
only ifC ′ <: C”. This is important in FS (and consequently in Solidity), because func-
tions often need to know something about their caller (e.g. the existence of a fallback
function). Nonetheless, this could be quite useful also in object-oriented programming,
where, generally, the caller, if needed, is explicitly passed as a parameter. However,
having it as a formal parameter might be confusing, and it might not be immediately
clear what that parameter actually represents. Thus, a possible direction of future work
could be investigating the use of this technique in object-oriented programming. This
addition would be two-fold: on the one hand the code could be easier to read. On the
other hand, it would simplify the implementation of functions and probably reduce all
the errors caused by a wrong value passed as an argument.
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8.2 Personal conclusions
At the beginning of this thesis, my research experience was really limited. I had the
pleasure and the honor to participate in other projects, but I had never undertaken a
work as monumental as this. Once, a Professor of mine said, during a lecture, that
researchers should instead be called “finders”, because their work is finding things
rather than searching for them. This sentence perfectly sums up what I felt over the
last months: it might be easy to see the room for improvements and to explore previ-
ously unexplored paths, but getting useful and sound results requires many iterations
and hours of work to make sure that everything goes as expected. This thesis is no dif-
ferent: it has gone through a number of revisions and has been subject of innumerable
modifications.
When formalizing a language as complex (and immature) as Solidity, the abstract
calculus needs continuous improvements to best adhere to the reality. When I first
begun working on it, I thought I perfectly knew what I had to do and how to do it,
but I was wrong. Deeply. I thought that modeling a programming language was only
about testing functionality and finding the best way to abstract it. This is only partially
true. As common in computer science, many are the ways to deal with and solve a
problem: all of them may be correct, but only a few will be a good fit. I experienced it
so many times. Almost every time I thought I found a good way I ended up realizing
that something in my solution could be ameliorated. The syntax and the semantics (and
also the type system, even though to a lower extent) got through many revisions, due
to errors, misunderstandings, and changes in Solidity behavior. It took me a long time
to clearly see the big picture.
Andrew Wiles, the mathematician who proved the Fermat’s last theorem3, once
said:
“Perhaps I could best describe my experience of doing mathematics
in terms of entering a dark mansion. You go into the first room and it’s
dark, completely dark. You stumble around, bumping into the furniture.
Gradually, you learn where each piece of furniture is. And finally, after
six months or so, you find the light switch and turn it on. Suddenly, it’s all
illuminated and you can see exactly where you were. Then you enter the
next dark room. . . ”
I felt exactly like this when it came the time to prove theorems on FS. I realized
that many things I was totally sure about were wrong. I found myself making changes
to the semantics, simplifying the syntax, and question myself about my entire work. I
found out that FS couldn’t solve all the errors I thought it could. Under the supervision
of Professor Silvia Crafa I explored many ways to extend it, finally ending up with
FS+. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first calculus trying to enhance Solidity’s
type system without proposing a new language. We interrogated ourselves many times
about the feasibility of our proposal, and strive to make it less invasive as possible.
Since the beginning, our aim wasn’t just to formalize a language to prove the type
safety of a core part of it. We wanted to achieve a result with practical consequences,
something that real-world programmers could and would use everyday, to make their
code and their programs better. Programming languages are one of the most powerful
tools we can count on nowadays. Computers and automated systems control our world
3No three positive integers a, b, and c satisfy the equation an + bn = cn for any integer value of n
greater than 2.
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to a great extent. They not only help us at work or at home, but since Bitcoin they also
have managed our money. We trust a network of tens of thousands of nodes, without
even knowing the position of any of them. We trust software written by people we don’t
know, we send our money to contracts that may contain the worst of the bugs. This is
awesome as long as it works, but when something goes wrong the consequences may
be awful. I cited the DAO contract during this work, and I talked a little about the bug
behind this tremendous page of Ethereum’s story. Ethereum had to hard-fork itself to
restore the situation before that bug was exploited, and this set a dangerous precedent.
Nowadays we trust software more than people, but we seem to have forgotten that
behind a software (from the most trivial script to the most sophisticated program) there
are people. People we know nothing about that could write a buggy software for fun,
profit, or incompetence.
When the software becomes so critical that it handles our own money, we should
make 100% sure about the correctness of every operation it carries out. And since we
know nothing about programmers and their competences, it is our duty to provide them
with tools capable of detecting potential vulnerabilities; tools that cannot be worked
around and that have no false positives or negatives. We have been experiencing so
with language-based security: there are no external tools that can be ignored, but it
is the language itself that rules out harmful code patterns. David Evans and David
Larochelle wrote4:
“So why do developers keep making the same mistakes? Instead of
relying on programmers’ memories, we should strive to produce tools that
codify what is known about common security vulnerabilities and integrate
it directly into the development process.”
Type systems are a perfect example of such tools, if integrated with a compiler. If a
snippet of code does not compile, it cannot be executed and hence can create no harm.
However, type systems risk not to be adopted if they are too heavy, or if they are too
invasive. This is the reason why we strove to make FS+ as simple and less invasive
as possible. Our goal was to create a tool that can be easily integrated with Solidity,
causing no incompatibility with the legacy code, but, at the same time, being simple
enough to be fully understood and used. We strongly believe that the modifications
proposed in FS+ could make their way into Solidity, helping programmers in writing
safer code. This is the greatest aim of this work.
This thesis has been a long journey, during which I learned many things. Since
my first year at University, I had tried to avoid the most theoretical part of computer
science, labeling it as not a good fit for me, and for a long time I had preferred just
programming. But during the fourth year, the first of my Master program, something
changed, and I started getting interested in all the theoretical stuff. I honestly got
enthralled by the logics and the mathematics behind the set of keywords we call “pro-
gramming languages”, and I then decided to undertake a thesis on this topic. Now that
I am through with it, I don’t regret at all my choice. It’s been a long and difficult jour-
ney, where I often found myself doubting about my work, but also where I learned what
being a researcher (or a “finder”) looks like. I felt happy whenever I was able to make
a little improvement on this thesis, I felt happy whenever I saw a little more clearly
something, and I felt enthusiastic whenever I got a sound proof or a confirmation that I
was walking on the right direction.
These six months of work taught me an important lesson: our life always challenges
us, at work, at the University, at school, any time and anywhere. Every day we face the
4“Improving security using extensible lightweight static analysis” [19]
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same dilemma: either to keep striving to ameliorate things, to make our job, or other
people’s job, better, easier, or faster, or to settle for what we already have. The former
may be difficult and tiring, but it ensures us we’re doing the right thing, that we are on
the right path, and when we succeed in getting something better we feel satisfied and
ready to start it again. It is exactly like climbing a mountain: we go up and climb to get
to the peak, but over there, right after the peak we just conquered, there’s something
higher to achieve. We just take a minute to rest, and then we start moving again.
This is how I felt while working on this topic. It’s been worth it, and the difficulties
made me understand so many things that I wouldn’t have understood otherwise. For
this, and for all the help she gave to me, I pay a debt of immense gratitude to my
supervisor, Professor Silvia Crafa, that let me guide this work, make decisions and
mistakes in autonomy, but that also never left me alone and helped me whenever I
needed it.
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Appendix A
Operational semantics rules for
FS
This Appendix lists the operational semantics rules of the FS language.
(IF-TRUE)
〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e1〉
(IF-FALSE)
〈β, σ, if false then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e2〉
(SEQ-C)
σ = β0
〈β, σ, v; e〉 −→ 〈β, β, e〉
(SEQ-R)
σ = β0
〈β, σ, revert; e〉 −→ 〈β0, σ, revert〉
(SEQ)
Top(σ) = a
〈β, σ, v; e〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e〉
(DECL)
x /∈ dom(β)
〈β, σ, T x = v; e〉 −→ 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v; e〉
(VAR)
〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉
(ASS)
x ∈ dom(β)
〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→ v], σ, v〉
(MAPPSEL)
〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉
(MAPPASS)
M ′ = M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪ {(v1, v2)}
〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉
(BALANCE)
β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n)
〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉
(ADDRESS)
βˆ(c) = a
〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉
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(NEW-1)
(c, a) /∈ dom(β) sv(C) = T˜ s |v˜| = |s˜| Top(σ) 6= ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉
(NEW-2)
(c, a) /∈ dom(β) sv(C) = T˜ s |v˜| = |s˜| Top(σ) = ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉
(NEW-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥ Top(σ) 6= ∅
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(CONTRRETR)
βC(a) = C βˆ(a) = c
〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉
(CONTRRETR-R)
βC(a) = C ′ C ′ 6= C
〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(STATESEL)
β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) s ∈ s˜
〈β, σ, c.s〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉
(STATEASS)
β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) s ∈ s˜
〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 −→ 〈β[c.s 7→ v′], σ, v′〉
(TRANSFER)
βC(a) = C fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, e)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n)
〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉
(CALL)
βˆ(c) = a βC(c) = C fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e) x˜ /∈ dom(β)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [x˜ 7→ v˜]
es = e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, es〉
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
βˆ(c) = a βC(c) = C fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e) x˜ /∈ dom(β)
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(βw, a, n), a′,−n) · [x˜ 7→ v˜] Top(σ) = ∅
es = e{this := c,msg.sender := a′,msg.value := n}
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, es; e′〉
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(TRANSFER-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥
〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(CALL-R)
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(CALLTOPLEVEL-R)
uptbal(β, a′,−n) = ⊥ Top(σ) = ∅
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert; e′〉
(RETURN)
〈β, σ · a, return v〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉
(RETURN-R)
〈β, σ · a, return revert〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
(CONG)
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉
〈β, σ,E[e]〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉
(REVERT)
〈β, σ,E[revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉
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Appendix B
Type system rules for FS
This Appendix lists the type system rules of the FS language.
(EMPTYENVIRONMENT)
∅ ` 〈〉
(VARIABLEENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 x /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, x : T ` 〈〉
(ADDRESSENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 a /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, a : address ` 〈〉
(CONTRACTENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 c /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, c : C ` 〈〉
(F OK IN C)
this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T2
T2 f ( ˜T1 x) {return e} OK in C
(C OK)
K = C (T˜ x) {this.s˜ = x˜} F˜ OK in C
contract C {T˜ s; K F˜} OK
(CALLSTACK)
Γ ` σ Γ ` a : address
Γ ` σ · a
(EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN)
Γ ` ∅
(VARIABLE)
Γ ` β x /∈ dom(β) Γ ` x : T Γ ` v : T
Γ ` β · [x 7→ v]
(CONTRACT)
Γ ` β (c, a) /∈ dom(β) Γ ` c : C Γ ` a : address
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` v˜ : T˜ Γ ` n : uint |s˜| = |v˜|
Γ ` β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]
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(CONFIGURATION)
Γ ` β Γ ` σ Γ ` e : T
Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
(PROGRAM)
C OK ∀ C ∈ CT Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T
Γ ` (CT, β, e) : T
(REF)
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` c : C
(VAR)
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` x : T
(TRUE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` true : bool
(FALSE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` false : bool
(ADDRESS)
Γ, a : address,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, a : address,Γ′ ` a : address
UNIT
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` u : unit
(FUN)
Γ ` c : C ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2
(NAT)
n ∈ N+ Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` n : uint
(MAPPING)
M = ˜{(k, v)} Γ ` k˜ : T1 Γ ` v˜ : T2
Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(REVERT)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` revert : T
(BAL)
Γ ` e : address
Γ ` balance(e) : uint
(ADDR)
Γ ` e : C
Γ ` address(e) : address
(RETURN)
Γ ` e : T
Γ ` return e : T
(SEQ)
Γ ` e1 : T1 Γ ` e2 : T2
Γ ` e1; e2 : T2
(DECL)
Γ ` e1 : T1 Γ, x : T1 ` e2 : T2
Γ ` T1 x = e1; e2 : T2
(MAPPSEL)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T1
Γ ` e1[e2] : T2
(STATESEL)
Γ ` e : C sv(C) = T˜ s si ∈ s˜
Γ ` e.si : Ti
(IF)
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : T Γ ` e3 : T
Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T
(ASS)
Γ ` x : T Γ ` e : T
Γ ` x = e : T
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(MAPPASS)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T1 Γ ` e3 : T2
Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(STATEASS)
Γ ` e1.s : T Γ ` e2 : T
Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T
(NEW)
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` e˜ : T˜ |e˜| = |s˜| Γ ` e′ : uint
Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C
(CONTRRETR)
Γ ` e : address warning
Γ ` C(e) : C
(TRANSFER)
Γ ` e1 : address Γ ` e2 : uint
Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : unit
(CALL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e˜ : T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
Γ ` e3 : address Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
(CALLVALUE)
Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e2 : uint Γ ` e˜ : T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
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Appendix C
Type system rules for FS+
This Appendix lists the type system rules of the FS+ language.
(TOP)
C <: Top
(CONTRACT)
contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜}
C <: D
(REFLEXIVITY)
C <: C
(TRANSITIVITY)
C <: D D <: E
C <: E
(ADDRESS-COVARIANCE)
C <: D
address〈C〉 <: address〈D〉
(STRUCTURAL FALLBACK - 1)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} unit fb () {return e} ∈ F˜
C <: Topfb
(STRUCTURAL FALLBACK - 2)
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} D <: Topfb
C <: Topfb
(EMPTYENVIRONMENT)
∅ ` 〈〉
(VARIABLEENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 x /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, x : T ` 〈〉
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(ADDRESSENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 a /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, a : address ` 〈〉
(CONTRACTENVIRONMENT)
Γ ` 〈〉 c /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, c : C ` 〈〉
this : C,msg.sender : address〈C′〉,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T ′2 T ′2 <: T2
CT (C) = contract C is D {T˜ s; K F˜} override(f,D, T˜1 → T2)
T2 f〈C ′〉 ( ˜T1 x) {return e} OK in C
(C OK)
K = C ( ˜T1 y, ˜T2 x) {super(y˜); this.s˜ = x˜} sv(D) = ˜T1 r
|r˜| = |y˜| F˜ OK in C
contract C is D { ˜T2 s; K F˜} OK
(CALLSTACK)
Γ ` σ Γ ` a : address〈C〉
Γ ` σ · a
(EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN)
Γ ` ∅
(VARIABLE)
Γ ` β x /∈ dom(β) Γ ` x : T Γ ` v : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` β · [x 7→ v]
(CONTRACT)
Γ ` β (c, a) /∈ dom(β) Γ ` c : C Γ ` a : address〈C〉
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′ T˜ ′ <: T˜ Γ ` n : uint |s˜| = |v˜|
Γ ` β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]
(CONFIGURATION)
Γ ` β Γ ` σ Γ ` e : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
(PROGRAM)
C OK ∀ C ∈ CT Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T
Γ ` (CT, β, e) : T
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(REF)
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, c : C,Γ′ ` c : C
(VAR)
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, x : T,Γ′ ` x : T
(TRUE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` true : bool
(FALSE)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` false : bool
(ADDRESS)
Γ, a : address〈C〉,Γ′ ` 〈〉
Γ, a : address〈C〉,Γ′ ` a : address〈C〉
UNIT
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` u : unit
(FUN)
Γ ` c : C ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2
(NAT)
n ∈ N+ Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` n : uint
(REVERT)
Γ ` 〈〉
Γ ` revert : T
(MAPPING)
M = ˜{(k, v)} Γ ` k˜ : T˜ ′1 Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′2 T˜ ′1 <: T1 T˜ ′2 <: T2
Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(BAL)
Γ ` e : address〈C〉
Γ ` balance(e) : uint
(ADDR)
Γ ` e : C
Γ ` address(e) : address〈C〉
(RETURN)
Γ ` e : T
Γ ` return e : T
(SEQ)
Γ ` e1 : T1 Γ ` e2 : T2
Γ ` e1; e2 : T2
(DECL)
Γ ` e1 : T ′1 T ′1 <: T1 Γ, x : T1 ` e2 : T2
Γ ` T1 x = e1; e2 : T2
(MAPPSEL)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T ′1 T ′1 <: T1
Γ ` e1[e2] : T2
(IF)
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : T1 Γ ` e3 : T2 T1 <: T T2 <: T
Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : T
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(ASS)
Γ ` x : T Γ ` e : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` x = e : T ′
(STATESEL)
Γ ` e : C sv(C) = T˜ s si ∈ s˜
Γ ` e.si : Ti
(MAPPASS)
Γ ` e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) Γ ` e2 : T ′1 Γ ` e3 : T ′2 T ′1 <: T1 T ′2 <: T2
Γ ` e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
(STATEASS)
Γ ` e1.s : T Γ ` e2 : T ′ T ′ <: T
Γ ` e1.s = e2 : T ′
(CONTRRETR)
Γ ` e : address〈C〉 C <: D
Γ ` D(e) : D
(NEW)
sv(C) = T˜ s Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′ T˜ ′ <: T˜ |e˜| = |s˜| Γ ` e′ : uint
Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C
(TRANSFER)
Γ ` e1 : address〈C〉 ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit Γ ` e2 : uint
Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, fb)
Γ ` e1.transfer(e2) : unit
(CALL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1| Γ ` this : C ′ C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
(CALLTOPLEVEL)
Γ ` e1 : C Γ ` e2 : uint ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 C ′ <: fsender(C, f)
Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1| Γ ` e3 : address〈C′〉
Γ ` e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
(CALLVALUE)
Γ ` e1 : T˜1 → T2 Γ ` e2 : uint Γ ` e˜ : T˜ ′1 T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 |e˜| = |T˜1|
Γ ` e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
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Additional Solidity examples
D.1 Cryptocurrency
Listing D.1 list the code of an interface, Currency, and an implementation BasicCurrency.
1 interface Currency {
2 function deposit() external payable;
3 function convert(uint) external view returns (uint);
4 function register() external;
5 function transfer(address, uint) external;
6 function getBalance() external view returns (uint);
7 }
8
9 contract BasicCurrency {
10
11 struct Account {
12 uint balance;
13 bool exists;
14 }
15
16 uint private change;
17
18 mapping (address => Account) private accounts;
19
20 event NewAccount(address _holder);
21 event NewDeposit(address _holder, uint _amount);
22 event NewTransfer(address _from, address _to, uint amount);
23
24 constructor(uint _change) public {
25 change = _change;
26 }
27
28 modifier notZero(uint _n) {
29 require(_n > 0);
30 _;
31 }
32
33 function deposit() external payable notZero(msg.value) {
34 require(accounts[msg.sender].exists);
35
36 uint amount = change * msg.value;
37 accounts[msg.sender].balance += amount;
38 emit NewDeposit(msg.sender, amount);
39 }
40
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41 function convert(uint _amount) external view returns (uint) {
42 return change * _amount;
43 }
44
45 function register() external {
46 require(!accounts[msg.sender].exists);
47
48 accounts[msg.sender].exists = true;
49 emit NewAccount(msg.sender);
50 }
51
52 function transfer(address _to, uint _amount) external notZero(
_amount) {
53 require(accounts[msg.sender].balance > _amount);
54
55 accounts[msg.sender].balance -= _amount;
56 accounts[_to].balance += _amount;
57 emit NewTransfer(msg.sender, _to, _amount);
58 }
59
60 function getBalance() external view returns (uint) {
61 return accounts[msg.sender].balance;
62 }
63 }
Listing D.1: Definition of a cryptocurrency
D.2 Plane tickets
Listing D.2 implements a contract modeling the seats on a plane. Passengers can buy
tickets and, possibly, ask for a reimbursement. Plane defines various modifiers that
are applied to its methods. To avoid the reentrancy problem that afflicted the DAO
contract [47], Plane also implements the withdrawal pattern and uses the operator
delete to make tickets available again in a simple way.
1 contract Plane {
2
3 struct Ticket {
4 uint8 seat;
5 bool bought;
6 }
7
8 uint8 constant private numtickets = 5; // number of seats
9 uint8 constant private ticketprice = 50; // 50 wei
10 address public company;
11 Ticket[numtickets] public tickets;
12
13 mapping (address => uint) private pendingWithdrawals; //
withdrawal pattern
14
15 mapping (address => Ticket) private boughtTickets;
16
17 // to iterate over the bought tickets
18 address[numtickets] private passengers;
19
20 uint8 private nextAvailableTicket;
21
22 modifier stillSpot() {
23 require(nextAvailableTicket < numtickets);
24 _;
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25 }
26
27 modifier enoughWei {
28 require(msg.value >= ticketprice);
29 pendingWithdrawals[msg.sender] += msg.value - ticketprice;
30 _;
31 }
32
33 modifier hasTicket {
34 require(boughtTickets[msg.sender].bought);
35 _;
36 }
37
38 modifier noOtherTickets {
39 require(!boughtTickets[msg.sender].bought);
40 _;
41 }
42
43 modifier companyOnly {
44 require(msg.sender == company);
45 _;
46 }
47
48 constructor() public {
49 company = msg.sender;
50 for(uint8 i = 0; i < numtickets; i++) {
51 tickets[i].seat = i;
52 }
53 }
54
55 function buyTicket() public payable stillSpot enoughWei
noOtherTickets {
56 tickets[nextAvailableTicket].bought = true;
57 boughtTickets[msg.sender] = tickets[nextAvailableTicket];
58 passengers[nextAvailableTicket] = msg.sender;
59 nextAvailableTicket = getNextAvailableTicket();
60 }
61
62 function getNextAvailableTicket() private view returns (uint8)
{
63 uint8 i = 0;
64 while (i < numtickets && tickets[i].bought) {i++;}
65 return i;
66 }
67
68 function askReimbursment() public hasTicket {
69 pendingWithdrawals[msg.sender] += ticketprice/2;
70 tickets[boughtTickets[msg.sender].seat].bought = false;
71 nextAvailableTicket = boughtTickets[msg.sender].seat;
72 delete boughtTickets[msg.sender];
73 delete passengers[boughtTickets[msg.sender].seat];
74 }
75
76 function withdraw() public {
77 uint amount = pendingWithdrawals[msg.sender];
78 pendingWithdrawals[msg.sender] = 0;
79 msg.sender.transfer(amount);
80 }
81
82 function getPassengers() public view returns(address[
numtickets]) {
83 return passengers;
84 }
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85
86 function takeOff() public companyOnly {
87 for (uint8 i = 0; i < numtickets; i++) {
88 tickets[i].bought = false;
89 delete boughtTickets[passengers[i]];
90 }
91 delete passengers;
92 }
93 }
Listing D.2: Solidity contract for plane tickets
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Proving the properties of the
type system
In this section we prove Lemmas of Permutation (Lemma 3), Weakening (Lemma 4),
and Substitution (Lemma 5), and Theorems of Progress (Theorem 3), Subject Reduc-
tion (Theorem 4), and Safety for configurations (Theorem 1) and programs (Theo-
rem 2).
In the proof that follows, we shall write Γ `k e : T and 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k 〈β′, σ′, e′〉
to indicate that the derivations of those judgments have height at most k.
E.1 Permutation Lemma
We recall Lemma 3:
Lemma 3 (Permutation).
If Γ ` e : T can be derived and ∆ is a permutation of Γ, then the judgment ∆ ` e : T
can be derived and the derivation has the same height of the previous one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` e : T .
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 6.3. The height of these
derivations is always 1.
• REF. The judgment is Γ ` c : C. Since it can be derived, by Case 9 of Lemma 2
we know that c : C ∈ Γ. Let ∆ be a permutation of Γ. Hence, ∆ has exactly the
same elements as Γ, but in a different order. This means that c : C ∈ ∆, and that
∆ ` c : C can be derived.
• VAR. This case is very similar to REF: the judgment is Γ ` x : T . Since it
can be derived, by Case 10 of Lemma 2 we know that x : T ∈ Γ. Let ∆ be a
permutation of Γ. Hence, ∆ has exactly the same elements as Γ, but in a different
order. This means that x : T ∈ ∆, and that ∆ ` x : T can be derived.
• TRUE. The judgment is Γ ` true : bool. Since it can be derived regardless of Γ,
using a permutation ∆ of Γ instead of Γ does not change anything. Hence, the
judgment ∆ ` true : bool can be derived.
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• FALSE. This case is very similar to TRUE: the judgment is Γ ` false : bool.
Since it can be derived regardless of Γ, using a permutation ∆ of Γ instead of Γ
does not change anything. Hence, the judgment ∆ ` false : bool is derivable.
• NAT. This case is very similar to TRUE: the judgment is Γ ` n : uint. The only
premise is n ∈ N+, and the judgment can be derived regardless of Γ. Hence,
using a permutation ∆ of Γ instead of Γ does not change anything: the judgment
∆ ` n : uint can be derived.
• ADDRESS. This case is very similar to REF: the judgment is Γ ` a : address.
Since it can be derived, by Case 6 of Lemma 2 we know a : address ∈ Γ. Let
∆ be a permutation of Γ. Hence, ∆ has exactly the same elements as Γ, but in a
different order. This means that a : address ∈ ∆, and that ∆ ` a : address can
be derived.
• UNIT. The judgment is Γ ` u : unit. Since it can be derived regardless of Γ,
using a permutation ∆ of Γ instead of Γ does not change anything. Hence, the
judgment ∆ ` u : unit.
• REVERT. The judgment is Γ ` revert : T . Again, it is an axiom and can be
derived regardless of Γ. Hence, using a permutation ∆ of Γ instead of Γ does
not change anything: the judgment ∆ ` revert : T can be derived.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from the judgment
Γ `k c : C, and the additional premise ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2. By inductive
hypothesis, ∆ `k c : C, where ∆ is a permutation of Γ, can be derived. Consid-
ering the judgment ∆ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2, we note that it can be derived from
∆ `k c : C, since the premise ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 is still valid.
• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived
from the judgments Γ `k k˜ : T˜1 and Γ `k v˜ : T˜2. By inductive hypothesis,
also the judgments ∆ `k k˜ : T˜1 and ∆ `k v˜ : T˜2, where ∆ is a permutation
of Γ, are derivable. Hence, by applying MAPPING to the latter two judgments,
∆ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis, also the judgment ∆ `k e : address,
where ∆ is a permutation of Γ. Hence, by applying BAL to it we obtain ∆ `k+1
balance(e) : uint.
• ADDR. This case is very similar to BAL: J = Γ `k+1 address(e) : address
was derived from Γ `k e : C. By inductive hypothesis, also the judgment
∆ `k e : C, where ∆ is a permutation of Γ, is derivable. Hence, by applying
ADDR to it we obtain ∆ `k+1 address(e) : address.
• RETURN. In this case: J = Γ `k+1 return e : T was derived from Γ `k
e : T . By inductive hypothesis, also the judgment ∆ `k e : T , where ∆ is
a permutation of Γ, is derivable. Hence, by applying RETURN to it we obtain
∆ `k+1 return e : T .
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• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1 : bool, Γ `k e2 : T , and Γ `k e3 : T . By inductive hypothesis, given a permu-
tation ∆ of Γ, the judgments ∆ `k e1 : bool, ∆ `k e2 : T , and ∆ `k e3 : T can
be derived. By applying IF to them we obtain ∆ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e2 : T .
• SEQ. This case is very similar to IF: J = Γ `k+1 e1; e2 : T was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T and Γ `k e2 : T . By inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆
of Γ, the judgments ∆ `k e1 : T and ∆ `k e2 : T can be derived. By applying
SEQ to them we obtain ∆ `k+1 e1; e2 : T .
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T1 and Γ, x : T1 `k e2 : T2. The derivations of the latter judgments
have height k. Let Γ′ = Γ, x : T1, ∆ be a permutation of Γ, and ∆′ be a permuta-
tion of Γ′; by inductive hypothesis we can derive ∆ `k e1 : T1. Nonetheless, we
cannot directly apply the inductive hypothesis on Γ′ `k e2 : T2, since we have
Γ′ 6= Γ. Still, we know that there exists a derivation, of height k, for this judg-
ment. (Otherwise J would not be derivable, but this is a contradiction, since we
assumed J has a valid derivation of height k+ 1.) Hence, it comes from another
judgment J ′ having a derivation of height k − 1 where any of the rules defined
in Section 6.3 was applied as a last step. We can now apply the inductive hy-
pothesis on J ′ considering ∆′ as a permutation, concluding that ∆′ `k e2 : T2 is
derivable. Lastly, applying DECL to ∆ `k e1 : T1 and ∆′ `k e2 : T2 we obtain
∆ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k e2 : T1. By inductive hypothesis, the
judgments ∆ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and ∆ `k e2 : T1 can be derived.
Hence, applying MAPPSEL the them we obtain ∆ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2.
• STATESEL In this case J = Γ `k+1 e.si : Ti was derived from Γ `k e : C,
with the additional premise stating si ∈ s˜, where sv(C) = T˜ s. Provided that
the height of Γ ` e : C is k, by inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆ of
Γ, we know we can derive ∆ `k e : C. The additional premise is still valid, and
applying STATESEL we obtain ∆ `k+1 e.si : Ti.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ `k x : T and
Γ `k e : T . By inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆ of Γ, we know we
can derive both ∆ `k x : T and ∆ `k e : T . Hence, by applying ASS to them
we can derive ∆ `k+1 x = e : T .
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k e2 : T1, and Γ `k
e3 : T2. By inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆ of Γ, we can derive
∆ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), ∆ `k e2 : T1, and ∆ `k e3 : T2. By the
application of MAPPASS we obtain ∆ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• STATEASS. This case is very similar to ASS: J = Γ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T
was derived from Γ `k e1.s : T and Γ `k e2 : T . By inductive hypothesis,
given a permutation ∆ of Γ, we know we can derive both ∆ `k e1.s : T and
∆ `k e2 : T . Hence, by applying STATEASS to them we can derive ∆ `k+1
e1.s = e2 : T .
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• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C was derived from
Γ `k e˜ : T˜ and Γ `k e′ : uint, together with the additional premise |e˜| = |s˜|,
where sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive hypothesis, we know that, given a permutation
∆ of Γ, we can derive both ∆ `k e˜ : T˜ and ∆ `k e′ : uint. Provided that the
additional premise checking the length of the tuples e˜ and s˜ is still valid, we can
apply NEW to obtain ∆ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 C(e) : C was derived from Γ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis ∆ `k e : address is derivable, where ∆ is
a permutation of Γ. Considering ∆ ` C(e) : C, notice it can be derived from
∆ `k e : address applying CONTRRETR, and its derivation has height k + 1.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived from
Γ `k e1 : address and Γ `k e2 : uint. By inductive hypothesis, considering a
permutation ∆ of Γ, we can derive ∆ `k e1 : address and ∆ `k e2 : uint. Lastly,
we can apply TRANSFER to them to obtain ∆ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜1, together with the additional
premises checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|) and the type of f in C
(ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2). By inductive hypothesis on the three judgments of
height k, and given a permutation ∆ of Γ, also the following judgments can be
derived: ∆ `k e : C, ∆ `k e2 : uint, and ∆ `k e˜ : T˜1. Applying CALL we
derive ∆ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
was derived from Γ `k e3 : address and Γ `k e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2. Let ∆ be
a permutation of Γ; by inductive hypothesis the judgments ∆ `k e3 : address
and ∆ `k e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2. We then apply CALLTOPLEVEL and obtain a
derivation of ∆ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜1, together with the premise
checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|). By inductive hypothesis on the
three judgments of height k, and given a permutation ∆ of Γ, also the following
judgments can be derived: ∆ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, ∆ `k e2 : uint, and ∆ `k e˜ : T˜1.
Applying CALLVALUE we derive ∆ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
E.2 Weakening Lemma
Weakening Lemma is formalized over FS configurations 〈β, σ, e〉. To prove it, we
shall first prove the validity of the same Lemma on the projections on β (Lemma 10),
σ (Lemma 11), and e (Lemma 12). In the proof that follow, let Γ′ = Γ ·∆.
E.2.1 Weakening of β
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the first component of
〈β, σ, e〉: β.
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Lemma 10 (Weakening of β).
Let Γ ` β be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ ·∆ ` β can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` β.
Base case This case corresponds to the axiom EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN in Section 6.3.
The height of the derivation is 1, and β = ∅, that is Γ `1 ∅. ∅ is well-formed regardless
of Γ, and hence it is also true Γ′ `1 ∅.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• VARIABLE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 β · [x 7→ v] was derived from Γ `k β,
Γ `k x : T , and Γ `k v : T , where x /∈ dom(β). By inductive hypothesis, also
the judgments Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k x : T , and Γ′ `k v : T are derivable. Applying
VARIABLE we can thus derive Γ′ `k+1 β · [x 7→ v], which is what we wanted to
prove.
• CONTRACT. In this case J = Γ `k+1 β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)] was derived from
Γ `k β, Γ `k c : C, Γ `k a : address, Γ `k n : uint, and Γ `k v˜ : T˜ , where
(c, a) /∈ dom(β) and sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive hypothesis, also the judgments
Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k c : C, Γ′ `k a : address, Γ′ `k n : uint, and Γ′ `k v˜ : T˜
are derivable. Applying CONTRACT we can thus derive Γ′ `k+1 β · [(c, a) 7→
(C, s˜:v, n)], which is what we wanted to prove.
E.2.2 Weakening of σ
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the second component of
〈β, σ, e〉: σ.
Lemma 11 (Weakening of σ).
Let Γ ` σ be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ ·∆ ` σ can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` σ.
Base case Rule CALLSTACK in Section 6.3 has, as a base case, the well-formedness
of β, proven by Lemma 10.
Inductive case Let the judgment Γ ` σ · a have height k+ 1. We assume the lemma
for the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height at most
k + 1.
Γ `k+1 σ · a was derived from Γ `k σ and Γ `k a : address. By inductive
hypothesis we can derive Γ′ `k σ and Γ′ `k a : address, and applying CALLSTACK
we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 σ · a.
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E.2.3 Weakening of e
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the first component of
〈β, σ, e〉: e.
Lemma 12 (Weakening of e).
Let Γ ` e : T be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ)∩dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ·∆ ` e : T can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` e : T .
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 6.3. The height of these
derivations is always 1.
• REF. The judgment is Γ ` c : C. From Case 9 of Lemma 2 we know that
c : C ∈ Γ. We defined Γ′ as Γ · ∆, so c : C ∈ Γ ⇒ c : C ∈ Γ′. Hence,
Γ′ ` c : C is derivable.
• VAR. The judgment is Γ ` x : T . From Case 10 of Lemma 2 we know that
x : T ∈ Γ. We defined Γ′ as Γ · ∆, so x : T ∈ Γ ⇒ x : T ∈ Γ′. Hence,
Γ′ ` x : T is derivable.
• TRUE. The judgment is Γ ` true : bool. From Case 1 of Lemma 2 we know
that this judgment is derivable with height 1 regardless of Γ, and so is Γ′ `
true : bool.
• FALSE. The judgment is Γ ` false : bool. From Case 2 of Lemma 2 we know
that this judgment is derivable with height 1 regardless of Γ, and so is Γ′ `
false : bool.
• NAT. The judgment is Γ ` n : uint. From Case 3 of Lemma 2 we know that this
judgment is derivable with height 1 whenever n ∈ N+, regardless of Γ, and so is
Γ′ ` n : uint.
• ADDRESS. The judgment is Γ ` a : address. From Case 6 of Lemma 2 we
know that a : address ∈ Γ. We defined Γ′ as Γ · ∆, so a : address ∈ Γ ⇒
a : address ∈ Γ′. Hence, Γ′ ` a : address is derivable.
• UNIT. The judgment is Γ ` u : unit. From Case 4 of Lemma 2 we know that
this judgment is derivable with height 1 regardless of Γ, and so is
• REVERT. The judgment is Γ ` revert : T . This judgment is derivable with
height 1 regardless of Γ, and so is Γ′ ` revert : T .
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from the judgment
Γ `k c : C with the premise ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2. We can apply the
inductive hypothesis to say that Γ′ `k c : C is derivable. Provided that the
premise ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 is still valid, applying FUN we conclude that
also Γ′ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 is derivable.
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• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived from
Γ `k k˜ : T˜1 and Γ `k v˜ : T˜2. By induction hypothesis, also Γ′ `k k˜ : T˜1 and
Γ′ `k v˜ : T˜2 can be derived. Hence, applying MAPPING we obtain a derivation
of Γ′ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e : address is derivable. We then
apply BAL to conclude that the judgment Γ′ `k+1 balance(e) : uint can be
derived.
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 address(e) : address was derived from Γ `k
e : C. By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e : C is derivable. We then apply ADDR
to conclude that the judgment Γ′ `k+1 address(e) : address can be derived, too.
• RETURN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 return e : T was derived from Γ `k e : T .
By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e : T is derivable. We then apply RETURN to
conclude that the judgment Γ′ `k+1 return e : T can be derived, too.
• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1 : bool, Γ `k e2 : T , and Γ `k e3 : T . We can thus apply the inductive
hypothesis and say that Γ′ `k e1 : bool, Γ′ `k e2 : T , and Γ′ `k e3 : T are all
derivable. We then apply IF to derive Γ′ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T .
• SEQ. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1; e2 : T2 was derived from Γ `k e1 : T1
and Γ `k e2 : T2. By inductive hypothesis, these “smaller” judgments are
derivable also under Γ′, without any changes in height, that is Γ′ `k e1 : T1 and
Γ′ `k e2 : T2. Applying SEQ we obtain a derivation Γ′ `k+1 e1; e2 : T2.
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : T1 and Γ, x : T1 `k e2 : T2. On the former we can apply the inductive
hypothesis and say that Γ′ `k e1 : T1 is derivable. On the contrary, we cannot
apply the inductive hypothesis on the latter, since the context is Γ, x : T1 and
not Γ. Still, we know there exists a derivation of height k for this judgment,
otherwise J would not be derivable, but this is a contradiction, since we assumed
J has a valid derivation of height k+ 1. Hence, it comes from another judgment
J ′ having a derivation of height k−1 where any of the rules defined in Section 6.3
was applied as a last step. We can now apply the inductive hypothesis on J ′,
considering Γ, x : T1 as a context and concluding that Γ, x : T1,∆ `k e2 : T2
is derivable. Lastly, applying DECL we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 T1 x =
e1; e2 : T2.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k e2 : T1. By inductive hypothesis also
the judgments Γ′ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ′ `k e2 : T1 are derivable.
Applying MAPPSEL we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2.
• STATESEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e.si : Ti was derived from Γ `k e : C,
with the additional premise stating si ∈ s˜, where sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive
hypothesis we know that also Γ′ `k e : C is derivable. As a final step, applying
STATESEL we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e.si : Ti.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ `k x : T and
Γ `k e : T . By inductive hypothesis we can derive with the same height also
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Γ′ `k x : T and Γ′ `k e : T , and applying ASS we obtain a derivation of
Γ′ `k+1 x = e : T .
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k e2 : T1, and Γ `k
e3 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we can derive with the same height also Γ′ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ′ `k e2 : T1, and Γ′ `k e3 : T2, and applying
MAPPASS we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• STATEASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1.s : T and Γ `k e2 : T . By inductive hypothesis we can derive with the same
height also Γ′ `k e1.s : T and Γ′ `k e2 : T , and applying STATEASS we obtain
a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T .
• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C was derived from
Γ `k e˜ : T˜ and Γ `k e′ : uint, together with the premise |e˜| = |s˜|, where
sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ and Γ′ `k e′ : uint can be
derived. Furthermore, the premise checking the length of e˜ and s˜ is still valid,
and we can apply NEW to derive Γ′ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 C(e) : C was derived from Γ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis also Γ′ `k e : address is derivable; apply-
ing CONTRRETR we then obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 C(e) : C.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived from
Γ `k e1 : address and Γ `k e2 : uint. By inductive hypothesis we can derive
Γ′ `k e1 : address and Γ′ `k e2 : uint. We then apply TRANSFER to obtain a
derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜1, together with the premises checking the
length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|) and the type of f in C (ftype(C, f) = T˜1 →
T2). By induction hypothesis we can derive Γ′ `k e1 : C, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and
Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1. Furthermore, the other two premises are still valid, and thus we
can apply CALL to derive Γ′ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
was derived from Γ `k e3 : address and Γ `k e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2. By induc-
tion hypothesis, the judgments Γ′ `k e3 : address and Γ′ `k e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2
are derivable. As a final step we apply CALLTOPLEVEL to derive
Γ′ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜1. There is another premise,
checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|). By induction hypothesis, the
judgments Γ′ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1 are derivable.
Furthermore, the other premise is still valid, and we can thus apply CALLVALUE
to obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
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E.2.4 Proof of the Lemma
We can now prove Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 (Weakening).
Let Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩
dom(∆) = ∅ (i.e. Γ and ∆ have no elements in common). Then Γ ·∆ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous one.
Proof. By hypothesis Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e〉 : T : by rule CONFIGURATION this means that
also Γ `k β, Γ `k σ, and Γ `k e : T are derivable. By, respectively, Lemma 10, 11,
and 12 we know that there exists a derivation for Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k σ, and Γ′ `k e : T .
Hence, applying CONFIGURATION to the latter three judgments we can derive Γ′ `k+1
〈β, σ, e〉 : T , which is what we wanted to prove.
E.3 Substitution Lemma
We recall Lemma 5:
Lemma 5 (Substitution).
If Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint ` e : T , Γ ` c : C,
Γ ` a : address, and Γ ` n : uint, then Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value :=
n} : T .
Proof. Let Γ′ = Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint. We prove this
lemma by induction on the height of the judgment Γ′ ` e : T .
We shall make use of the following notation to make the proof more readable:
subst(e) = e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value := n}
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 6.3. The height of these
derivations is always 1.
• REF. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` d : D. There are two sub-cases:
– d 6= this. By Case 9 of Lemma 2 we obtain d : D ∈ Γ′. Since d 6=
msg.value, d 6= msg.sender, and d 6= this, from d : D ∈ Γ′ follows
d : D ∈ Γ. Lastly, d : D ∈ Γ ⇒ Γ ` d : D by applying REF, since
subst(d) = d.
– d = this. By Case 9 of Lemma 2 we obtain D = C. We are to prove
Γ ` subst(this) : C, but subst(this) = c and the judgment becomes
Γ ` c : C, which is true by the second hypothesis.
• VAR. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` x : T and subst(e) = subst(x) =
x, where x 6= msg.value, x 6= msg.sender, and x 6= this. By Case 10 of
Lemma 2 we know x : T ∈ Γ′, and, for what we just said (x 6= msg.value,
x 6= msg.sender, and x 6= this), x : T ∈ Γ, too. We are to prove Γ ` x : T ,
which is true by VAR, since we just noticed x : T ∈ Γ.
• TRUE. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` true : bool and subst(e) = subst(true) =
true. We are to prove Γ ` true : bool, which is true by TRUE.
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• FALSE. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` false : bool and subst(e) = subst(false)
= false. We are to prove Γ ` false : bool, which is true by FALSE.
• NAT. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` m : uint, where m 6= msg.value. In this
case subst(m) = m and the judgment becomes Γ ` m : uint, which is true by
NAT.
• UNIT. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` u : unit and subst(e) = subst(u) = u.
We are to prove Γ ` u : unit, which is true by UNIT.
• ADDRESS. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` a′ : address, where a′ 6= msg.sender.
In this case subst(a′) = a′. By Case 6 of Lemma 2 we know a′ : address ∈ Γ′,
and thus a′ : address ∈ Γ. We are to prove Γ ` a′ : address, which is true
because a′ : address ∈ Γ.
• REVERT. In this case the judgment is Γ′ ` revert : T and
subst(e) = subst(revert) = revert. We are to prove Γ ` revert : T , which is
true by rule REVERT.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 d.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from Γ′ `k d : D.
We again have two sub-cases:
– if d 6= this then, by Case 9 of Lemma 2 we obtain d : D ∈ Γ′. We supposed
d 6= this, but it is also true that d 6= msg.sender and d 6= msg.value. Hence,
d : D ∈ Γ′ ⇒ d : D ∈ Γ ⇒ Γ ` d : D. Furthermore, subst(d.f) = d.f ,
and the judgment Γ ` d.f : T˜1 → T2 is derivable.
– id d = this then, by Case 9 of Lemma 2 we know D = C. We are to prove
Γ ` subst(this.f) : D, but subst(this.f) = c.f and the judgment becomes
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2. By the second hypothesis we know we can derive
Γ ` c : C, and applying FUN we can also derive Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2, which
is what we wanted to prove since subst(this.f) = c.f .
• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived
from Γ′ `k k˜ : T1 and Γ′ `k v˜ : T2. Since both k˜ and v˜ are tuples of values,
subst(k˜) = k˜ and subst(v˜) = v˜. By inductive hypothesis, Γ ` k˜ : T1 and
Γ ` v˜ : T2, and applying MAPPING we derive Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), as
required.
• BAL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ′ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : address, and
applying BAL we obtain Γ ` balance(subst(e)) : uint, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(balance(e)) : uint (see Figure 4.3).
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 address(e) : address was derived from
Γ′ `k e : C. By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : C, and ap-
plying ADDR we obtain Γ ` address(subst(e)) : address, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(address(e)) : address (see Figure 4.3).
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• RETURN. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 return e : T was derived from Γ′ `k e : T .
By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : T , and applying RETURN we
obtain Γ ` return subst(e) : T , which is the same as Γ ` subst(return e) : T
(see Figure 4.3).
• IF. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : bool, Γ′ `k e2 : T and Γ′ `k e3 : T . By inductive hypoth-
esis, we can derive Γ ` subst(e1) : bool, Γ ` subst(e2) : T and Γ `
subst(e3) : T . We are to prove Γ ` subst(if e1 then e2 else e2) : T , which
is derived applying IF to the latter judgments together with the equivalence
if subst(e1) then subst(e2) else subst(e3) = subst(if e1 then e2 else e2).
• SEQ. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1; e2 : T2 was derived from Γ′ `k e1 : T1
and Γ′ `k e2 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we obtain Γ ` subst(e1) : T1 and
Γ ` subst(e2) : T2; applying SEQ we derive Γ ` subst(e1); subst(e2) : T2,
which is what we wanted to prove since subst(e1; e2) = subst(e1); subst(e2).
• DECL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : T1 and Γ′, x : T1 `k e2 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we
can derive Γ ` subst(e1) : T1. To apply the inductive hypothesis to the lat-
ter judgment we need to rearrange the context. By Lemma 3 we know that
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint `k e2 : T2 can
be derived with the same height. Furthermore, we can apply Lemma 4 to the
other three hypotheses to obtain a derivation of the judgments
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint `k c : C,
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint `k a : address, and
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint `k n : uint. Now, by
inductive hypothesis, also
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint ` subst(e2) : T2
can be derived. Lastly, by applying DECL we obtain a derivation of Γ ` T1 x =
subst(e1); subst(e2) : T2, which is the same as Γ ` subst(T1 x = e1; e2) : T2
since subst(T1 x = e1; e2) = subst(T1 x = e1); subst(e2) =
T1 x = subst(e1); subst(e2).
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ′ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ′ `k e2 : T1. By inductive hypothesis we derive
Γ ` subst(e1) : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ ` subst(e2) : T1; then, applying
MAPPSEL, we obtain a derivation of Γ ` subst(e1)[subst(e2)] : T2, which is
what we wanted to prove since subst(e1[e2] = subst(e1)[subst(e2)]).
• STATESEL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e.si : Ti was derived from Γ′ `k
e : C, where sv(C) = T˜ s and si ∈ s˜. By inductive hypothesis we obtain
Γ ` subst(e) : C; then, applying STATESEL we derive Γ ` subst(e).si : Ti.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ′ `k x : T
and Γ′ `k e : T . By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(x) : T and
Γ ` subst(e) : T ; applying ASS we obtain Γ ` subst(x) = subst(e) : T , which
is the same as Γ ` subst(x = e) : T since subst(x) = x and subst(x = e) =
(x = subst(e)).
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ′ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ′ `k e2 : T1, and Γ′ `k
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e3 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we derive Γ ` subst(e1) : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), Γ ` subst(e2) : T1, and Γ ` subst(e3) : T2. By MAPPASS we ob-
tain Γ ` subst(e1)[subst(e2) → subst(e3)] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), which is
what we wanted to prove since subst(e1[e2 → e3]) = subst(e1)[subst(e2) →
subst(e3)].
• STATEASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T was derived from
Γ′ `k e1.s : T and Γ′ `k e2 : T . By inductive hypothesis we obtain Γ `
subst(e1.s) : T and Γ ` subst(e2) : T ; then, applying STATEASS we derive
Γ ` subst(e1).s = subst(e2) : T , which is what we wanted to prove since
subst(e1.s = e2) = subst(e1).s = subst(e2).
• NEW. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 new C.value(e1)(e˜) : C was derived from
Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ and Γ′ `k e1 : uint, where sv(C) = T˜ s and |e˜| = |s˜|. By inductive
hypothesis we obtain Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜ and Γ ` subst(e1) : uint; applying NEW
we conclude Γ ` subst(new C.value(e1)(e˜)) : C, since
subst(new C.value(e1)(e˜)) = new C.value(subst(e1))(subst(e˜)).
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 C(e) : C was derived from Γ′ `k
e : address. By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : address, and
applying CONTRRETR we obtain Γ ` C(subst(e)) : C, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(C(e)) : C.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : address and Γ′ `k e2 : uint. By inductive hypothesis we get
Γ ` subst(e1) : address and Γ ` subst(e2) : uint. Furthermore, applying
TRANSFER we derive Γ ` subst(e1).transfer(subst(e2)) : unit, which is the
same as Γ ` subst(e1.transfer(e2)) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : C, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1, where ftype(C, f) =
T˜1 → T2 and |e˜| = |T˜1|. By inductive hypothesis we get Γ ` subst(e1) : C,
Γ ` subst(e2) : uint, and Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜1: applying CALL we derive Γ `
subst(e1).f.value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)) : T2, which is what we wanted to prove
since subst(e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)) = subst(e1).f.value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)).
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case is very similar to the previous one, with the only
addition of the judgment Γ ` e3 : address checking the well-typing of the third
parameter.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived
from Γ′ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1, where
|e˜| = |T˜1|. By inductive hypothesis we get Γ ` subst(e1) : T˜1 → T2,
Γ ` subst(e2) : uint, and Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜1: applying CALLVALUE we derive
Γ ` subst(e1).value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)) : T2, which is what we wanted to
prove since subst(e1.value(e2)(e˜)) = subst(e1).value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)).
E.4 Progress Theorem
Before proving Theorem 3, we shall prove an additional lemma stating that, for well-
typed judgments, dom(Γ) ⊇ dom(β), that is, every x, c, or a ∈ Γ is also in β. Again,
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we shall abuse the notation regarding pairs (c, a) in β.
Lemma 13. Let Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T be derivable. Then dom(Γ) ⊇ dom(β).
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that ∃x ∈ dom(β) such as x /∈ dom(Γ), and that e
contains such x. This means that either x, x = e′, or both appears in e. In the former
case, rule VAR in Section 6.3 apply to give a type to e. However, VAR requires x to be
in Γ (i.e. x : T ′ ∈ Γ), but it does not by hypothesis. The latter case is similar: rule
ASS applies, and it contains, as a premise, Γ ` x : T ′, which in turn is handled by
VAR. Hence, the type system cannot give a type to x, but this is a contradiction, since
we assumed Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T as derivable. Hence, x must be in dom(Γ).
The same reasoning applies to a and c.
We can now prove Theorem 3:
Theorem 3 (Progress).
If 〈β, σ, e〉 is closed (Definition 13) and well-typed (i.e. ∃Γ such that Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
is derivable), then either e = v, e = revert, or ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→
〈β′, σ′, e′〉.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the height of the judgment Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T .
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 6.3. By rule CONFIGU-
RATION, Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T implies Γ ` β and Γ ` σ. These cases modify neither β nor
σ, and hence we focus on the expression e (i.e. on the judgment Γ ` e : T ).
• REF. The judgment is Γ ` c : C, and c is already a value.
• VAR. The judgment is Γ ` x : T . By hypothesis, we know Γ ` x : T , which
implies, by rule VAR, x : T ∈ Γ, which means x ∈ dom(Γ). By Lemma 13,
x ∈ dom(Γ) ⇒ x ∈ dom(β), which makes β(x) well-defined. By rule VAR in
Section 5.5, ∃e′ = β(x) such that 〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉.
• TRUE. The judgment is Γ ` true : bool, and the expression true is already a
value.
• FALSE, NAT, ADDRESS, and UNIT. The judgments are Γ ` false : bool, Γ `
n : uint, Γ ` a : address, or Γ ` u : unit, respectively, and the expressions false,
n, a, and u are already values.
• REVERT. The judgment is Γ ` revert : T , and the expression is a revert.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the theorem for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• MAPPING. The judgment is Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and the expression
M is already a value.
• FUN. The judgment is Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2, and the expression c.f is already a
value.
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• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 : uint was derived from Γ `k
〈β, σ, e〉 : address. By inductive hypothesis we know e is either a value, revert,
or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the following
cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 7 of Lemma 6, v is an address a. By rule BALANCE
in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉, where β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n)
is well-defined for what we said in Lemma 13: Γ ` 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 : uint
is well typed, and then ∃c such that the pair (c, a) ∈ dom(β).
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, balance(e′)〉.
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, address(e)〉 : address was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : C. By inductive hypothesis we know e is either a value, revert,
or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the following
cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 5 of Lemma 6, v is a contract reference c. By rule
ADDRESS in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉, where βˆ(c) =
a. The latter equivalence is well-defined by Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, address(e)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, address(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, address(e′)〉.
• RETURN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ · a, return e〉 : T was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ · a, e〉 : T . By inductive hypothesis we know e is either a value,
revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ · a, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the
following cases:
– if e = v then, by rule RETURN in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ · a, return v〉 −→
〈β, σ, v〉.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ·a, return revert〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ · a, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ · a, return e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, return e′〉.
• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 : T was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : bool, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T , and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : T . By
inductive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value, a revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such
that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉. We distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v then, by Case 1 of Lemma 6, v is either true or false. If it is
true, by rule IF-TRUE in Section 5.5 〈β, σ, if true then e2 else e3〉 −→
〈β, σ, e2〉. On the other hand, if it is false, by rule IF-FALSE in Section 5.5
〈β, σ, if false then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e3〉.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, if revert then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
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– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, if e′1 then e2 else e3〉.
• SEQ. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1; e2〉 : T2 was derived from Γ `k
〈β, σ, e1〉 : T1 and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we know e1
is either a value, revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉. We
distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v then two scenarios are possible. First, if Top(σ) = ∅, by
rule SEQ-C in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v; e2〉 −→ 〈β, β, e2〉. Secondly, if ∃a
such that Top(σ) = a then, by rule SEQ in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v; e2〉 −→
〈β, σ, e2〉.
– if e1 = revert then, again, two scenarios are possible. First, if Top(σ) = ∅
(and, consequently, ∃β0 such that σ = β0), by rule SEQ-R in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert; e2〉 −→ 〈β0, β0, revert〉. Secondly, if ∃a such that Top(σ) =
a then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, revert; e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1; e2〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1; e2〉.
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, T1 x = e1; e2〉 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T1 and ∅, x : T1 `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T2. By inductive hypothesis, e1
is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. We
distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 then, by rule DECL in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, T1 x = v1; e2〉 −→
〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v1; e2〉. Note that the premise x /∈ dom(β) is always
satisfied since variables can be renamed by α-equivalence.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, T1 x = revert; e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert; e2〉. Note that this case does
not take into account e2 at all.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, T1 x = e1; e2〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, T1 x = e′1; e2〉.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, x = e〉 : T was derived from Γ `k
〈β, σ, x〉 : T and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : T . By inductive hypothesis, e is either a
value, revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish
the following cases:
– if e = v then, by rule ASS in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→
v], σ, v〉. Note that x ∈ dom(β) is always satisfied for what we said in
Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x = revert〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x =
e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, x = e′〉.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1[e2]〉 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T1. By induc-
tive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that
〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning applies to e2, thus e2 is either a
value, revert, or ∃β′2, σ′2, e′2 such that 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉. We distinguish
the following cases:
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– if e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 then, by Case 4 of Lemma 6, v1 is a total function
M from T1 to T2. By rule MAPPSEL in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ,M [v2]〉 −→
〈β, σ,M(v2)〉. Note that M(v2) is always well-defined because M is a
total function.
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, v1[revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, revert[e2]〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1[e2]〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1[e2]〉. Note we do not have to specify what
e2 is.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[e2]〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1[e′2]〉.
• STATESEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e.si〉 : Ti was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : C, where C is such that sv(C) = T˜ s and si ∈ s˜. By in-
ductive hypothesis we know e is either a value, revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the following cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 5 of Lemma 6, v is a contract reference c. By
rule STATESEL in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, c.si〉 −→ 〈β, σ, vi〉, where β(c) =
(C, s˜:v, n) and c.si = vi. Note that β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) is well-defined by
Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, revert.si〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e.si〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′.si〉.
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1[e2 → e3]〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T1,
and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : T2. By inductive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value,
revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning
applies to e2 and e3. We distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and e3 = v3 then, by Case 4 of Lemma 6, v1
is a total function M from T1 to T2. By rule MAPPASS in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ,M [v2 → v3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉, where M ′ = M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪
{(v1, v2)}.
– if either e2 = revert or e3 = revert, with e1 = M then, by rule REVERT in
Section 5.5, 〈β, σ,M [revert → v3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉 or
〈β, σ,M [v2 → revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, respectively.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1[e2 → e3]〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1[e′2 → e3]〉.
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– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and 〈β, σ, e3〉 −→ 〈β′3, σ′3, e′3〉 then, by rule CONG in
Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[v2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′3, σ′3, v1[v2 → e′3]〉.
• STATEASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.si = e2〉 : T was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1.si〉 : T and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T . By inductive hypothesis we know
e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉.
The same reasoning applies to e2. We distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 then, by Case 21 of Lemma 2 we know Γ ` v1 : C
can be derived. Hence, by Case 5 of Lemma 6, v1 is a contract reference
c. By rule STATEASS in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, c.si = v2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v2〉,
where β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) and c.si = vi. Note that β(c) is well-defined by
Lemma 13.
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.s = revert〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert.si = e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.si = e2〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1.si = e2〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.si = e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1.si = e′2〉.
• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, new C.value(e1)(e˜)〉 : C was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜ . By inductive hypothesis we know
e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The
same reasoning applies to the tuple e˜: it is either a tuple of values (v˜), a tuple of
values and expressions separated by a revert (i.e. v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j ),
or it is in the form v{0≤i<m}i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j and ∃β′i, σ′i, e′j such that
〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→ 〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉. We distin-
guish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e˜ = v˜ then, by Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1 = n. Three sce-
narios are possible here. If Top(σ) 6= ∅, then either NEW-1 or NEW-R
(as defined in Section 5.5) applies. If it is NEW-1 (note the check about
the length of the tuples is true since it is also a premise of the rule NEW
in Section 6.3) then the balance of the contract corresponding to Top(σ)
is enough to create a new contract with an initial balance of n. Hence,
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) ·
·[(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where (c, a) is a fresh pair identifying the new
contract in β. On the other hand, if NEW-R applies, then the balance of the
contract corresponding to Top(σ) is not enough. Hence,
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉. Lastly, if Top(σ) = ∅, then
NEW-2 (as defined in Section 5.5) applies. Hence, 〈β, σ, newC.value(n)(v˜)〉
−→ 〈β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where (c, a) is, as before, a fresh pair
identifying the new contract in β.
– if either e1 = revert or e1 = v1 and e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j
then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, new C.value(revert)(e˜)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉 or 〈β, σ, newC.value(v1)(e˜ = v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e{m<j≤n}j )〉
−→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, respectively.
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– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, new C.value(e1)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, new C.value(e′1)(e˜)〉.
– if e1 = v1, e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j , and 〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, new C.value(v1)(v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j )〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, new C.value(v1)(v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j )〉.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, C(e)〉 : C was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : address. By inductive hypothesis, e is either a value, revert
or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the following
cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 7 of Lemma 6, v is an address a. Two are the
possible scenarios. First, βC(a) = C (well-defined by Lemma 13) and
rule CONTRRETR of Section 5.5 applies. a corresponds to a reference c to
a contract C. Hence, 〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉. Secondly, βC(a) = C ′,
with C ′ 6= C. In this case rule CONTRRETR-R of Section 5.5 applies, and
〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉. Again, βC(a) = C ′ is well-defined by
Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, C(revert)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, C(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, C(e′)〉.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.transfer(e2)〉 : unit was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : address and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint. By inductive hypothe-
sis, e1 is either a value, revert or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉.
The same reasoning applies to e2. We distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 then, by Case 7 and Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1 is
an address a and v2 is a non-negative integer n. Let β(a) = (C, s˜:v,m),
well-defined by Lemma 13. Two are the possible scenarios. First, if m ≥
n rule TRANSFER in Section 5.5 applies and 〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→
〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉, where
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n), βˆ(c) = a, and e is either the
body of the callback function of C, if any, or return revert. Secondly, if
m < n then TRANSFER-R applies and we obtain 〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if either e1 = revert or e1 = v1 and e2 = revert then, by rule REVERT in
Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, revert.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉 or
〈β, σ, v1.transfer(revert)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, respectively.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1.transfer(e2)〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1.transfer(e′2)〉.
Note we did not make any reasoning about Top(σ). As said, we assumed
Top(σ) 6= ∅.
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• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : C, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜1,
where ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 and |e˜| = |T˜1|. By inductive hypothesis, e1
is either a value, revert or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The
same reasoning applies to e2 and to the tuple e˜. The former is either a value,
revert or ∃β′′, σ′′, e′2 such that 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉. The latter is either
a tuple of values (v˜), a tuple of values and expressions separated by a revert
(i.e. v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j ), or it is in the form v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j and
∃β′i, σ′i, e′j such that 〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉. We distinguish the following cases:
– e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and e˜ = v˜. By Case 5 and Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1
is a contract reference c and v2 is a non-negative integer n. Let β(c) =
(C, s˜:v,m), well-defined by Lemma 13. Two are the possible scenarios.
First, ifm ≥ n, then rule CALL in Section 5.5 applies. It retrieves f ’s body,
e, and its formal parameters x˜, defines
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→ vi xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜] as ex-
plained in Chapter 5, and then evolves as follows: 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→
〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉. Sec-
ondly, if m < n, then rule CALL-R in Section 5.5 applies, and
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if either e1 = revert, e1 = v1 and e2 = revert, or e1 = v1, e2 = v2 and
e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉,
〈β, σ, v1.f.value(revert)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, or
〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2)(e˜ = v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e{m<j≤n}j )〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉,
respectively.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1.f.value(e′2)(e˜)〉.
– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j , and
〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→ 〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉 then, by
rule CONG in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2)(v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j )〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, v1.f.value(v2)(v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j )〉.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜)〉 : T2
was derived from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : address.
This case is very similar to the previous one, with the only addition of the pa-
rameter e3 and considering CALLTOPLEVEL and CALLTOPLEVEL-R instead
of CALL and CALL-R. What we said and proved previously applies here, too.
We can apply the inductive hypothesis on e3. If it is a value, then, by Case 7
of Lemma 6, it is an address a. If also e1, e2, and e˜ are values, either CALL-
TOPLEVEL or CALLTOPLEVEL-R (as defined in Section 5.5) applies, accord-
ing to the balance of the caller. When it is a revert, rule REVERT in Sec-
tion 5.5 applies. Lastly, when e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 and ∃β′, σ′, e′3 such that
〈β, σ, e3〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′3〉 we obtain 〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2).sender(e3)(e˜)〉 −→
〈β′, σ′, v1.f.value(v2).sender(e′3)(e˜)〉.
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• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜1,
all such that the height of their derivations is k. Also this case is similar to
CALL, and the same rules (CALL and CALL-R of Section 5.5) are applied. The
only difference is the expression e1. By inductive hypothesis, it is either a value,
revert or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉. If it is a value, by
Case 6 of Lemma 6, it is a function pointer c.f . From this point on, every case is
equal to those discussed for CALL, with the application of the same rules CALL
and CALL-R.
E.5 Subject Reduction Theorem
To prove Theorem 4 we shall need an additional lemma formalizing type preservation
into evaluation contexts E.
Lemma 14 (Type preservation into E). If Γ ` E[e] : T then ∃T ′ such that Γ ` e : T ′,
and ∀e′ | Γ ` e′ : T ′ ⇒ Γ ` E[e′] : T .
Proof. We prove this lemma by on the definition of evaluation contexts given in Sec-
tion 6.3.
• E = []. This case is trivial: [e] = e, thus Γ ` e : T implies trivially T ′ = T . The
second conclusion follows immediately.
• E = balance(E′), and E[e] = balance(e). In this case Γ ` balance(e) : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 11 of Lemma 2, T = uint and Γ `
e : address, which is part of what we aimed to prove (setting T ′ = address).
Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : address, and consider rule BAL
in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : address satisfies its premise, and thus we can derive
Γ ` balance(e′) : uint, which is the same as Γ ` balance[e′] : uint.
• E = address(E′), and E[e] = address(e). In this case Γ ` address(e) : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 12 of Lemma 2, T = address and Γ `
e : C, which is part of what we aimed to prove (setting T ′ = C). Let e′ be any
expression such that Γ ` e′ : C, and consider rule ADDR in Section 6.3: Γ `
e′ : C satisfies its premise, and thus we can derive Γ ` address(e′) : address,
which is the same as Γ ` address[e′] : address.
• E = E′.s, andE[e] = e.s. In this case Γ ` e.s : T can be derived by hypothesis.
By Case 14 of Lemma 2, Γ ` e : C, which is part of what we aimed to prove
(setting T ′ = C). Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : C, and consider
rule STATESEL in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : C, together with the conclusions of
Case 14 of Lemma 2 satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` e′.s : Ti,
which is the same as Γ ` E[e′] : uint.
• E = E′.transfer(e1), andE[e] = e.transfer(e1). In this case Γ ` e.transfer(e1) : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 15 of Lemma 2, T = unit, Γ ` e : address,
and Γ ` e1 : uint. Setting T ′ = address, Γ ` e : address proves the first con-
clusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : address, and
consider rule TRANSFER in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : address and Γ ` e1 : uint
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satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` e′.transfer(e1) : unit, which is
what we aimed to prove since (E.transfer(e1))[e′] = e′.transfer(e1).
• E = a.transfer(E′), andE[e] = a.transfer(e). In this case Γ ` a.transfer(e) : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 15 of Lemma 2, T = unit, Γ ` a : address,
and Γ ` e : uint. Setting T ′ = uint, Γ ` e : uint proves the first conclusion
of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : uint, and consider
rule TRANSFER in Section 6.3: Γ ` a : address and Γ ` e′ : uint satisfy its
premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` a.transfer(e′) : unit, which is the same as
Γ ` E[e′] : unit.
• E = new C.value(E′)(e˜), and E[e] = new C.value(e)(e˜). In this case Γ `
new C.value(e)(e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 16 of Lemma 2,
T = C, Γ ` e : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ , where sv(C) = T˜ s. Setting T ′ = uint, Γ `
e : uint proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such
that Γ ` e′ : uint, and consider rule NEW in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : uint, together
with the conclusions of Case 16 of Lemma 2, satisfy its premises, and thus we
can derive Γ ` new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C, which is the same as Γ ` E[e′] : C.
• E = new C.value(n)(v˜, E′, e˜), andE[e] = new C.value(a)(v˜, e, e˜). In this case
Γ ` new C.value(a)(v˜, e, e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 16 of
Lemma 2, T = C, Γ ` n : uint, and Γ ` v{0≤j<i}j , ei, e{i<j≤m}j : T˜ , where
sv(C) = T˜ s. Setting T ′ = Ti, Γ ` ei : Ti proves the first conclusion of this
lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : Ti, and consider rule NEW in
Section 6.3: Γ ` a : uint, together with Γ ` v{0≤j<i}j , e′, e{i<j≤m}j : T˜ , satisfy
its premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` new C.value(a)(v˜, e, e˜) : C, which is
the same as Γ ` E[e′] : C.
• E = C(E′), and E[e] = C(e). In this case Γ ` C(e) : T can be derived by
hypothesis. By Case 17 of Lemma 2, T = C and Γ ` e : address, which is
part of what we aimed to prove (setting T ′ = address). Let e′ be any expression
such that Γ ` e′ : address, and consider rule CONTRRETR in Section 6.3: Γ `
e′ : address satisfies its premise, and thus we can derive Γ ` C(e′) : C, which is
the same as Γ ` C[e′] : C, which is indeed the same as Γ ` E[e′] : C.
• E = E′; e1, and E[e] = e; e1. In this case Γ ` e; e1 : T can be derived by
hypothesis. By Case 18 of Lemma 2, ∃T1 such that Γ ` e : T1 and Γ ` e1 : T .
Setting T ′ = T1, Γ ` e : T1 proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be
any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T1, and consider rule SEQ in Section 6.3: Γ `
e′ : T1 and Γ ` e1 : T satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` e′; e : T ,
which is what we aimed to prove since (E; e1)[e′] = e′; e1.
• E = E.f.value(e1)(e˜), and E[e] = e.f.value(e1)(e˜). In this case
Γ ` e.f.value(e1)(e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 24 of Lemma 2,
∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e : C,
Γ ` e1 : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ . Setting T ′ = C, Γ ` e : C proves the first conclu-
sion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : C, and consider
rule CALL in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : C, together with the conclusions of Case 24 of
Lemma 2, satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` e.f.value(e1)(e˜) : T2,
which is the same as Γ ` E[e′] : T2.
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• E = c.f.value(E)(e˜), and E[e] = c.f.value(e)(e˜). In this case
Γ ` c.f.value(e)(e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 24 of Lemma 2,
∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` c : C,
Γ ` e : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ . Setting T ′ = uint, Γ ` e : uint proves the
first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : uint,
and consider rule CALL in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : uint, together with the con-
clusions of Case 24 of Lemma 2, satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive
Γ ` c.f.value(e′)(e˜) : T2, which is the same as Γ ` E[e′] : T2.
• E = c.f.value(n)(v˜, E, e˜), and E[e] = c.f.value(n)(v˜, e, e˜). In this case Γ `
c.f.value(n)(v˜, e, e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 24 of Lemma 2,
∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` c : C, Γ `
n : uint, and Γ ` c.f.value(n)(v{0≤j<i}j , ei, e{i<j≤m}j ) : T˜ . Setting T ′ = Ti,
Γ ` ei : Ti proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression
such that Γ ` e′ : Ti, and consider rule CALL in Section 6.3: we know Γ `
e′ : Ti, and hence we can replace ei in v
{0≤j<i}
j , ei, e
{i<j≤m}
j with e
′, in such
a way that we obtain Γ ` v{0≤j<i}j , e′, e{i<j≤m}j : T˜ . This, together with the
other conclusions of Case 24 of Lemma 2, satisfy the premises of CALL, and
thus we can derive Γ ` c.f.value(n)(v{0≤j<i}j , e′, e{i<j≤m}j ) : T2, which is the
same as Γ ` E[e′] : T2.
• E = E.value(e1)(e˜), and E[e] = e.value(e1)(e˜). In this case
Γ ` e.value(e1)(e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 25 of Lemma 2,
∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e : T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e1 : uint, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ .
Setting T ′ = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` e : T˜1 → T2 proves the first conclusion of this
lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T˜1 → T2, and consider
rule CALLVALUE in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : T˜1 → T2, together with the con-
clusions of Case 25 of Lemma 2, satisfy its premises, and thus we can derive
Γ ` e′.value(e1)(e˜) : T2, which is the same as Γ ` E[e′] : T2.
• The cases with E = E′.f.value(e1).sender(e2)(e˜),
E = c.f.value(E′).sender(e1)(e˜), and E = E.a.value(c).sender(n)(v˜, E′, e˜)
are the same as discussed above for call. The only difference relies on the ad-
ditional hypothesis about the sender. For what concerns these three cases, the
sender’s expression (respectively e2, e1 and a) is just an hypothesis used to de-
rive the second conclusion of this lemma. The remaining case, where the sender
is actually the target expression, is discussed below.
• E = c.f.value(n).sender(E′)(e˜), and E[e] = c.f.value(n).sender(e)(e˜). In
this case Γ ` c.f.value(n).sender(E)(e˜) : T can be derived by hypothesis. By
Case 26 of Lemma 2, ∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2,
Γ ` c : C, Γ ` n : uint, Γ ` e : address, and Γ ` e˜ : T˜ . Setting T ′ =
address, Γ ` e : address proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be
any expression such that Γ ` e′ : address, and consider rule CALLTOPLEVEL
in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : address satisfies its first premise. The second one refers
back to CALL, whose premises are satisfied by the conclusions of Case 24 of
Lemma 2. Hence, we can derive Γ ` c.f.value(n).sender(e)(e˜) : T2.
• E = (T1 x = E′; e1), and E[e] = (T1 x = e; e1). In this case Γ ` T1 x =
e; e1 : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 19 of Lemma 2, Γ ` e : T1 and
Γ, x : T1 ` e1 : T . Setting T ′ = T1, Γ ` e : T1 proves the first conclusion of
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this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T1, and consider rule
DECL in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : T1 and Γ, x : T1 ` e1 : T satisfy its premises, and
thus we can derive Γ ` T1 x = e′; e1 : T , which is what we wanted to prove,
since (T1 x = E; e1)[e′] = T1 x = e′; e1
• E = (x = E′), and E[e] = (x = e). In this case Γ ` x = e : T can be
derived by hypothesis. By Case 20 of Lemma 2, Γ ` x : T and Γ ` e : T .
Setting T ′ = T , Γ ` e : T proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′
be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T , and consider rule ASS in Section 6.3:
its premises are satisfied by Γ ` x : T and Γ ` e′ : T ; we can then derive
Γ ` x = e′ : T , which is what we aimed to prove since (x = E′)[e′] = (x = e′).
• E = (E′.s = e1), and E[e] = (e.s = e1). In this case Γ ` e.s = e1 : T can
be derived by hypothesis. By Case 21 of Lemma 2, Γ ` e : C, Γ ` e.s : T , and
Γ ` e1 : T . Setting T ′ = C, Γ ` e : C proves the first conclusion of this lemma.
Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : C, and consider rule STATEASS
in Section 6.3. The second premise is satisfied by Γ ` e1 : T ; the first one
is also satisfied, since Γ ` e′ : C makes it possible to derive Γ ` e′.s : T .
Hence, we can derive Γ ` e′.s = e1 : T , which is what we aimed to prove since
(E.s = e1)[e
′] = (e′.s = e1).
• E = (c.s = E′), and E[e] = (c.s = e). In this case Γ ` c.s = e : T can be
derived by hypothesis. By Case 21 of Lemma 2, Γ ` c : C, Γ ` c.s : T , and
Γ ` e : T . Setting T ′ = T , Γ ` e : T proves the first conclusion of this lemma.
Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T , and consider rule STATEASS in
Section 6.3. The second premise is satisfied by Γ ` e′ : T , whereas the first one
is so by Γ ` c.s : T . Hence, we can derive Γ ` c.s = e′ : T , which is what we
aimed to prove since (c.s = E)[e′] = (c.s = e′).
• E = E′[e1], and E[e] = e[e1]. In this case Γ ` e[e1] : T can be derived
by hypothesis. By Case 22 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that T = T2, Γ `
e : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and Γ ` e1 : T1. Setting T ′ = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `
e : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any
expression such that Γ ` e′ : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and consider rule MAPPSEL
in Section 6.3. The first premise is satisfied by Γ ` e′ : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2),
whereas the second one is so by Γ ` e1 : T1. Hence, we can derive Γ `
e′[e1] : T2, which is what we aimed to prove since (E[e1])[e′] = e′[e1].
• E = M [E′], and E[e] = M [e]. In this case Γ ` M [e] : T can be de-
rived by hypothesis. By Case 22 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that T = T2,
Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and Γ ` e : T1. Setting T ′ = T1, Γ ` e : T1
proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that
Γ ` e′ : T1, and consider rule MAPPSEL in Section 6.3. The first premise is
satisfied by Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), whereas the second one is so by
Γ ` e′ : T1. Hence, we can derive Γ ` M [e′] : T2, which is what we aimed to
prove since (M [E])[e′] = M [e′].
• E = E′[e1 → e2], and E[e] = e[e1 → e2]. In this case Γ ` e[e1 → e2] : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 23 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that T =
mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e1 : T1, and Γ `
e2 : T2. Setting T ′ = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ `
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e′ : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and consider rule MAPPASS in Section 6.3. The first
premise is satisfied by Γ ` e′ : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), whereas the others are is so
by Case 23 of Lemma 2. Hence, we can derive Γ ` e′[e1 → e2] : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), which is what we aimed to prove since (E[e1 → e2])[e′] = e′[e1 → e2].
• E = M [e → e1], and E[e] = M [e → e1]. In this case Γ ` M [e → e1] : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 23 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that T =
mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` e : T1, and Γ ` e1 : T2.
Setting T ′ = T1, Γ ` e : T1 proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be
any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T1, and consider rule MAPPASS in Section 6.3.
The second premise is satisfied by Γ ` e′ : T1, whereas the others are is so by
Case 23 of Lemma 2. Hence, we can derive Γ ` M [e′ → e1] : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), which is what we aimed to prove since (M [E → e1])[e′] = M [e′ → e1].
• E = M [v → e], and E[e] = M [v → e]. In this case Γ ` M [v → e′] : T
can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 23 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that T =
mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` v : T1, and Γ ` e : T2.
Setting T ′ = T2, Γ ` e : T2 proves the first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be
any expression such that Γ ` e′ : T2, and consider rule MAPPASS in Section 6.3.
The third premise is satisfied by Γ ` e′ : T2, whereas the others are is so by
Case 23 of Lemma 2. Hence, we can derive Γ ` M [v → e′] : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), which is what we aimed to prove since (M [v → E])[e′] = M [v → e′].
• E = if E′ then e2 else e3, and E[e] = if e then e2 else e3. In this case Γ `
if e then e2 else e3 : T can be derived by hypothesis. By Case 27 of Lemma 2,
Γ ` e : bool and Γ ` e2, e3 : T . Setting T ′ = bool, Γ ` e : bool proves the
first conclusion of this lemma. Let e′ be any expression such that Γ ` e′ : bool,
and consider rule IF in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : bool and Γ ` e2, e3 : T satisfy its
premises, and thus we can derive Γ ` if e′ then e2 else e3 : T , which is what we
aimed to prove since (if E then e2 else e3)[e′] = if e′ then e2 else e3
• E = returnE′, andE[e] = return e. In this case Γ ` return e : T can be derived
by hypothesis. By Case 13 of Lemma 2, Γ ` e : T can be derived, which is part
of what we aimed to prove (setting T ′ = T ). Let e′ be any expression such that
Γ ` e′ : T , and consider rule RETURN in Section 6.3: Γ ` e′ : T satisfies its
premise, and thus we can derive Γ ` e′ : T , which is what we aimed to prove
since (returnE)[e′] = return e′.
We can now prove Theorem 4:
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction).
If Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T with 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then ∃∆ such that Γ′ = Γ · ∆ and
Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T .
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the height of the derivation of one re-
duction step 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e′〉.
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 5.5, where the height of
the derivation corresponding to the computational step is 0.
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• IF-TRUE. In this case 〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e1〉. By hypoth-
esis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURA-
TION in Section 6.3, Γ ` if true then e1 else e2 : T , and by Case 27 of Lemma 2
we know Γ ` e1 : T , which makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T , since β and
σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
• IF-FALSE. This case is dual to IF-TRUE.
• SEQ-C. In this case 〈β, σ, v; e1〉 −→ 〈β, β, e1〉. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, v; e1〉 : T .
This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` v; e1 : T , and
by Case 18 of Lemma 2 we know Γ ` e1 : T , which makes it derivable
Γ′ ` 〈β, β, e1〉 : T , since β is well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
• SEQ-R. In this case 〈β, σ, revert; e1〉 −→ 〈β0, σ, revert〉, where σ = β0. By
hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, revert; e1〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 6.3, Γ ` σ (and consequently Γ ` β0). Hence, bearing in mind
that revert is well-typed regardless of the actual T (as stated by rule REVERT in
Section 6.3), we have Γ ` revert : T , which implies Γ′ ` 〈β0, σ, revert〉 : T ,
since σ = β0 is well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
• SEQ. In this case 〈β, σ, v; e1〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e1〉, where Top(σ) = a. By hypothesis,
Γ ` 〈β, σ, v; e1〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3,
Γ ` v; e1 : T , and by Case 18 of Lemma 2 we know Γ ` e1 : T , which makes it
derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting
∆ = ∅.
• STATESEL. In this case 〈β, σ, c.s〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉, where β(c) = (C, s˜:v, n) and
s ∈ s˜. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.s〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGU-
RATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` c.s : T . Furthermore, v has same type T ; that is
Γ ` v : T . Hence, Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, v〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis
and ∆ = ∅.
• DECL. In this case 〈β, σ, T1 x = v; e1〉 −→ 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v; e1〉, where
x /∈ dom(β). By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, T x = v; e1〉 : T2. This implies, by
rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` T x = v; e1 : T2, and by Case 19
of Lemma 2 we know Γ ` e1 : T2 and Γ ` v : T1. Let ∆ = x : T1 and
Γ′ = Γ · ∆, and consider Γ′ ` β · [x 7→ v]. Rule VARIABLE requires Γ′ ` β,
which is derivable by applying Lemma 10 to the hypothesis Γ ` β, x /∈ dom(β),
which is true by hypothesis of DECL, Γ′ ` x : T1, and Γ′ ` v : T1. The former
is true by rule VAR in Section 6.3, since ∆ = x : T1. The latter is true by
Lemma 12 applied to Γ ` v : T1. Hence, by rule VARIABLE, Γ′ ` β · [x 7→ v]
is true. Furthermore, by Lemma 11, given Γ ` σ we know that also Γ′ ` σ can
be derived. Hence, by rule CONFIGURATION, we can derive Γ′ ` 〈β · [x 7→
v], σ, v; e1〉 : T2, which is what we wanted to prove.
• VAR. In this case 〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, x〉 : T .
This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` x : T , and by Case 10
of Lemma 2 x : T ∈ Γ. By rule VARIABLE, each value v pointed to by a variable
identifier x has the same type of x itself. This means that Γ ` β(x) : T . Hence,
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, β(x)〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis and setting
∆ = ∅.
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• BALANCE. In this case 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉, where β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n).
By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURA-
TION in Section 6.3, Γ ` balance(a) : T , and by Case 11 of Lemma 2 we know
T = uint and Γ ` a : address. From rule CONTRACT in Section 6.3 follows
Γ ` n : uint, which makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, n〉 : uint, since β and σ are
well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
• ADDRESS. In this case 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉, where βˆ(c) = a. By
hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 6.3, Γ ` address(c) : T , and by Case 12 of Lemma 2 we know
T = address and Γ ` c : C. We defined βˆ(c) = a if (c, a) ∈ dom(β). Γ ` β
implies, by rule CONTRACT in Section 6.3, that every pair (c, a) ∈ dom(β) is
well-formed, and hence, by Lemma 13, Γ ` a : address. From this follows
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, a〉 : address, since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting
∆ = ∅.
• ASS. In this case 〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→ v], σ, v〉, where x ∈ dom(β).
By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, x = v〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 6.3, Γ ` x = v : T , and by Case 20 of Lemma 2, Γ ` x : T
and Γ ` v : T . Provided that the type of x and v is T , β remains well-typed.
In fact VARIABLE (Section 6.3) applies and makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β[x 7→
v], σ, v〉 : T , setting ∆ = ∅.
• STATEASS In this case 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 −→ 〈β[c.s 7→ v′], σ, v′〉, where β(c) =
(C, s˜:v, n) and s ∈ s˜. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 : T . This implies,
by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` c.s = v′ : T , and by Case 21 of
Lemma 2 we know Γ ` c.s : T and Γ ` v′ : T . Provided that the type of c.s
and v′ is T , β remains well-typed. CONTRACT (Section 6.3) applies and makes
it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 : T , setting ∆ = ∅.
• MAPPSEL. In this case 〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉. By hypothesis, Γ `
〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ `
M [v1] : T , and by Case 22 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), T = T2, and Γ ` v1 : T1. Since a mapping is a total function T1 → T2,
M [v1] is always well-defined and has type T2, that is Γ′ ` 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉 : T2,
where β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis and ∆ = ∅.
• MAPPASS. In this case 〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉, where M ′ =
M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪ {(v1, v2)}. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 : T .
This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` M [v1 → v2] : T ,
and by Case 23 of Lemma 2, ∃T1, T2 such that Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2),
T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` v1 : T1, and Γ ` v2 : T2. Looking at M ′, we note
it is obtained from M substituting the pair (v1,M(v1)) with (v1, v2). The types
of both v1 and v2 are correct with respect to mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and so we can
derive Γ′ ` 〈β, σ,M ′〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), since β and σ are well-typed by
hypothesis and ∆ = ∅.
• NEW-1. In this case 〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) ·
[(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where (c, a) /∈ dom(β), sv(C) = T˜ s, and |v˜| =
|s˜|. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 : T . This implies, by rule
CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` new C.value(n)(v˜) : T , and by Case 16
of Lemma 2 we know T = C, Γ ` n : uint, and Γ ` v˜ : T˜ . Let ∆ =
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c : C, a : address and Γ′ = Γ ·∆, and consider Γ′ ` β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)].
Rule CONTRACT requires Γ′ ` β, which is derivable by applying Lemma 10 to
the hypothesis Γ ` β, (c, a) /∈ dom(β), which is true by hypothesis of NEW-
1, Γ′ ` c : C, Γ′ ` a : address, Γ′ ` v˜ : T˜ (where sv(C) = T˜ s), and
Γ′ ` n : uint. Γ′ ` c : C and Γ′ ` a : address() are derivable by rules
REF and ADDRESS, respectively. Γ′ ` v˜ : T˜ and Γ′ ` n : uint are, on the
other hand, derivable by Lemma 10 applied to the hypotheses Γ ` n : uint and
Γ ` v˜ : T˜ . Furthermore, uptbal only modifies β incrementing or decrementing
the balance n, thus preserving its well-formedness. We can here suppose that
such operation is successful, since the case where uptbal returns ⊥ is dealt with
by NEW-R (see below). Hence, by rule CONTRACT in Section 6.3 it follows
Γ′ ` uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]. By Lemma 11, given
Γ ` σ also Γ′ ` σ is true. This makes it derivable, by rule CONFIGURATION,
Γ′ ` 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉 : C, which is what
we wanted to prove.
• NEW-2. This case is very similar to NEW-1, with the only difference that no
balance updates are made on β.
• NEW-R. In this case 〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, with
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥. By rule REVERT in Section 6.3 Γ ` revert : T ,
which implies Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, revert〉 : T , where β and σ are well-typed by hypoth-
esis and ∆ = ∅.
• CALL. In this case 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,
msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉, where βˆ(c) = a, βC(c) = C,
fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e), (xi, a)xi∈x˜ /∈ dom(β), and
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→ vi xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜]. By hypoth-
esis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURA-
TION in Section 6.3, Γ ` c.f.value(n)(v˜) : T , and by Case 24 of Lemma 2
∃T˜1, T2 such that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` c : C,
Γ ` n : uint, and Γ ` v˜ : T˜1. Since βˆ(c) = a is well-defined by hypothe-
sis, ∃(c, a) ∈ dom(β) such that Γ ` a : address: from it follows Γ ` σ · a.
Also note that Γ ` σ ⇒ Γ ` Top(σ) : address, where Top(σ) 6= ∅ (otherwise
CALLTOPLEVEL would apply). From rule F OK IN C (Section 6.3) we know
this : C,msg.sender : address,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T2. By Lemma 5,
considering the judgments Γ ` c : C, Γ ` Top(σ) : address, and Γ ` n : uint
(which we have already proven as true), follows Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender :=
Top(σ),msg.value := n} : T2. The last thing we have to deal with is β′. First,
as we already pointed out, uptbal only modifies the balances via arithmetical
operations, thus preserving the well-formedness of β. Again, we can suppose
that such operation is successful, since the case where uptbal returns ⊥ is dealt
with by CALL-R (see below). Secondly, we append to β a list of fresh pairs of
local variables, together with the address of the contract identifying the invoked
function. From Γ ` v˜ : T˜1 follows that each value vi has the same type of the for-
mal parameter xi it refers to, and we have already proven Γ ` Top(σ) : address.
Hence, by rule VARIABLE in Section 6.3, Γ ` β′, and we can finally derive
Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉 : T2,
where ∆ = ∅.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender :=
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a′,msg.value := n}; e′〉, where βˆ(c) = a, βC(c) = C, fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e),
(xi, a)
xi∈x˜ /∈ dom(β), and
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→ vi xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜]. This case is
very similar to CALL, the only difference relying on the sender, which is here ex-
plicitly set to a′ (since Top(σ) = ∅). We shall prove only the correctness of such
sender, referring to the previous case for the rest of the proof. By hypothesis,
Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGU-
RATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′ : T , and by Case 26
of Lemma 2, Γ ` a′ : address. Setting ∆ = ∅, we obtain Γ′ ` a′ : address. The
proof is now the same as before, using a′ instead of Top(σ).
• CALL-R. This case is the same as NEW-R:
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, with
uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥. By rule REVERT in Section 6.3 Γ ` revert : T ,
which implies Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, revert〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis
and ∆ = ∅.
• CALLTOPLEVEL-R. This case is the same as CALL-R.
• TRANSFER. This case is the same as CALL, the only difference relying on the
absence of formal parameters. Furthermore, the return type is unit. Hence, β′
is well-formed for what we said before, and so are σ · Top(σ) and e{this :=
c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}. Also note that Top(σ) 6= ∅, and
hence using it to enlarge σ and to form β′ is safe.
• TRANSFER-R. This case is the same as CALL-R.
• RETURN. In this case 〈β, σ · a, return v〉 −→ 〈β, σ, v〉. Γ ` σ · a ⇒ Γ ` σ by
rule CALLSTACK in Section 6.3. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, return v〉 : T ; this
implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` return v : T . Hence, by
Case 13 of Lemma 2, Γ ` v : T and we can derive Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, v〉 : T , where
∆ = ∅.
• RETURN-R. In this case 〈β, σ · a, return revert〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉. By rule
CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` revert : T is derivable, and by Case 5 of
lemma 2, we obtain Γ ` revert : T . Furthermore β and σ are well-typed for what
we previously said for RETURN, and thus we can derive Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, revert〉 : T ,
where ∆ = ∅.
• CONTRRETR. In this case 〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉, where βC(a) = C and
βˆ(a) = c. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, C(a)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIG-
URATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` C(a) : T , and by Case 17 of Lemma 2 we know
T = C and Γ ` a : address. Since βˆ(a) = c is well-defined by hypothesis,
∃(c, a) ∈ dom(β), and since Γ ` β we get Γ ` c : C. Hence, Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, c〉 : C,
considering that also σ is well-typed by hypothesis and setting ∆ = ∅.
• CONTRRETR-R. In this case 〈β, σ, C(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, where βC(a) = C ′
and C ′ 6= C. By rule REVERT in Section 6.3 Γ ` revert : T , which implies
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, revert〉 : T , where β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting
∆ = ∅.
• REVERT. In this case 〈β, σ,E[revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉. Whatever E is, by
rule REVERT in Section 6.3 Γ ` revert : T . Hence, Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, revert〉 : T ,
where β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
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Inductive case This case takes into account only rule CONG, the sole computational
rule of our semantics. In this case 〈β, σ,E[e]〉 −→k+1 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉. The height of
the derivation making this step possible is k+ 1, and its last judgment is 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k
〈β′, σ′, e′〉. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ,E[e]〉 : T . To apply the inductive hypothesis
we need to prove that, given a T ′, Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T ′. We do so using Lemma 14,
whose hypothesis is satisfied by the hypotheses of this theorem. Hence, ∃T ′ such that
Γ ` e : T ′ and ∀e′ such that Γ ` e′ : T ′ we have Γ ` E[e′] : T . The former is enough
to prove Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T ′, since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis (i.e. Γ ` β and
Γ ` σ). Bearing in mind that the premise of CONG states 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k 〈β′, σ′, e′〉,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to conclude Γ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T ′. This implies,
by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 6.3, Γ ` e′ : T ′. We now make use of the
latter conclusion of Lemma 14: Γ ` e′ : T ′ ⇒ Γ ` E[e′] : T ′. Consequently,
Γ ` 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉 : T , which is what we aimed to prove.
E.6 Type Safety Theorem for FS configurations
We recall the theorem of type safety for FS configurations:
Theorem 1 (Type safety for configurations).
If Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T , 〈β, β, e〉 is closed, and ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, β, e〉 −→∗
〈β′, σ′, e′〉, with 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 6−→, then either e′ = v, where v is a value, or e′ = revert.
Proof. Let β′, σ′, e′ be such that 〈β, β, e〉 −→∗ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉, with 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 6−→. The
theorem states e′ is either a value v or revert. From Γ ` 〈β, β, e〉 : T and Theorem 4
it follows Γ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T . Now, by Theorem 3 we have three cases: e′ is either a
value, revert, or ∃β′′, σ′′, e′′ such that 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 −→ 〈β′′, σ′′, e′′〉, but we assumed e′
such that e′ 6−→. Hence, the third case does not apply and we conclude that e′ is either
a value v or revert.
E.7 Type Safety Theorem for FS programs
We recall Theorem 2:
Theorem 2 (Type safety for programs).
Let P = (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) be an FS program. If Γ ` (CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) : T , P
is closed, and ∃(β′, e′) such that 〈β, e1; . . . ; en〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉, with 〈β′, e′〉 6=⇒, then
either e′ = v or e′ = revert.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on n.
Base case In this case n = 1, and the program is (CT, β, e1). By hypothesis
Γ ` (CT, β, e1) : T and by rule PROGRAM in Section 6.3 we know Γ ` 〈β, β, e1〉 : T .
By hypothesis we also know that 〈β, e1〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉, with 〈β′, e′〉 6=⇒. Since there
are no other expression to evaluate after e1 (i.e. no sequential composition), only
SUCCESS and FAILURE (as defined in Figure 5.3) can be applied. This means that
we are to evaluate e1 according to the rules defined in Section 5.5, thus obtaining
〈β, β, e1〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β, e′〉, where 〈β′, β, e′〉 6−→. Two things are worth to be pointed
out. First, the evaluation begins at the initial state 〈β, β, e1〉 because e1 is the first
expression in e1; . . . ; en. Secondly, the evaluation of e1 “creates” the blockchain β′,
which is not copied over the second component (σ) of the final configuration. This
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happens because, in this case, we do not consider any sequential compositions after e1,
and thus the rules committing or discarding the changes to the blockchain (i.e. SEQ-C
and SEQ-R in Section 5.5) do not apply. By Lemma 1, (CT, β, e1) closed implies
〈β, β, e1〉 closed. Hence, by Theorem 1, e′ is either a value v or revert. We analyze the
two cases separately:
• if e′ = v then, by rule SUCCESS in Figure 5.3, 〈β, e1〉 =⇒ 〈β′, v〉.
• if e′ = revert then, by rule FAILURE in Figure 5.3, 〈β, e1〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉.
Inductive case We assume the property true for the sequence e1; . . . ; ei−1 and are
to prove it for ei. The sequence we are taking into account is thus e1; . . . ; ei−1; ei.
We are considering a subset of the initial tuple of expressions without reducing either
β or CT . Hence, the hypothesis of closedness for P remains valid. By inductive
hypothesis, if ∃β′, e′ such that 〈β, e1; . . . ; ei−1〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′〉 and 〈β′, e′〉 6=⇒, then
either e′ = v′ or e′ = revert. Hence, applying this to the bigger picture including ei
leads to 〈β, e1; . . . ; ei−1; ei〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, e′; ei〉. We make a distinction according to the
actual e′:
• if e′ = v′ we have 〈β, e1; . . . ; ei−1〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, v′〉. By rule COMMIT in Fig-
ure 5.3, 〈β, e1; . . . ; ei−1; ei〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, ei〉, and we are to evaluate ei on β′. Pro-
vided that no reverts have been thrown, evaluating ei on β′ (i.e. 〈β′, ei〉) is equiv-
alent to evaluating e1; . . . ; ei starting from the blockchain β. Hence, we consider
the sequence e1; . . . ; ei, and reason about the configuration
〈β, β, e1; . . . ; ei〉. By hypothesis we know that e1; . . . ; en is well-typed (Γ `
(CT, β, e1; . . . ; en) : T ), and so is e1; . . . ; ei, since it is a subset of the orig-
inal sequence: Γ ` β : (CT, β, e1; . . . ; ei) : T . Furthermore, we know that
e1; . . . ; ei evaluates to something: 〈β, e1; . . . ; ei〉 =⇒∗ 〈β′, ei〉 by induction hy-
pothesis and rule COMMIT in Figure 5.3. The application of COMMIT implies
the application of SUCCESS, which in turns evaluates the expressions using the
rules defined in Section 5.5; that is 〈β, β, e1; . . . ; ei−1; ei〉 −→∗ 〈β′, β′, ei〉. Let
β′′, e′′ be such that 〈β′, β′, ei〉 −→∗ 〈β′′, β′, e′′〉, and thus 〈β, β, e1; . . . ; ei−1; ei〉
−→∗ 〈β′′, β′, e′′〉, where 〈β′′, β′, e′′〉 6−→. Again, note that changes of β′′ are
not copied over β′ since no top-level sequential composition follows ei. By
Lemma 1, (CT, β, e1; . . . ; ei) closed implies 〈β, β, e1; . . . ; ei〉 closed. By The-
orem 1, e′′ is either a value v′′ or revert. In the former case, by rule SUCCESS in
Figure 5.3, 〈β′, ei〉 =⇒ 〈β′′, v′′〉. In the latter, by rule FAILURE in Figure 5.3,
〈β′, ei〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉.
• Let j < i be such that ej is the first expression in e1; . . . ; ei−1 throwing revert.
We make a distinction based on the actual value of j:
– if j = i− 1 then the first expression throwing revert was ei−1. In this case,
β′ is the blockchain containing all the changes made by e1; . . . ; ei−2 (pos-
sibly ∅), and we know that 〈β′, ei−1〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉. By rule ABORT in
Figure 5.3, if 〈β′, ei−1〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉 then 〈β′, ei−1; ei〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉,
without even evaluating ei.
– if j < i − 1 then an expression in the middle of the smaller sequence
(e1; . . . ; ei−1) threw revert. In this case, β′ is the blockchain contain-
ing all the changes made by e1; . . . ; ej−1 (possibly ∅), and we know that
〈β′, ej〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉. By rule ABORT in Figure 5.3, if 〈β′, ej〉 =⇒
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〈β′, revert〉 then 〈β′, ej ; ej+1〉 =⇒ 〈β′, revert〉, without even evaluating
ej+1; . . . ; ei−1; ei.
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Appendix F
Proving the safety of FS+
In this section we prove Lemmas of Permutation (Lemma 3), Weakening (Lemma 4),
and Substitution (Lemma 9), and Theorems of Progress (Theorem 3), Subject Reduc-
tion (Theorem 4), and Safety for configurations (Theorem 1) and programs (Theo-
rem 2) in the context of the new type system described in Chapter 7. In addition, we
shall prove the Theorem of Cast Safety (Theorem 5) and Transfer Safety (Theorem 6).
In the proof that follows, we shall write Γ `k e : T and 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k 〈β′, σ′, e′〉
to indicate that the derivations of those judgments have height at most k.
F.1 Permutation Lemma
We recall Lemma 3:
Lemma 3 (Permutation).
If Γ ` e : T can be derived and ∆ is a permutation of Γ, then the judgment ∆ ` e : T
can be derived and the derivation has the same height of the previous one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` e : T . We shall rewrite the proof only for the rules in Section 7.4, that defines
the changes with respect to the rules in Section 6.3. All the cases not showed here are
as in Appendix E.1.
Base cases The only modified axiom is ADDRESS, whose derivation has height 1.
• ADDRESS. The judgment is Γ ` a : address〈C〉. Since it can be derived, by
Case 5 of Lemma 7 we know a : address〈C〉 ∈ Γ. Let ∆ be a permutation of
Γ. Hence, ∆ has exactly the same elements as Γ, but in a different order. This
means that a : address〈C〉 ∈ ∆, and that ∆ ` a : address〈C〉 can be derived.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from the judg-
ments Γ `k c : C and Γ `k this : C ′, together with the additional premises
ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 and C ′ <: fsender(C, f). By inductive hypothesis,
∆ `k c : C and ∆ `k this : C ′, where ∆ is a permutation of Γ, can be derived.
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Considering the judgment ∆ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2, we note that it can be derived
from ∆ `k c : C and ∆ `k this : C ′, since the other two premises are still valid.
• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived from
the judgments Γ `k k˜ : T ′1 and Γ `k v˜ : T ′2, where T ′1 <: T1 and T ′2 <: T2. By
inductive hypothesis, also the judgments ∆ `k k˜ : T ′1 and ∆ `k v˜ : T ′2, where ∆
is a permutation of Γ, are derivable. Hence, by applying MAPPING to the latter
two judgments and the two additional premises, ∆ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2).
• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ `k
e : address〈C〉. By inductive hypothesis, also the judgment ∆ `k e : address〈C〉,
where ∆ is a permutation of Γ. Hence, by applying BAL to it we obtain ∆ `k+1
balance(e) : uint.
• ADDR. This case is very similar to BAL: J = Γ `k+1 address(e) : address〈C〉
was derived from Γ `k e : C. By inductive hypothesis, also the judgment
∆ `k e : C, where ∆ is a permutation of Γ, is derivable. Hence, by applying
ADDR to it we obtain ∆ `k+1 addresse : address〈C〉.
• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1 : bool, Γ `k e2 : T1, and Γ `k e3 : T2, where T1 <: T and T2 <: T . By
inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆ of Γ, the judgments ∆ `k e1 : bool,
∆ `k e2 : T1, and ∆ `k e3 : T2 can be derived. By applying IF to them we
obtain ∆ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e2 : T .
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : T
′
1, where T
′
1 <: T1, and Γ, x : T1 `k e2 : T2. The derivations of the
latter judgments have height k. Let Γ′ = Γ, x : T1, ∆ be a permutation of Γ,
and ∆′ be a permutation of Γ′; by inductive hypothesis we can derive ∆ `k
e1 : T
′
1. Nonetheless, we cannot directly apply the inductive hypothesis on
Γ′ `k e2 : T2, since we have Γ′ 6= Γ. Still, we know that there exists a derivation,
of height k, for this judgment. (Otherwise J would not be derivable, but this is a
contradiction, since we assumed J has a valid derivation of height k+1.) Hence,
it comes from another judgment J ′ having a derivation of height k−1 where any
of the type rules we have defined was applied as a last step. We can now apply
the inductive hypothesis on J ′ considering ∆′ as a permutation, concluding that
∆′ `k e2 : T2 is derivable. Lastly, applying DECL to ∆ `k e1 : T ′1 and ∆′ `k
e2 : T2, together with the other premise, we obtain ∆ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k e2 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1. By inductive
hypothesis, the judgments ∆ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and ∆ `k e2 : T ′1 can
be derived. Hence, applying MAPPSEL the them we obtain ∆ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ `k x : T and
Γ `k e : T ′, where T ′ <: T . By inductive hypothesis, given a permutation ∆
of Γ, we know we can derive both ∆ `k x : T and ∆ `k e : T ′. Hence, by
applying ASS to them we can derive ∆ `k+1 x = e : T .
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was
derived from Γ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k e2 : T ′1, and Γ `k e3 : T ′2,
where T ′1 <: T1 and T
′
2 <: T2. By inductive hypothesis, given a permutation
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∆ of Γ, we can derive ∆ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), ∆ `k e2 : T ′1, and
∆ `k e3 : T ′2. By the application of MAPPASS we obtain ∆ `k+1 e1[e2 →
e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• STATEASS. This case is very similar to ASS: J = Γ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T was
derived from Γ `k e1.s : T and Γ `k e2 : T ′, with T ′ <: T . By inductive
hypothesis, given a permutation ∆ of Γ, we know we can derive both ∆ `k
e1.s : T and ∆ `k e2 : T ′. Hence, by applying STATEASS to them we can
derive ∆ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T .
• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C was derived from
Γ `k e˜ : T˜ ′, with T˜ ′ <: T˜ , and Γ `k e′ : uint, together with the additional
premise |e˜| = |s˜|, where sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive hypothesis, we know that,
given a permutation ∆ of Γ, we can derive both ∆ `k e˜ : T˜ ′ and ∆ `k e′ : uint.
Provided that the additional premise checking the length of the tuples e˜ and s˜ is
still valid, we can apply NEW to obtain ∆ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 D(e) : D was derived from Γ `k
e : address〈C〉. By inductive hypothesis ∆ `k e : address〈C〉 is derivable,
where ∆ is a permutation of Γ. Considering ∆ ` D(e) : D, notice it can be
derived from ∆ `k e : address〈C〉 applying CONTRRETR, and its derivation has
height k + 1.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived
from Γ `k e1 : address〈C〉, Γ `k this : C ′, and Γ `k e2 : uint, together
with the additional premise ensuring the definition of the fallback function in
C (ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit) and checking the required type for the sender
(C ′ <: fsender(C, fb)). By inductive hypothesis, considering a permutation ∆
of Γ, we can derive ∆ `k e1 : address〈C〉, ∆ `k this : C ′, and ∆ `k e2 : uint.
Lastly, we can apply TRANSFER to them to obtain ∆ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, Γ `k this : C ′, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, together
with the additional premises checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|),
the required type for the sender (C ′ <: fsender(C, f)), and the type of f in C
(ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2). By inductive hypothesis on the four judgments of
height k, and given a permutation ∆ of Γ, also the following judgments can be
derived: ∆ `k e : C, ∆ `k e2 : uint, ∆ `k this : C ′, and ∆ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1.
Applying CALL we derive ∆ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
was derived from Γ `k e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, Γ `k e3 : address〈C′〉, and
Γ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, together with the additional premises checking the length of the
tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|), the required type for the sender (C ′ <: fsender(C, f)), and
the type of f in C (ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2). By inductive hypothesis on the
four judgments of height k, and given a permutation ∆ of Γ, also the following
judgments can be derived: ∆ `k e : C, ∆ `k e2 : uint, ∆ `k e3 : address〈C′〉,
and ∆ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1. We then apply CALLTOPLEVEL and obtain a derivation of
∆ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, where T˜ ′1 <: T˜1,
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together with the premise checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|). By
inductive hypothesis on the three judgments of height k, and given a permutation
∆ of Γ, also the following judgments can be derived: ∆ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2,
∆ `k e2 : uint, and ∆ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1. Applying CALLVALUE we derive ∆ `k+1
e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
F.2 Weakening Lemma
As said in Appendix E.2, Weakening Lemma is formalized over FS configurations
〈β, σ, e〉. To prove it, we shall first prove the validity of the same Lemma on the
projections on β (Lemma 10), σ (Lemma 11), and e (Lemma 12). In the proof that
follow, let Γ′ = Γ ·∆.
F.2.1 Weakening of β
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the first component of
〈β, σ, e〉: β.
Lemma 10 (Weakening of β).
Let Γ ` β be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ ·∆ ` β can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` β.
Base case This case corresponds to the axiom EMPTYBLOCKCHAIN in Section 7.4.
The height of the derivation is 1, and β = ∅, that is Γ `1 ∅. ∅ is well-formed regardless
of Γ, and hence it is also true Γ′ `1 ∅.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• VARIABLE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 β · [x 7→ v] was derived from Γ `k β,
Γ `k x : T , and Γ `k v : T ′, where x /∈ dom(β) and T ′ <: T . By inductive
hypothesis, also the judgments Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k x : T , and Γ′ `k v : T ′ are
derivable. Applying VARIABLE we can thus derive Γ′ `k+1 β · [x 7→ v], which
is what we wanted to prove.
• CONTRACT. In this case J = Γ `k+1 β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)] was derived
from Γ `k β, Γ `k c : C, Γ `k a : address, Γ `k n : uint, and Γ `k v˜ : T˜ ′,
where (c, a) /∈ dom(β), sv(C) = T˜ s, and T˜ ′ <: T˜ . By inductive hypothesis,
also the judgments Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k c : C, Γ′ `k a : address, Γ′ `k n : uint, and
Γ′ `k v˜ : T˜ ′ are derivable. Applying CONTRACT we can thus derive Γ′ `k+1
β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], which is what we wanted to prove.
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F.2.2 Weakening of σ
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the second component of
〈β, σ, e〉: σ.
Lemma 11 (Weakening of σ).
Let Γ ` σ be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ ·∆ ` σ can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` σ.
Base case Rule CALLSTACK in Section 7.4 has, as a base case, the well-formedness
of β, proven by Lemma 10.
Inductive case Let the judgment Γ ` σ · a have height k+ 1. We assume the lemma
for the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height at most
k + 1.
Γ `k+1 σ · a was derived from Γ `k σ and Γ `k a : address〈C〉. By inductive hy-
pothesis we can derive Γ′ `k σ and Γ′ `k a : address〈C〉, and applying CALLSTACK
we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 σ · a.
F.2.3 Weakening of e
Here we prove the projection of the lemma of Weakening on the first component of
〈β, σ, e〉: e.
Lemma 12 (Weakening of e).
Let Γ ` e : T be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ)∩dom(∆) = ∅.
Then Γ·∆ ` e : T can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous
one.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the height of the derivation of the judg-
ment Γ ` e : T . We shall rewrite the proof only for the rules in Section 7.4, that defines
the changes with respect to the rules in Section 6.3. All the cases not showed here are
as in Appendix E.2.
Base cases The only modified axiom is ADDRESS, whose derivation has height 1.
• ADDRESS. The judgment is Γ ` a : address〈C〉. From Case 5 of Lemma 7 we
know that a : address〈C〉 ∈ Γ. We defined Γ′ as Γ ·∆, so a : address〈C〉 ∈ Γ⇒
a : address〈C〉 ∈ Γ′. Hence, Γ′ ` a : address〈C〉 is derivable.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from the judgment
Γ `k c : C with the premise ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2. Furthermore, Γ `k
this : C ′, where C ′ <: fsender(C, f). We can apply the inductive hypothesis to
say that Γ′ `k c : C and Γ `k this : C ′ are derivable. Provided that the premises
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ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2 and C ′ <: fsender(C, f) are still valid, applying FUN
we conclude that also Γ′ `k+1 c.f : T˜1 → T2 is derivable.
• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived from
Γ `k k˜ : T ′1 and Γ `k v˜ : T ′2, where T ′1 <: T1 and T ′2 <: T2. By induction
hypothesis, also Γ′ `k k˜ : T ′1 and Γ′ `k v˜ : T ′2 can be derived. Hence, applying
MAPPING we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ `k
e : address(C). By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e : address〈C〉 is derivable. We
then apply BAL to conclude that the judgment Γ′ `k+1 balance(e) : uint can be
derived.
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 address(e) : address〈C〉 was derived from
Γ `k e : C. By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e : C is derivable. We then apply
ADDR to conclude that the judgment Γ′ `k+1 address(e) : address〈C〉 can be
derived, too.
• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1 : bool, Γ `k e2 : T1, and Γ `k e3 : T2, with T1 <: T and T2 <: T . We
can thus apply the inductive hypothesis and say that Γ′ `k e1 : bool, Γ′ `k
e2 : T1, and Γ′ `k e3 : T2 are all derivable. We then apply IF to derive Γ′ `k+1
if e1 then e2 else e3 : T .
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : T
′
1, where T
′
1 <: T1, and Γ, x : T1 `k e2 : T2. On the former we can
apply the inductive hypothesis and say that Γ′ `k e1 : T ′1 is derivable. On the
contrary, we cannot apply the inductive hypothesis on the latter, since the context
is Γ, x : T1 and not Γ. Still, we know there exists a derivation of height k for
this judgment, otherwise J would not be derivable, but this is a contradiction,
since we assumed J has a valid derivation of height k+ 1. Hence, it comes from
another judgment J ′ having a derivation of height k − 1 where any of the type
rules was applied as a last step. We can now apply the inductive hypothesis on
J ′, considering Γ, x : T1 as a context and concluding that Γ, x : T1,∆ `k e2 : T2
is derivable. Lastly, applying DECL we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 T1 x =
e1; e2 : T2.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k e2 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1. By inductive
hypothesis also the judgments Γ′ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ′ `k e2 : T ′1
are derivable. Applying MAPPSEL we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ `k x : T and
Γ `k e : T ′, where T ′ <: T . By inductive hypothesis we can derive with the
same height also Γ′ `k x : T and Γ′ `k e : T ′, and applying ASS we obtain a
derivation of Γ′ `k+1 x = e : T .
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was
derived from Γ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k e2 : T ′1, and Γ `k e3 : T ′2,
where T ′1 <: T1 and T
′
2 <: T2. By inductive hypothesis we can derive with
the same height also Γ′ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ′ `k e2 : T ′1, and
Γ′ `k e3 : T ′2, and applying MAPPASS we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1
e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2).
190
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
• STATEASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T was derived from Γ `k
e1.s : T and Γ `k e2 : T ′, where T ′ <: T . By inductive hypothesis we can
derive with the same height also Γ′ `k e1.s : T and Γ′ `k e2 : T ′, and applying
STATEASS we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T .
• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C was derived from Γ `k
e˜ : T˜ ′, where T˜ ′ <: T˜ , and Γ `k e′ : uint, together with the premise |e˜| = |s˜|,
where sv(C) = T˜ s. By inductive hypothesis, Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ ′ and Γ′ `k e′ : uint
can be derived. Furthermore, the premise checking the length of e˜ and s˜ is still
valid, and we can apply NEW to derive Γ′ `k+1 new C.value(e′)(e˜) : C.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 D(e) : D was derived from Γ `k
e : address〈C〉, whereC <: D. By inductive hypothesis also Γ′ `k e : address〈C〉
is derivable; applying CONTRRETR we then obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1
D(e) : D.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived from
Γ `k e1 : address〈C〉, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k this : C ′. Furthermore,
ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit ensures that C defined a fallback, whereas C ′ <:
fsender(C, fb) ensures that the sender a run-time will be a subcontract of the
required one. By inductive hypothesis we can derive Γ′ `k e1 : address〈C〉,
Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k this : C ′. The other two premises are still valid, and
applying TRANSFER we obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, Γ `k e˜ : T˜1, where T˜1 <: T˜1, and Γ `k this : C ′,
together with the premises checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|), the
type of f in C (ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2), and the constraint on the sender’s type
(C ′ <: fsender(C, f)). By induction hypothesis we can derive Γ′ `k e1 : C,
Γ′ `k e2 : uint, Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1, and Γ `k this : C ′. Furthermore, the other
three premises are still valid, and thus we can apply CALL to derive Γ′ `k+1
e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2
was derived from Γ `k e1 : C, Γ `k e2 : uint, Γ `k e˜ : T˜1, where T˜1 <:
T˜1, and Γ `k e3 : address〈C′〉, where C ′ <: fsender(C, f), together with the
premises checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|), the type of f in C
(ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2). By induction hypothesis we can derive Γ′ `k e1 : C,
Γ′ `k e2 : uint, Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜1, and Γ `k e3 : address〈C′〉. Furthermore, the other
two premises are still valid, and thus we can apply CALLTOPLEVEL to derive
Γ′ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜) : T2.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k e2 : uint, and Γ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, where T˜ ′1 <: T˜1. There
is another premise, checking the length of the tuple e˜ (|e˜| = |T˜1|). By induction
hypothesis, the judgments Γ′ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1
are derivable. Furthermore, the other premise is still valid, and we can thus apply
CALLVALUE to obtain a derivation of Γ′ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2.
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F.2.4 Proof of the Lemma
We can now prove Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 (Weakening).
Let Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T be a derivable judgment, and let ∆ be such that dom(Γ) ∩
dom(∆) = ∅ (i.e. Γ and ∆ have no elements in common). Then Γ ·∆ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
can be derived and its derivation has the same height as the previous one.
Proof. By hypothesis Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e〉 : T : by rule CONFIGURATION this means that
also Γ `k β, Γ `k σ, and Γ `k e : T ′, where T ′ <: T are derivable. By, respectively,
Lemma 10, 11, and 12 we know that there exists a derivation for Γ′ `k β, Γ′ `k σ, and
Γ′ `k e : T ′. Hence, applying CONFIGURATION to the latter three judgments we can
derive Γ′ `k+1 〈β, σ, e〉 : T , which is what we wanted to prove.
F.3 Substitution Lemma
We recall Lemma 9:
Lemma 9 (Substitution).
If Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint ` e : T , Γ ` c : C ′,
Γ ` a : address〈D′〉, and Γ ` n : uint, with D′ <: D, then
Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value := n} : T .
Proof. Let Γ′ = Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint. We prove this
lemma by induction on the height of the judgment Γ′ ` e : T .
We shall make use of the following notation to make the proof more readable:
subst(e) = e{this := c,msg.sender := a,msg.value := n}
We shall use identifiers C, C ′, D, D′, and E to indicate contract names.
Base cases Only one case, corresponding to rule ADDRESS, has changed with respect
to Appendix E.3. The height of its derivation is 1.
• ADDRESS. In this case the judgment is
Γ′ ` a′ : address〈E〉, where a′ 6= msg.sender. In this case subst(a′) = a′. By
Case 5 of Lemma 7 we know a′ : address〈E〉 ∈ Γ′, and thus a′ : address〈E〉 ∈ Γ,
because Γ′ = Γ, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint, and
a′ 6= this, a′ 6= msg.sender, and a′ 6= msg.value. We are to prove Γ `
a′ : address〈E〉, which is true because a′ : address〈E〉 ∈ Γ.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the lemma for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k + 1. We
shall omit the unchanged cases with respect to Appendix E.3.
• FUN. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 d.f : T˜1 → T2 was derived from Γ′ `k d : E
and Γ′ `k this : C, with the additional premise stating C <: fsender(E, f). We
again have two sub-cases:
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– if d 6= this then, by Case 8 of Lemma 7 we obtain d : E ∈ Γ′. We supposed
d 6= this, but it is also true that d 6= msg.sender and d 6= msg.value. Hence,
d : E ∈ Γ′ ⇒ d : E ∈ Γ ⇒ Γ ` d : E. Furthermore, subst(d.f) = d.f ,
and the judgment Γ ` d.f : T˜1 → T2 is derivable, since the other premises
have remained valid.
– id d = this then, by Case 8 of Lemma 7 we know E = C. We are to prove
Γ ` subst(this.f) : E, but subst(this.f) = c.f and the judgment becomes
Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2. By the second hypothesis we know we can derive
Γ ` c : C and applying FUN we can also derive Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2, which
is what we wanted to prove since subst(this.f) = c.f .
• MAPPING. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) was derived
from Γ′ `k k˜ : T˜ ′1 and Γ′ `k v˜ : T˜ ′2, where T˜ ′1 <: T1 and T˜ ′2 <: T2. Since
both k˜ and v˜ are tuples of values, subst(k˜) = k˜ and subst(v˜) = v˜. By inductive
hypothesis, Γ ` k˜ : T˜ ′1 and Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′2, and applying MAPPING we derive
Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), as required.
• BAL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 balance(e) : uint was derived from Γ′ `k
e : address〈E〉. By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : address〈E〉,
and applying BAL we obtain Γ ` balance(subst(e)) : uint, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(balance(e)) : uint (see Figure 4.3).
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 address(e) : address〈E〉 was derived from
Γ′ `k e : E. By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(e) : E, and applying
ADDR we obtain Γ ` address(subst(e)) : address〈E〉, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(address(e)) : address〈E〉 (see Figure 4.3).
• IF. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 if e1 then e2 else e3 : T was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : bool, Γ′ `k e2 : T1 and Γ′ `k e3 : T2, with T1, T2 <: T . By
inductive hypothesis, we can derive Γ ` subst(e1) : bool, Γ ` subst(e2) : T1
and Γ ` subst(e3) : T2. We are to prove Γ ` subst(if e1 then e2 else e2) : T ,
which is derived applying IF to the latter judgments together with the equivalence
if subst(e1) then subst(e2) else subst(e3) = subst(if e1 then e2 else e2).
• DECL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 T1 x = e1; e2 : T2 was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : T ′1 and Γ′, x : T1 `k e2 : T2, with T ′1 <: T1. By inductive hy-
pothesis we can derive Γ ` subst(e1) : T ′1. To apply the inductive hypothesis to
the latter judgment we need to rearrange the context. By Lemma 3 we know that
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint `k e2 : T2 can be
derived with the same height. Furthermore, we can apply Lemma 4 to the other
three hypotheses to obtain a derivation of the judgments
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint `k c : C,
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint `k a : address〈D′〉,
and Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint `k n : uint.
Now, by inductive hypothesis, also
Γ, x : T1, this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint ` subst(e2) : T2
can be derived. Lastly, by applying DECL we obtain a derivation of Γ ` T1 x =
subst(e1); subst(e2) : T2, which is the same as Γ ` subst(T1 x = e1; e2) : T2
since subst(T1 x = e1; e2) = subst(T1 x = e1); subst(e2) =
T1 x = subst(e1); subst(e2).
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• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2] : T2 was derived from Γ′ `k
e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ′ `k e2 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1. By inductive hy-
pothesis we derive Γ ` subst(e1) : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ ` subst(e2) : T ′1;
then, applying MAPPSEL, we obtain a derivation of Γ ` subst(e1)[subst(e2)] : T2,
which is what we wanted to prove since subst(e1[e2] = subst(e1)[subst(e2)]).
• ASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 x = e : T was derived from Γ′ `k x : T and
Γ′ `k e : T ′, where T ′ <: T . By inductive hypothesis we have Γ ` subst(x) : T
and Γ ` subst(e) : T ′; applying ASS we obtain Γ ` subst(x) = subst(e) : T ,
which is the same as Γ ` subst(x = e) : T since subst(x) = x and subst(x =
e) = (x = subst(e)).
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1[e2 → e3] : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ′ `k e1 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ′ `k e2 : T ′1, and Γ′ `k
e3 : T
′
2, where T
′
1 <: T1 and T
′
2 <: T2. By inductive hypothesis we derive Γ `
subst(e1) : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` subst(e2) : T ′1, and Γ ` subst(e3) : T ′2.
By MAPPASS we obtain Γ ` subst(e1)[subst(e2)→ subst(e3)] : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), which is what we wanted to prove since subst(e1[e2 → e3]) =
subst(e1)[subst(e2)→ subst(e3)].
• STATEASS. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.s = e2 : T was derived from Γ′ `k
e1.s : T and Γ′ `k e2 : T ′, where T ′ <: T . By inductive hypothesis we obtain
Γ ` subst(e1.s) : T and Γ ` subst(e2) : T ′; then, applying STATEASS we
derive Γ ` subst(e1).s = subst(e2) : T , which is what we wanted to prove
since subst(e1.s = e2) = subst(e1).s = subst(e2).
• NEW. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 new C.value(e1)(e˜) : C was derived from
Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ ′ and Γ′ `k e1 : uint, where sv(C) = T˜ s, |e˜| = |s˜|, and T˜ ′ <: T˜ .
By inductive hypothesis we obtain Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜ ′ and Γ ` subst(e1) : uint;
applying NEW we conclude Γ ` subst(new C.value(e1)(e˜)) : C, since
subst(new C.value(e1)(e˜)) = new C.value(subst(e1))(subst(e˜)).
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 E(e) : E was derived from Γ′ `k
e : address〈E′〉, where E′ <: E. By inductive hypothesis we have
Γ ` subst(e) : address〈E′〉, and applying CONTRRETR we obtain
Γ ` E(subst(e)) : E, which is the same as Γ ` subst(E(e)) : E.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.transfer(e2) : unit was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : address〈C〉, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k this : C ′, where C ′ <:
fsender(C, fb). By inductive hypothesis we get Γ ` subst(e1) : address〈C〉
and Γ ` subst(e2) : uint. Furthermore, applying TRANSFER we derive Γ `
subst(e1).transfer(subst(e2)) : unit, which is the same as
Γ ` subst(e1.transfer(e2)) : unit.
• CALL. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.f.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : C, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, where ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2,
|e˜| = |T˜1|, and T˜ ′1 <: T˜1. By inductive hypothesis we get Γ ` subst(e1) : C,
Γ ` subst(e2) : uint, and Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜ ′1: applying CALL we derive Γ `
subst(e1).f.value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)) : T2, which is what we wanted to prove
since subst(e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)) = subst(e1).f.value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)).
194
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case is very similar to the previous one, with the only
addition of the judgment Γ ` e3 : address〈C′〉 checking the well-typing of the
third parameter.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ′ `k+1 e1.value(e2)(e˜) : T2 was derived from
Γ′ `k e1 : T˜1 → T2, Γ′ `k e2 : uint, and Γ′ `k e˜ : T˜ ′1, where |e˜| = |T˜1|
and T˜ ′1 <: T˜1. By inductive hypothesis we get Γ ` subst(e1) : T˜1 → T2,
Γ ` subst(e2) : uint, and Γ ` subst(e˜) : T˜ ′1: applying CALLVALUE we derive
Γ ` subst(e1).value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)) : T2, which is what we wanted to
prove since subst(e1.value(e2)(e˜)) = subst(e1).value(subst(e2))(subst(e˜)).
F.4 Progress Theorem
We recall Theorem 3:
Theorem 3 (Progress).
If 〈β, σ, e〉 is closed (Definition 13) and well-typed (i.e. ∃Γ such that Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T
is derivable), then either e = v, e = revert, or ∃(β′, σ′, e′) such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→
〈β′, σ′, e′〉.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the height of the judgment
Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T .
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 6.3. By rule CONFIGU-
RATION, Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T implies Γ ` β and Γ ` σ. These cases modify neither β nor
σ, and hence we focus on the expression e (i.e. on the judgment Γ ` e : T ).
• REF. The judgment is Γ ` c : C, and c is already a value.
• VAR. The judgment is Γ ` x : T . By hypothesis, we know Γ ` x : T , which
implies, by rule VAR, x : T ∈ Γ, which means x ∈ dom(Γ). By Lemma 13,
x ∈ dom(Γ) ⇒ x ∈ dom(β), which makes β(x) well-defined. By rule VAR in
Section 5.5, ∃e′ = β(x) such that 〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉.
• TRUE. The judgment is Γ ` true : bool, and the expression true is already a
value.
• FALSE, NAT, ADDRESS, and UNIT. The judgments are Γ ` false : bool, Γ `
n : uint, Γ ` a : address〈C〉, or Γ ` u : unit, respectively, and the expressions
false, n, a, and u are already values.
• REVERT. The judgment is Γ ` revert : T , and the expression is a revert.
Inductive cases Given a judgment J such that its derivation has height k + 1, we
prove the inductive cases on the last rule used to derive J . We assume the theorem for
the judgments with height at most k and we prove it for those with height k+ 1. These
cases correspond to the rules in Section 6.3, with the modified CONTRRETR given in
Section 7.4.
• MAPPING. The judgment is Γ ` M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), and the expression
M is already a value.
195
Matteo Di Pirro How Solid is Solidity?
• FUN. The judgment is Γ ` c.f : T˜1 → T2, and the expression c.f is already a
value.
• BAL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 : uint was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : address〈C〉. By inductive hypothesis we know e is either a
value, revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish
the following cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 1 of Lemma 8, v is an address a. By rule BALANCE
in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉, where β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n)
is well-defined by Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, balance(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, balance(e′)〉.
• ADDR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, address(e)〉 : address〈C〉 was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : C. By inductive hypothesis we know e is either a value,
revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 5 of Lemma 6, v is a contract reference c. By rule
ADDRESS in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉, where βˆ(c) =
a. c belongs for sure to dom(β) by Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, address(e)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, address(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, address(e′)〉.
• IF. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 : T was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : bool, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T1, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : T2, where
T1 <: T and T2 <: T . By inductive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value,
a revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉. We distinguish the
following cases:
– if e1 = v then, by Case 1 of Lemma 6, v is either true or false. On the one
hand, if it is true, by rule IF-TRUE in Section 5.5
〈β, σ, if true then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e2〉. On the other hand, if it is false,
by rule IF-FALSE in Section 5.5
〈β, σ, if false then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e3〉.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, if revert then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, if e′1 then e2 else e3〉.
• DECL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, T1 x = e1; e2〉 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1, and Γ, x : T1 `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T2.
By inductive hypothesis, e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that
〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. We distinguish the following cases:
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– if e1 = v1 then, by rule DECL in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, T1 x = v1; e2〉 −→ 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v1; e2〉. Note that the premise
x /∈ dom(β) is always verified since variables can be renamed by α-
equivalence.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, T1 x = revert; e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert; e2〉. Note that this case does
not take into account e2 at all.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, T1 x = e1; e2〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, T1 x = e′1; e2〉.
• ASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, x = e〉 : T was derived from Γ `k
〈β, σ, x〉 : T and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : T ′, where T <: T ′. By inductive hypothesis,
e is either a value, revert, or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We
distinguish the following cases:
– if e = v then, by rule ASS in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→
v], σ, v〉. Note that x ∈ dom(β) is always satisfied for what we said in
Lemma 13.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x = revert〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, x =
e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, x = e′〉.
• MAPPSEL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1[e2]〉 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2) and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1.
By inductive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such
that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning applies to e2, thus e2 is
either a value, revert, or ∃β′2, σ′2, e′2 such that 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉. We
distinguish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 then, by Case 4 of Lemma 6, v1 is a total functionM
from T1 to T2. By rule MAPPSEL in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ,M [v2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M(v2)〉. Note that M(v1) is always well-defined
since M is a total function.
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, v1[revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert[e2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1[e2]〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1[e2]〉. Note we do not have to specify what
e2 is.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[e2]〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1[e′2]〉.
• MAPPASS. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1[e2 → e3]〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2)
was derived from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : T ′1,
and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : T ′2, where T ′1 <: T1 and T ′2 <: T2. By inductive hypoth-
esis we know e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→
〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning applies to e2 and e3. We distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
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– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and e3 = v3 then, by Case 4 of Lemma 6, v1
is a total function M from T1 to T2. By rule MAPPASS in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ,M [v2 → v3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉, where
M ′ = M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪ {(v1, v2)}.
– if either e2 = revert or e3 = revert, with e1 = M then, by rule REVERT in
Section 5.5, 〈β, σ,M [revert → v3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉 or
〈β, σ,M [v2 → revert]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, respectively.
– if e1 = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1[e2 → e3]〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[e2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1[e′2 → e3]〉.
– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and 〈β, σ, e3〉 −→ 〈β′3, σ′3, e′3〉 then, by rule CONG in
Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1[v2 → e3]〉 −→ 〈β′3, σ′3, v1[v2 → e′3]〉.
• NEW. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, new C.value(e1)(e˜)〉 : C was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜ ′, where t˜′ <: T˜ . By in-
ductive hypothesis we know e1 is either a value, revert, or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning applies to the tuple e˜: it is ei-
ther a tuple of values (v˜), a tuple of values and expressions separated by a revert
(i.e. v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j ), or it is in the form v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j and
∃β′i, σ′i, e′j such that
〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→ 〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉. We distin-
guish the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e˜ = v˜ then, by Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1 = n. Three sce-
narios are possible here. If Top(σ) 6= ∅, then either NEW-1 or NEW-R
(as defined in Section 5.5) applies. If it is NEW-1 (note the check about
the length of the tuples is true since it is also a premise of the rule NEW
in Section 7.4) then the balance of the contract corresponding to Top(σ)
is enough to create a new contract with an initial balance of n. Hence,
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′ · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where
(c, a) is a fresh pair identifying the new contract in β and
β′ = uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n). On the other hand, if NEW-R applies, then
the balance of the contract corresponding to Top(σ) is not enough. Hence,
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉. Lastly, if Top(σ) = ∅, then
NEW-2 (as defined in Section 5.5) applies. Hence,
〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where
(c, a) is, as before, a fresh pair identifying the new contract in β.
– if either e1 = revert or e1 = v1 and e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j then,
by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, new C.value(revert)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉 or
〈β, σ, newC.value(v1)(e˜ = v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e{m<j≤n}j )〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉,
respectively.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, new C.value(e1)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, new C.value(e′1)(e˜)〉.
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– if e1 = v1, e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j , and
〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→ 〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉 then, by
rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, new C.value(v1)(v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j )〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, new C.value(v1)(v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j )〉.
• CONTRRETR. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ,D(e)〉 : D was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e〉 : address〈C〉, where C <: D. By inductive hypothesis, e is either
a value, revert or ∃β′, σ′, e′ such that 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉. We distinguish
the following cases:
– if e = v then, by Case 1 of Lemma 8, v is an address a. With the new
rule just one scenario might happen: βC(a) = C <: D (well-defined by
Lemma 13) and rule CONTRRETR of Section 7.3 applies. a corresponds
to a reference c to a contract C. Hence, 〈β, σ,D(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉. On
the other hand, the case with βC(a) = C < / : D is not possible. In
fact, Γ ` 〈β, σ,D(v)〉 : T ⇒ Γ ` D(v) : T (by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 7.4). By Case 16 of Lemma 7, C <: D. This rules out rule
CONTRRETR-R in Section 5.5, which does not apply anymore.
– if e = revert then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ,D(revert)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ,D(e)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, D(e′)〉.
• TRANSFER. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.transfer(e2)〉 : unit was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : address〈C〉 and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint. By inductive hy-
pothesis, e1 is either a value, revert or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that
〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉. The same reasoning applies to e2. We distinguish
the following cases:
– if e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 then, by Case 7 and Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1 is
an address a and v2 is a non-negative integer n. Let β(a) = (C, s˜:v,m),
well-defined by Lemma 13. Two are the possible scenarios. First, if m ≥
n rule TRANSFER in Section 5.5 applies and 〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→
〈uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n), σ · a, e′〉, where e′ = e{this :=
c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}, βˆ(c) = a, and e is either
the body of the fallback function of C, if any, or return revert. Secondly, if
m < n then TRANSFER-R applies and we obtain 〈β, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→
〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if either e1 = revert or e1 = v1 and e2 = revert then, by rule REVERT
〈β, σ, revert.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉 or
〈β, σ, v1.transfer(revert)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, respectively.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1.transfer(e2)〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.transfer(e2)〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1.transfer(e′2)〉.
Note we did not make any reasoning about Top(σ). As said, we assumed
Top(σ) 6= ∅.
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• CALL. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 was derived from
Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : C, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜1′, where
ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, T˜1′ <: T˜1, and |e˜| = |T˜1|. By inductive hypothesis,
e1 is either a value, revert or ∃β′1, σ′1, e′1 such that 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉.
The same reasoning applies to e2 and to the tuple e˜. The former is either a value,
revert or ∃β′2, σ′2, e′2 such that 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉. The latter is either
a tuple of values (v˜), a tuple of values and expressions separated by a revert
(i.e. v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j ), or it is in the form v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j and
∃β′i, σ′i, e′j such that 〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉. We distinguish the following cases:
– e1 = v1, e2 = v2, and e˜ = v˜. By Case 5 and Case 2 of Lemma 6, v1 is a
contract reference c and v2 is a non-negative integer n. Let
β(c) = (C, s˜:v,m). Two are the possible scenarios. First, if m ≥ n, then
rule CALL in Section 5.5 applies. It retrieves f ’s body, e, and its formal
parameters x˜, defines β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→
vi
xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜] as explained in Chapter 5, and then evolves as follows:
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e′〉, where
e′ = e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}. Secondly, if
m < n, then rule CALL-R in Section 5.5 applies, and
〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉.
– if either e1 = revert, e1 = v1 and e2 = revert, or e1 = v1, e2 = v2
and e˜ = v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e
{m<j≤n}
j then, by rule REVERT in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, revert.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉,
〈β, σ, v1.f.value(revert)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉, or
〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2)(e˜ = v{0≤i<m}i , revert, e{m<j≤n}j )〉 −→ 〈β, σ, revert〉,
respectively.
– if 〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1〉 then, by rule CONG in Section 5.5,
〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′1, σ′1, e′1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉.
– if e1 = v1 and 〈β, σ, e2〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, e′2〉 then, by rule CONG in Sec-
tion 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′2, σ′2, v1.f.value(e′2)(e˜)〉.
– if e1 = v1, e2 = v2, e˜ = v
{0≤i<m}
i , e
{m≤j≤n}
j , and
〈β, σ, v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j 〉 −→ 〈β′i, σ′i, v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j 〉 then, by
rule CONG in Section 5.5, 〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2)(v{0≤i<m}i , e{m≤j≤n}j )〉 −→
〈β′i, σ′i, v1.f.value(v2)(v{0≤i<m}i , e′{m≤j≤n}j )〉.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2).sender(e3)(e˜)〉 : T2 was
derived from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1.f.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e3〉 : address〈C′〉,
with additional hypothesis stating that C ′ must be a subtype of the minimum
type required by f ’s signature. This case is very similar to the previous one,
with the only addition of the parameter e3 and considering CALLTOPLEVEL and
CALLTOPLEVEL-R instead of CALL and CALL-R. What we said and proved
previously applies here, too. We can apply the inductive hypothesis on e3. If
it is a value, then, by Case 1 of Lemma 8, it is an address a. If also e1, e2,
and e˜ are values, either CALLTOPLEVEL or CALLTOPLEVEL-R (as defined in
Section 5.5) applies, according to the balance of the caller. When it is a revert,
rule REVERT in Section 5.5 applies. Lastly, when e1 = v1 and e2 = v2 and
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∃β′, σ′, e′3 such that 〈β, σ, e3〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′3〉 we obtain
〈β, σ, v1.f.value(v2).sender(e3)(e˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, v1.f.value(v2).sender(e′3)(e˜)〉.
• CALLVALUE. In this case J = Γ `k+1 〈β, σ, e1.value(e2)(e˜)〉 : T2 was derived
from Γ `k 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T˜1 → T2, Γ `k 〈β, σ, e2〉 : uint, and Γ `k 〈β, σ, e˜〉 : T˜1′,
where T˜1
′
<: T˜1. Also this case is similar to CALL, and the same rules (CALL
and CALL-R of Section 5.5) are applied. The only difference is the expression
e1. By inductive hypothesis, it is either a value, revert or ∃β′, σ′, e′1 such that
〈β, σ, e1〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′1〉. If it is a value, by Case 6 of Lemma 6, it is a function
pointer c.f . From this point on, every case is equal to those discussed for CALL,
with the application of the same rules CALL and CALL-R.
F.5 Subject Reduction Theorem
We recall Theorem 4:
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction).
If Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T with 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 then ∃∆ such that Γ′ = Γ · ∆ and
Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T .
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the height of the derivation of one re-
duction step 〈β, σ, e〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e′〉.
Base cases These cases correspond to the axioms in Section 5.5, where the height of
the derivation corresponding to the computational step is 0. We shall show only the
cases where something changes with respect to the proof in Appendix E.5.
• IF-TRUE. In this case 〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 −→ 〈β, σ, e1〉. By hypoth-
esis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, if true then e1 else e2〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIG-
URATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` if true then e1 else e2 : T , and by Case 26 of
Lemma 7 we know Γ ` e1 : T ′, where T ′ <: T , which makes it derivable
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, e1〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis and ∆ = ∅.
• IF-FALSE. This case is dual to IF-TRUE.
• DECL. In this case 〈β, σ, T1 x = v; e1〉 −→ 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v; e1〉, where
x /∈ dom(β). By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, T1 x = v; e1〉 : T2. This implies, by
rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` T x = v; e1 : T2, and by Case 18
of Lemma 7 we know Γ ` e1 : T2 and Γ ` v : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1. Let
∆ = x : T1 and Γ′ = Γ · ∆, and consider Γ′ ` β · [x 7→ v]. Rule VARIABLE
requires Γ′ ` β, which is derivable by applying Lemma 10 to the hypothesis
Γ ` β, x /∈ dom(β), which is true by hypothesis of DECL, Γ′ ` x : T1, and
Γ′ ` v : T ′1. The former is true by rule VAR in Section 6.3, since ∆ = x : T1.
The latter is true by Lemma 12 applied to Γ ` v : T ′1. Hence, by rule VARIABLE,
Γ′ ` β · [x 7→ v] is true. Furthermore, by Lemma 11, given Γ ` σ we know
that also Γ′ ` σ can be derived. Hence, by rule CONFIGURATION, we obtain a
derivation of Γ′ ` 〈β · [x 7→ v], σ, v; e1〉 : T2, which is what we aimed to prove.
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• VAR. In this case 〈β, σ, x〉 −→ 〈β, σ, β(x)〉. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, x〉 : T .
This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` x : T , and by Case 9
of Lemma 7 x : T ∈ Γ. By rule VARIABLE, each value v pointed to by a
variable identifier x has a type T ′ <: T . This means that Γ ` β(x) : T ′. Hence,
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, β(x)〉 : T , since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting ∆ = ∅.
• BALANCE. In this case 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, n〉, where β(a) = (C, s˜:v, n).
By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, balance(a)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURA-
TION in Section 7.4, Γ ` balance(a) : T , and by Case 10 of Lemma 7 we know
T = uint and Γ ` a : address〈C′〉, where C ′ <: C. From rule CONTRACT in
Section 7.4 follows Γ ` n : uint, which makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, n〉 : uint,
since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, where ∆ = ∅.
• ADDRESS. In this case 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, a〉, where βˆ(c) = a. By
hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, address(c)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 7.4, Γ ` address(c) : T , and by Case 11 of Lemma 7 we know
T = address〈C〉 and Γ ` c : C. We defined βˆ(c) = a if (c, a) ∈ dom(β). Γ ` β
implies, by rule CONTRACT in Section 7.4, that every pair (c, a) ∈ dom(β) is
well-formed, and hence, by Lemma 13, Γ ` a : address〈C〉. From this follows
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, a〉 : address〈C〉, since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting
∆ = ∅.
• ASS. In this case 〈β, σ, x = v〉 −→ 〈β[x 7→ v], σ, v〉, where x ∈ dom(β). By
hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, x = v〉 : T ′. This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION
in Section 7.4, Γ ` x = v : T ′, and by Case 19 of Lemma 7, Γ ` x : T
and Γ ` v : T ′, where T ′ <: T . β remains well-typed. In fact VARIABLE
(Section 7.4) applies and makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β[x 7→ v], σ, v〉 : T , where
∆ = ∅.
• STATEASS In this case 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 −→ 〈β[c.s 7→ v′], σ, v′〉, where β(c) =
(C, s˜:v, n) and s ∈ s˜. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 : T ′. This implies,
by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` c.s = v′ : T ′, and by Case 20 of
Lemma 7 we know Γ ` c.s : T and Γ ` v′ : T ′, where T ′ <: T . Provided that
the type of c.s is T and that of v′ is T ′ <: T , β remains well-typed. CONTRACT
(Section 7.4) applies and makes it derivable Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, c.s = v′〉 : T ′, where
∆ = ∅.
• MAPPSEL. In this case 〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉. By hypothesis, Γ `
〈β, σ,M [v1]〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ `
M [v1] : T , and by Case 21 of Lemma 7, ∃T1, T2 such that Γ `M : mapping(T1 ⇒
T2), T = T2, and Γ ` v1 : T ′1, where T ′1 <: T1. Since a mapping is a to-
tal function T1 → T2, M [v1] is always well-defined and has type T2, that is
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ,M(v1)〉 : T2, where β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis, setting
∆ = ∅.
• MAPPASS. In this case 〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 −→ 〈β, σ,M ′〉, where M ′ =
M\{(v1,M(v1))} ∪ {(v1, v2)}. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ,M [v1 → v2]〉 : T .
This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` M [v1 → v2] : T ,
and by Case 22 of Lemma 7, ∃T1, T2, T ′1 <: T1, and T ′2 <: T2 such that Γ `
M : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), T = mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), Γ ` v1 : T ′1, and Γ `
v2 : T
′
2. Looking at M
′, we note it is obtained from M substituting the pair
(v1,M(v1)) with (v1, v2). The types of both v1 and v2 are correct with respect
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to mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), since T ′1 <: T1 and T ′2 <: T2, and so we can derive Γ′ `
〈β, σ,M ′〉 : mapping(T1 ⇒ T2), since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis,
setting ∆ = ∅.
• NEW-1. In this case 〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) ·
[(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉, where (c, a) /∈ dom(β), sv(C) = T˜ s, and |v˜| =
|s˜|. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, new C.value(n)(v˜)〉 : T . This implies, by rule
CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` new C.value(n)(v˜) : T , and by Case 15
of Lemma 7 we know T = C, Γ ` n : uint, and Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′, where T˜ ′ <:
T˜ . Let ∆ = c : C, a : address〈C〉 and Γ′ = Γ · ∆, and consider Γ′ ` β ·
[(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]. Rule CONTRACT requires Γ′ ` β, which is derivable by
applying Lemma 10 to the hypothesis Γ ` β, (c, a) /∈ dom(β), which is true
by hypothesis of NEW-1, Γ′ ` c : C, Γ′ ` a : address〈C〉, Γ′ ` v˜ : T˜ ′, and
Γ′ ` n : uint. Γ′ ` c : C and Γ′ ` a : address〈C〉 are derivable by rules
REF and ADDRESS, respectively. Γ′ ` v˜ : T˜ ′ and Γ′ ` n : uint are, on the
other hand, derivable by Lemma 12 applied to the hypotheses Γ ` n : uint and
Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′. Furthermore, uptbal only modifies β incrementing or decrementing
the balance n, thus preserving its well-formedness. We can here suppose that
such operation is successful, since the case where uptbal returns ⊥ is dealt with
by NEW-R (see below). Hence, by rule CONTRACT in Section 7.4 it follows
Γ′ ` uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)]. By Lemma 11, given
Γ ` σ also Γ′ ` σ is true. This makes it derivable, by rule CONFIGURATION,
Γ′ ` 〈uptbal(β,Top(σ),−n) · [(c, a) 7→ (C, s˜:v, n)], σ, c〉 : C, which is what
we wanted to prove.
• CALL. In this case 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,
msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉, where βˆ(c) = a, βC(c) = C,
fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e), (xi, a)xi∈x˜ /∈ dom(β), and
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→ vi xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜]. By hypothe-
sis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n)(v˜)〉 : T . This implies, by rule CONFIGURATION in
Section 7.4, Γ ` c.f.value(n)(v˜) : T , and by Case 23 of Lemma 7 ∃T˜1, T2 such
that T = T˜1 → T2, ftype(C, f) = T˜1 → T2, Γ ` c : C, Γ ` n : uint, and
Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′1, where T˜ ′1 <: T˜1. Since βˆ(c) = a is well-defined by hypothesis,
∃(c, a) ∈ dom(β) such that Γ ` a : address〈C〉: from it follows Γ ` σ · a.
Also note that Γ ` σ ⇒ Γ ` Top(σ) : address〈D′〉, where Top(σ) 6= ∅ (oth-
erwise CALLTOPLEVEL would apply). From rule F OK IN C (Section 7.4) we
know this : C,msg.sender : address〈D〉,msg.value : uint, x˜ : T˜1 ` e : T2.
By Case 23 of Lemma 7 we know D′ <: D. By Lemma 5, considering the
judgments Γ ` c : C, Γ ` Top(σ) : address〈D′〉, and Γ ` n : uint (which
we have already proven as true), follows Γ ` e{this := c,msg.sender :=
Top(σ),msg.value := n} : T2. The last thing we have to deal with is β′.
First, as we already pointed out, uptbal only modifies the balances via arith-
metical operations, thus preserving the well-formedness of β. Again, we can
suppose that such operation is successful, since the case where uptbal returns
⊥ is dealt with by CALL-R (see below). Secondly, we append to β a list of
fresh pairs of local variables, together with the address of the contract identi-
fying the invoked function. From Γ ` v˜ : T˜ ′1, where T˜ ′1 <: T˜1 by Case 23
of Lemma 7, follows that each value vi has a subtype of the formal parame-
ter xi it refers to, and we have already proven Γ ` Top(σ) : address〈D′〉.
Hence, by rule VARIABLE in Section 7.4, Γ ` β′, and we can finally derive
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Γ′ ` 〈β′, σ · a, e{this := c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉 : T2,
where ∆ = ∅.
• CALLTOPLEVEL. In this case 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 −→ 〈β′, σ ·
a, e{this := c,msg.sender := a′,msg.value := n}; e′〉, where βˆ(c) = a,
βC(c) = C, fbody(C, f, v˜) = (x˜, e), (xi, a)xi∈x˜ /∈ dom(β), and
β′ = uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) · [xi 7→ vi xi∈x˜,vi∈v˜]. This case is
very similar to CALL, the only difference relying on the sender, which is here
explicitly set to a′ (since Top(σ) = ∅). We shall prove only the correctness
of such sender, referring to the previous case for the rest of the proof. By hy-
pothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ, c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′〉 : T . This implies, by rule
CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` c.f.value(n).sender(a′)(v˜); e′ : T , and by
Case 25 of Lemma 7, Γ ` a′ : address〈D′〉. By the same Case, f in C required
a sender of type at least D (fsender(C, f) = D), and D′ <: D. Setting ∆ = ∅,
we obtain Γ′ ` a′ : address〈D′〉. The proof is now similar to the previous one.
• TRANSFER. This case is the same as CALL, the only difference relying on the
absence of formal parameters. Furthermore, the return type is unit. Hence, β′
is well-formed for what we said before, and so are σ · Top(σ) and e{this :=
c,msg.sender := Top(σ),msg.value := n}. Also note that Top(σ) 6= ∅, and
hence using it to enlarge σ and to form β′ is safe.
• CONTRRETR. In this case 〈β, σ,D(a)〉 −→ 〈β, σ, c〉, where βC(a) = D′,
D′ <: D, and βˆ(a) = c. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ,D(a)〉 : T . This implies, by
rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` D(a) : T , and by Case 16 of Lemma 7
we know T = D and Γ ` a : address〈D′〉. Since βˆ(a) = c is well-defined by
hypothesis, ∃(c, a) ∈ dom(β), and since Γ ` β we get Γ ` c : D. Hence,
Γ′ ` 〈β, σ, c〉 : D, considering that σ is well-typed by hypothesis and ∆ = ∅.
Inductive case This case takes into account only rule CONG, the sole computational
rule of our semantics. In this case 〈β, σ,E[e]〉 −→k+1 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉. The height of
the derivation making this step possible is k+ 1, and its last judgment is 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k
〈β′, σ′, e′〉. By hypothesis, Γ ` 〈β, σ,E[e]〉 : T . To apply the inductive hypothesis
we need to prove that, given a T ′, Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T ′. We do so using Lemma 14,
whose hypothesis is satisfied by the hypotheses of this theorem. Hence, ∃T ′ such that
Γ ` e : T ′ and ∀e′ such that Γ ` e′ : T ′ we have Γ ` E[e′] : T . The former is enough
to prove Γ ` 〈β, σ, e〉 : T ′, since β and σ are well-typed by hypothesis (i.e. Γ ` β and
Γ ` σ). Bearing in mind that the premise of CONG states 〈β, σ, e〉 −→k 〈β′, σ′, e′〉,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to conclude Γ ` 〈β′, σ′, e′〉 : T ′. This implies,
by rule CONFIGURATION in Section 7.4, Γ ` e′ : T ′. We now make use of the
latter conclusion of Lemma 14: Γ ` e′ : T ′ ⇒ Γ ` E[e′] : T ′. Consequently,
Γ ` 〈β′, σ′, E[e′]〉 : T , which is what we aimed to prove.
F.6 Type Safety Theorems
Proven the validity of Progress (Theorem 3) and Subject Reduction (Theorem 4), the
proof for the Theorems of Type Safety for configurations (Theorem 1) and programs
(Theorem 2) remains the same as in Appendix E.6 and Appendix E.7, respectively.
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F.7 Cast Safety Theorem
We recall Theorem 5:
Theorem 5 (Cast safety).
If P = (CT, β, e) is closed and well-typed then P is cast-safe.
Proof. Let P = (CT, β, e) be a well-typed FS program. Consider the evaluation start-
ing from the state 〈β, β, e〉, where β contains all the deployed contracts. (CT, β, e)
closed means that 〈β, β, e〉 is closed, too (Lemma 1), and its being well-typed im-
plies that ∃Γ such that Γ ` (CT, β, e) : T . Consequently, by rule PROGRAM, Γ `
〈β, β, e〉 : T , and by Lemma 13, dom(Γ) ⊇ dom(β). If the evaluation of e does
not contain the rule CONTRRETR or CONTRRETR-R, the theorem is trivially true,
since e does not contain any casts. Thus, let e contain at least a cast, such that
〈β, β, e〉 −→∗ 〈β′, σ,D(a)〉. We are to prove that the evaluation of D(a) does not
throw any reverts. By hypothesis, Γ ` e : T is derivable. This means that also D(a)
is well-typed, i.e. the judgment Γ ` D(a) : T ′ is derivable, too. By Case 16 of
Lemma 7, T ′ = D and ∃D′ <: D such that Γ ` a : address〈D′〉 is derivable. Then,
by Case 5 of Lemma 7, a : address〈D′〉 ∈ Γ and hence a corresponds to an instance of
D′ <: D. D(a) may evolve into two different terms, according to rules CONTRRETR
and CONTRRETR-R in Section 7.3:
• If CONTRRETR applies then c = βˆ′(a) must be an instance of a subcontract of
D′′ <: D, and we know that a refers exactly to an instance of D′ <: D. Hence,
setting D′′ = D′, we can apply CONTRRETR and obtain 〈β′, σ,D(a)〉 −→
〈β′, σ, c〉.
• For CONTRRETR-R to apply it is necessary that β′C(a) = D′′ 6<: D, but this an
absurd, since by hypothesis a points to an instance of D′ <: D. Hence, this case
does not apply and 〈β′, σ,D(a)〉 6−→ 〈β′, σ, revert〉.
Note that we know that 〈β′, σ,D(a)〉 cannot go stuck (i.e. neither CONTRRETR nor
CONTRRETR-R applies), since by Theorem 1 any closed and well-typed configuration
evolves toward either a value v or a revert.
F.8 Transfer Safety Theorem
We recall Theorem 6:
Theorem 6 (Transfer safety).
If P = (CT, β, e) is closed and well-typed then P is transfer-safe.
Proof. Let P = (CT, β, e) be a well-typed FS program. Consider the evaluation start-
ing from the state 〈β, β, e〉, where β contains all the deployed contracts. (CT, β, e)
closed means that 〈β, β, e〉 is closed, too (Lemma 1), and its being well-typed im-
plies that ∃Γ such that Γ ` (CT, β, e) : T . Consequently, by rule PROGRAM, Γ `
〈β, β, e〉 : T , and by Lemma 13, dom(Γ) ⊇ dom(β). If e does not contain any
transfer the theorem is trivially true. Thus, let e contain at least a transfer, such
that 〈β, β, e〉 −→∗ 〈β′, σ, a.transfer(n)〉. We are to prove that the evaluation of
a.transfer(n) does not throw any reverts. By hypothesis, Γ ` e : T is derivable.
This means that also a.transfer(n) is well-typed, i.e. Γ ` a.transfer(n) : T ′ is deriv-
able, too. By Case 14 of Lemma 7 T ′ = unit, Γ ` e1 : address〈C〉, Γ ` e2 : uint,
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and Γ ` this : C ′′. In addition, ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit means that fb is defined
in C. Lastly, its signature requires C ′′ to be a subcontract of C ′ = fsender(C, fb)
(C ′′ <: C ′). a.transfer(n) may evolve into two different expressions, according to the
result of fbody(C, fb, {}) in rule TRANSFER in Section 5.5:
• If fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, return e′) and uptbal(uptbal(β, a, n),Top(σ),−n) =
β′′ 6= ⊥, then 〈β′, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β′′, σ · a, e′{this := c,msg.sender :=
Top(σ),msg.value := n}〉. The fallback is defined and balances are sufficient to
accomplish the money transfer, thus the evaluation proceeds. Note that it is fine
if e′ contains a revert, since Definition 18 allows those raised by programmers.
• If, on the other hand, fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, return e′), but
uptbal(β′,Top(σ),−n) = ⊥, 〈β′, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 −→ 〈β′, σ, revert〉. Note
that this case is fine, too, since Definition 18 accepts reverts thrown as a conse-
quence of an insufficient balance.
• The case with fbody(C, fb, {}) = ({}, return revert) does not apply. In fact,
we know that ftype(C, fb) = {} → unit, which means that either C or any of
its supercontracts contains a fallback function. Hence, for fbody(C, fb, {}) to
return ({}, return revert), it is necessary that the lookup goes up the hierarchy
until Top, but this cannot happen if any of the contracts in the hierarchy contains
a valid fb. Hence, fbody(C, fb, {}) cannot return ({}, return revert).
Note that we know that 〈β′, σ, a.transfer(n)〉 cannot go stuck (i.e. TRANSFER does not
apply), since by Theorem 1 any closed and well-typed configuration evolves toward
either a value v or a revert.
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